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An Abstract of a Thesis 
EURATOM'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) began. 
operating in 1958 and, along with the European Economic 
Community (EEC), represented a functional approach to the 
problem of revitalizing the drive toward ~ntegration in 
Europe. From the outset most qualified observers expressed 
hi~h regard for the chance.of Euratom's success·, primarily 
b~cause of the economic promise 0f nuclear power. Since 
that ti~e, however, the hopes for success in peaceful 
nuclear integration have been repeatedly deflated to such 
an extent that, at present, the continued existence of 
Euratom in its contemporary form, and under its present 
terms of reference, has been gravely threatened. 
This study, therefore, first examines the events and 
political maneuverings in the early stages of European 
integration which eventually led to Euratom, and then 
continues with a discussion of the functional and institu-
tional structure of the Community and its operational 
achievements and setbacks in an effort to assess its role 
in the European movement. The conclusions reached are that 
' 
economic conditions provided the initial bar to Euratom's 
success but over the past several years political discord 
has been the predcminant factor. Finally, it is concluded 
that Euratom's continued existence will depend upon a 
\ 
restructuring of the European Community based upon a 
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The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was 
brought into existence in January of 1958, along with the 
more heralded European Economic Community (EEC), for the ex-
pressed purpose of revitalizing the then somewhat listless 
drive toward an integrated Europe of "the Six." The move-
ment for the progressive unification of France, Germany, 
. 
Italy and the Benelux nations had been dealt a severe blow 
by the defeat of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 
1954. However, the protagonists of European integration, 
particularly M. Jean Monnet of France and M. Paul Henri 
Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, were deeply convinced 
of the need for unity and, consequently, resolutely deter-
mined that the French Assembly's rejection of EDC would be 
considered as nothing more than just a temporary setback. 
Therefore, in keeping with this resolve, the foreign 
miriisters of the Six-were called to a conference at Messina, 
Sicily, in May of ~955 by the Common Assembly of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) for the purpose of 
finding ways to extend and enhance the powers of the Com-
munity. Recognizing that the EDC venture ruled out_, for th2 
time being at least, a similar purely political experiment, 
M. Spaak voiced the opinion that "a means must be found of 
reaching the same goal--that distant goal of an integrated 
Europe--by other methods and through other channels." 
vii 
Consequently, having failed on the political plane, 
the six foreign ministers turned again to the economic 
sphere, as they had with the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, and adopted the so-called functional approacri as a 
means of getting Europe back on the road to integration. 
This functional approach included the establi~h~ent of a 
joint organization for the development and utilization of 
atomic energy. 
r 
The Treaty establishing Euratom was signed in Rome on 
March 25, 1957, and went into effect as of 1 January. 1958. 
The Preamble to the Treaty emphasizes the realization "that 
nuclear energy constitutes the essential resource for • • · 
effecting progress in peaceful achievement'' and calls for a 
common effort without delay "to create the conditions re-
quired for the development of a powerful nuclear industry'' 
to provide energy, modernize technical processes, and 
contribute to the well-being of the European people. 
From the outset, the majority of qualified observers, 
both within and without the Community, expressed high regard 
for the chance of Euratom's success. In many ways it was 
felt Euratom would be confronted with difficulties of a much 
smaller magnitude than those of its sister Communities, the 
EEC and ECSC. Atomic energy was a new industry with few 
vested interests, private or national. The costs of 
developing the various atomic programs were excessive on a 
viii 
national scale (as France had already discovered) but might 
be handled adequately by the pooled resources of the six 
member nations in community effort; and the United States 
and Great Britain appeared willing to offer outside assist-
ance to help Europe "catch up." In addition, the Suez 
crisis of 1956 had pointed up Europe's dependency upon out-
side sources for its energy needs. All factors considered, 
Euratom's future looked promising indeed. 
Today, however, some ten years from its date of in-
ception, Euratom has failed to attain the position of 
importance in the Community some observers felt it must 
surely attain. Little is written or heard of Euratom out-
side the Community nations. Studies devoted to the European 
movement invariably stress the successes and implications of 
the Common Market with little or no reference to Euratom. 
Even within the Community itself the member nations have 
increasingly turned away from the institutions they created 
i? favor of national nuclear programs, thus jeopardizing 
the entire concept of nuclear integration in Europe. 
In this manner, then, Euratom's role in what was 
optimistically dubbed the Relance Europeenne, supposedly so 
clearly defined at the time of its creation; has become 
blurred over a period of ten years time. This study, 
therefore, after examining the events and political 
maneuverings in the early stages of European integration 
ix 
which eventually led to Euratom, will discuss the functional 
and insti~uti9nal structure of the Co~munity and its opera-
tional achievements and setbacks in an effort to judge its 
future position as a part of ~he European movement. 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION FOR EURATOM 
Following the close of World War II, two discernible 
trends developed in the movement to bring some semblance of 
unity to Western Europe. One of these ai~ed at bringing the 
European nations together through the employment of the 
traditional methods of international cooperation, with 
governments seeking out specific areas and conditions under 
which compatible interests might emerge, while all the time 
maintaining their formal sovereignty and ultimate freedom of 
action. The efforts of Great Britain best exemplified ad-
herence to this traditional concept of international 
organization. 
The other trend followed the so-called "European 
idea" wherein nations would band together in community 
effort, partially surrendering certain aspects of their 
national sovereignty to common or "supranational" institu-
tions which in turn would exercise the newly acquired powers 
in the interest of the community welfare. The ultimate aim 
of the "European idea" was, and remains today, nothing less 
than the political and economic integration of Europe. 
The Council of Europe, establishe~ in 1949, was an 
early manifestation of Europe's search for unity, and in-
cidentally, an attempt to combine the efforts of the European 
2 
federalists on the one hand, and the internationalists og 
the other. However, its statute, watered down by compromise, 
failed to provide the impetus for a drive to unification. 
Consequently, at this point the two trends toward unity 
diverged and the concept of a "supranational" community of 
six nations emerged, finding expression in the formation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. 
The formation of the ECSC was ·not an entirely new idea 
in the process of economic integration. Custom unions in 
various forms had existed in Europe in the past, and shortly 
after the Second World War the Benelux nations had taken 
what might be considered the first step in the coeval 
European unification movement by setting up the Benelux 
Customs Union. However, the Coal and Steel Community wa~ 
unique in that it brought the coal an:J steel industries of 
Germany and France together under a common executive 
authority, be::::ause this common executive (the High Authority) 
was granted certain powers of control which hitherto had 
been the jealously guarded symbolism of national sovereignty, 
and most significantly, because it was held not as an end in 
itself but the beginning of a pattern which would ultimately 
lead to the merging of national sovereignties in economic 
and political federation. 
The formation of the Coal and Steel Community was an 
indirect product ~f the frustration engendered by post-
3 
World War II national differences concerning the proper 
path to integration. By 1950, M. Jean Monnet, the organizer 
of the French Plan for Reconstruction and Development, and 
M. Robert Schuman, the then French Foreign Minister, im-
patient at the impasse at hand, conceived the idea of 
setting up an economic sector approach to provide a·founda-
tion for the building of a federal Europe. Minister Schuman, 
on May 9,·1950, proposed that the entire production of 
Franco-German coal and steel be placed under a common 
authority~ along with the production of other European. 
nations that wished to join, with the hope that this would 
create an economic interreliance that would make war between 
the traditional enemies "not only unthinkable but materially 
impossible'' and "would be the leaven from which might grow 
a wider and deeper community between countries. 111 
Schuman's proposa_l received a quick and encouraging· 
response from West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations. 
Germany recognized an opportunity for equality in the 
Western World; Italy and the Benelux states saw numerous 
economic and political advantages growing out of membership 
in·such a community. The Treaty establishing the ECSC was 
signed on April 18, 1951, completed ratification by the six 
1Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and 
Steel, No. 1 (Luxembourg: High Authority, ECSC, Information 
Service, October 1954), p. 3. Hereafter cited as Bulletin 
from the ECSC. 
parliaments· fourteen months later and went into effect ~n 
July 25, 1952. In early August of that year Europe h9-d its 
first nsupranational" institution.2 
4 
By their acceptance of the ECSC Treaty the six member 
nations had del~gated powers over their .coal and steel re-
sources and industries to the ·institutions established by 
the Treaty for a period of at least fifty y~ars and by 
implication, irrevocably. The TreatY. provided for four 
institutions; the High Authority, empowered to act as the 
governing body of the Community; the Assembly, a parlia-
mentary body elected by the parliaments of participating 
states and without legislative power but with a mandate to· 
debate and recommend policies for the betterment of the 
Community; the Council of Ministers, an advisory body to 
the High Authority which would concern itself primarily with 
giving adequate representation to the suggestions and 
interests of the member governments; and, finally, the 
Court of Justice, serving the role as legal iuardian of 
Community interests.3 
Prior to ratification, parliamentary discussion, 
particularly in France and West Germany, focused in the 
2 
Ibid. 
3Treaty Establishing the Eurooean·coal and Steel Com-· 
munitv and connected documen~(Luxembourg:~High Authority 
of the European Coal and Steel Community, English transla-
tion, 1951). Title Two, pp. 17-28, Articles 7-45, deals with 
the Community Institutions. 
5 
main on the.powers given by the Treaty to the High Authority 
'• 
and the Court. The use of the term "supranational" to define 
these two ins ti tut ions, and conse.quently "the Coal and Steel 
Community en toto, brought out the uniqueness of this initial 
program aimed at launching at least a part of Western Europe 
toward economic and political integration. The term "supra-
national" was itself a neologism and at times evoked different 
responses and explanations from interested observers. On the 
one hand, there was general agreement that the Community 
went far beyond the previous traditional attempts to or.-
ganize international society, whether on a regional or 
universal level. On the other, the ECSC could not properly 
be held as having constituted a truly federal structure. 
Consequently, the term "supranational" was employed to 
categorize .this innovation in organizational structure which 
featured char~cteristics of both the traditional international 
and federal organs blended in such a manner as to create a 
distinctive organization lying somewhere between the two 
traditional forms. M. Schuman made note of t~is distinction 
in the following terms: 
The supranational is situated at equal distances 
between, on the one hand, international individualism 
which considers national sovereignty untouchable 
and accepts only limitations of sovereignty in 
·the form of occasional, temporary treaty clauses; 
and, on the other hand, the federalism of states 
which are subordinated to a superstate with 
complete territorial sovereignty •.•• 4 
In- this manner, therefore, the brand of innovation 
was applied to the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
term "supranational'' became almost synonomous with its 
governing body, the High Authority. ·rt was the fervent wish 
of the European integrationists that the proper functioning 
of the ECSC would be nothing less than an adumbration of an 
ever-widening economic and political ~nt~gration of Europe.5 
EDC AND WEU 
Paralleling in ti~e the conception, formulation and 
implementation of the ECSC. Treaty were negotiations among 
Western European nations and the United States which sought 
to ~rovide for a common defense of Europe. The North Atlantic 
Tr·ea:ty Organization had been signed on April 4,-· 1949, and 
had initiated a modest attempt to insure the safety of 
4 Quoted in Henry L. Mason, The European Coal and 
Steel Community (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955), p. 121. In con-
trast, Jean Monnet, rightfully referred to as the "Father of 
'the European Movement," once called the ECSC a "supranational, 
in other words a federal institution." Undoubtedly, Monnet's 
desires concerning the future of Europe is reflected in this 
reference. Ibid., p. 123. 
5 . 
The Preamble to the Treaty makes note of the hopes for 
future progress in integration through the creation "of an 
economic community,· the foundation.of a broad and independent 
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts" and 
by the laying of "the bases of institutions capable of giving 
direction to their future common des tiny.'' Coal and Steel 
Treaty, Q.Q• cit., p. 7. 
7 
Western Europe from overt Communist penetr~tion. But far 
from leading to an immediate increase in tension between 
East and West, the creation of NATO was followed by a short 
period of relative calm, and the urgency which prompted the 
formation of NATO--it followed closely the Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia and the establishment of the Berlin blockade, 
b~th in 1948--was diminished in the tedious work of setting 
up its governing bodies and establishing a workable defense 
1 . 6 po icy. 
However, the relaxation in tension was short-liv~d, 
and the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 revived 
the nee~ to look to the defense of Europe to prevent a simi-
lar attack there. Prodded by the United States, the NATO 
Council called for a ''forward strategy'' which should resist 
any Communist advance as far to the east as possible. This 
concept necessarily implied two conditions which would be 
required for its successful implementation, these being a 
buildup of military strength based upon a rearmed Germany, 
and a defensive stand on German soil. The NATO Council 
called for the creation, at the earliest possible time, of 
6 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris: NATO 
Information Service, 1961), p. 17. Following the signing of 
the Treaty in April of 1949, the U.S.S.R. raised the Berlin 
blockade (May 12, 1949) and a "Big Four". foreign ministers 
conference took place in Paris (May 23. 1949) to discuss the 
Berlin problem and consider the questibn of a treaty with 
Austria. 
8 
''an in~egra ted· force under a centralised command' adequate 
to deter agression and to ensure the defence of Western 
Europe. 117 
At first the French refused to agree to the reestab-
lishment of a German army and to Germany's incorporation into 
NATO. And G~rmany, for its part, would not consider rearming 
until guaranteed th~ return of its sovereignty. However, 
.. 
the FtBnch Go~ernment again took the initiative, as it had in 
. . 
announcing the proposal foi a Coal an6 Steel Community, and 
produced the ill-fa.ted "Pleven Plan" p.s a means of breaking 
. 8. 
the defense stalemate. The French pla~ called for the 
creat1on of a "European army" with manpower contributions 
from each member nation, the force beiqg placed under the 
control of a Defense Commission and a Cciuncil of Ministers 
within the framework of a European Defense Community. The 
EDC would also have a Court of Justice and an Assembly, thus· 
7Ibid., p. 19. 
8Premier Rene Pleven announced his Gove.rnment's plan 
for a European army in the latter part of October, 1950. 
One month prior to this, the French delegation to the 
September NATO Council meeting had bowed to United States 
and United Kingdom pressure by conceding, in principle, to 
the rearmament of Germany. A final communique issued by 
the Council on September 26 noted that "the Council was in 
agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to 
the defense of Wes tern Europe. . ·. . " Lord Ismay, NATO--
The First Five Years (Paris: NATO, the International 
Secretariat, 1954), p. 186. 
9 
paralleling the structure of the ECSc. 9 After much prolonged 
. 
negotiations the EDC Treaty was signed in May of 1952. The 
. . 
proposed Defense Community had the staunch backing of the 
United States and Great Britain, and although the British 
would not formally join, they appeared. willing to reach an 
agreement with. the Community of Six whereby specified British 
.land and air forces would .remain· on the European mainland. 
This proposed commitment on the part ·or Her Majesty's Govern-
ment represented a distinct departure from traditi6nal British 
policy, and in September of 1954, at the·time.of the London 
Conference which paved the way for the setting up of the 
Western European Union, it would be hailed by the United 
States and Continental Europe alike as the one act of out-
standing diplomacy which set the stage for German rearmamGnt 
and entry intd NAio.lO But at the time of the ciriginal offer 
it was not enough to persuade the. French Parliament to accept 
EDC. With Governments falling and being replaced in rapid 
9The text of the European Defense Community Treaty may 
be found in L'Annee Politique (Paris: Editions du Grand · 
Siecle, 1952), pp. 522-557. 
l OB . t . . 1 d. h d f t t . d t . r1 a1n a rea y a orces s a ione on he main-
land in accordance with the military plans laid down by 
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEDR). The 
commitment undertaken at the time of the London Conference 
in 1954 was therefore a reassertion of promises already made. 
Political and Economic Planning, European Organisations 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1959), p. 212; and 
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Fr~, Troubled Ally (New York: 
Praeger, 1960), p. 102. . 
10 
succession~-M. Pleven, followed by Edgar Faure, then in order 
\ 
Antoine Piria!, Rene Mayer and Joseph Laniel all h·eaded gov-
ernments from 1950 to 1954--the EDC Treaty failed to reach · 
the f1oor of the French Assembly for debate until August of 
1954 when it was submitted for action by the- Government of 
Pierre Mendes-France and summarily rejected. 
W0ile EDC was in the process of being drafted, 
~negotiated, signed and finally debated to death, a draft 
. . 
constitu.tion for a supranational European Political Community 
was presented to _the six member governments of the ECSC by an 
. . -
·ad hoc Assembly consisting of the membership of the Coal and 
Steel Community's Common Assembly and additional members from 
the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly. At this 
point in 1953 the integrationists' hopes for a European 
Federation reached their zenith. However, the dream was 
quickly shattered by the_ vagaries of political reality, for 
the success of EPC was inextricably caught up with the 
·fortunes of EDC, and when the French·Assembly rejected the 
Defense Community, EPC was given up. 11 
11 
The European Political Community was intended to 
have institutions patterned after those of the ECSC, and its 
executive would be ceded the powers of ECSC and the proposed 
EDC, these two Communities becoming functional sub-divisions 
.of the parent Political Community. However, the executive 
body of EPC, unlike the other two, would·be directly respon-
sible to a popularly elected bicameral legislature. Political 
and Economic Planning, QQ· cit., p. 210; also Ernst B. Haas, 
The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1 9 58 ) ' p . 107 ~ 
11 
One month after the defeat of EDC, from September 28th 
. -
to Oct:ober 3rd, 1954·, · a nine-power conference was held in 
Lon.d_on to find ways to fill th:e d_efense vacuum in Western 
Europe brought ·about by French procrastination. British 
. . 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden offered his Government's 
solution to the problem of iaining French acceptance of a 
.. 
rearmed Germany by promising to ''continue· to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe, including GermanY., the effec·tive strength 
.of the United Kingdom· forces now assigned to SACEUR (Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe), four divisions and the tactical 
air force. • '' The United Kingdom also undertook not to 
withdra~ the forces assigned against the wishes of the majority 
12 
of the Brussels Treaty powers. As noted previously, Eden's 
declaration was hailed as an historic ~ct of diplomacy. The 
United States delegation, led by Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, felt it was a "major contribution" to the 
success of the conference. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belg-ian 
12 . . 
. New York Times, October 4, 1954. "The Text of the 
Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference." The Brussels 
Treaty Organization was established in· 1948 bi the 
Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, with the essential purpose of . 
setting up a system of automatic mutual assistance in the 
event of "an armed attack in Europe." As such it provided 
a basis for the formation of NATO in 1949 and WEU in 
1954. 
12 
Foreign Min"is ter, noted that "the most generous partic.ipant 
13 . 
was England and that it is a great victory for England." 
However, the British commitment, no matter how loudly 
proclaimed, was by no means irrevocable. Written into the 
Paris Agreements of late October 1954, which formalized the 
London discussions', were reservations permitting the British 
t0 withdraw from the continent in the case of "an acute over-
seas emergency," and to "invite the Nprth Atlantic Council 
to review the financial conditions'' concerning the maintenance 
of the mainland forces in the case of these forces putting 
"too heavy a strain on the finances of the United Kingdom. 
;,14 Thus Britain left a crack in the door providing 
an ~venue of withdrawal from Continental Europe if ever the 
need arose. 
13 . . 
New York Times, October 3, 1954. Harold Callender, 
Times correspondent, com~enting on the agreements reached 
noted that "if Britain had made her concession one .month 
earlier, the European Defense Community probably would have 
been approved by the French Parliament. At least Premier 
Mendes-France contends that it was killed for want of a 
closer British association with it. The French feared a 
supranational community from which Britain would be absent, 
and an integrated European Army with which British troops 
would be linked too vaguely." Ibid., October 1, 1954. This 
appears, in retrospect, as an overly optimistic opinion. In 
light of Britain's previous commitments to SACEUR it seems 
that only if Britain joined EDC as a full member would EDC 
have had a chance to pass the French National Assembly. 
Ili-Ibid., October 3, 1954. 
13 
The Paris Agreements paved the way to the revision ~rid 
exten$ion of the Brussels Treaty to include both Germany and 
Italy in the new treaty organization hamed Western European 
Union. The occupation regime was ended in Germany and, with 
the linking of WEU to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
the Federal Republic became NATO's fifteenth member. 1 5 The 
German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, for his contribution to 
the accords (and to win the consent ~f Premier Mendes-France), 
offered "a voluntary repudiation of German rights to the pro-
duction of atomic weapons" which amounted to a reiteration 
of the German concessions written into Article 107 of the 
European Defense Treaty some two years previous. 16 However, 
on this occasion, the French Assembly yielded to pressure 
from within (its own Government) and without (the United 
States and the European allies) and accepted the conditions 
set before it--with, of course, mixed emotions in many 
quarters. And although ·the formation of WEU allowed for the 
long-awaited strengthening of Europe's defenses, it could not 
be regarded by European integrationists as a satisfactory 
replacement for EDC. With the British in full membership 
the Western European Union offered an exceedingly poor 
foundation for further construction or a European political 
l5Ibid. 
16 New York Times, October 3, 1954. 
community. The demise of EDC, and with it the proposed ~PC, 
·• 
brought the drive for a united Europe to a standstill. Even 
the continued existence of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity was in doubt. Commenting on the situation Dr. Thomas 
Dehler, leader of Germany's Free Democratic Party, remarked· 
that "the rejection of the EDC is a sentence of death on the 
European Coal and Steel Community, which cannot live on as a 
torso. 1117 At this time the "European· idea" was giving every 
indication of becoming ·an illusion. 
p. 4. 
17 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 2, November 1954, 
CHAPTER II 
THE RELAUNCHING OF EUROPE 
However dormant lay the "European idea" after defeat· 
of EDC, it was evidently not yet quite ready to die. In 
what might be considered a somewhat prophetic pronouncement 
in retrospect, but could hardly be held as significant at the 
. 
time, the Metalworkers Union of the Federal German Republic 
passed a resolution at its Third Congress 'on September 23, 
1954, just three weeks after the interment of EDC, which de-
clared it to be "in favor of the integration of the peoples 
of Europe in the framework of a wider European economy," and 
advised in a not entirely apolitical tQne that "after the 
setback suffered by the European policy of the Federal 
Republic (EDC), which stressed military considerations and 
the idea of defense, the Union Congress insists that in a 
future European policy the accent should be placed on the 
organization of economic collaboration. 111 Undoubtedly not 
realizing it at. the moment, the Metalworker's.resolution 
was an adumbration of the course that European integration-
ists would take in relaunching the European idea •. _ 
If there were any doubts that the "Father of the 
European Movement,'' M. Monnet, had allowed the twin 
1
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 2, November 1954, p. 5. 
(Italics mine). 
16 
annihilation of the EPC and EDC to diminish his sense of_ 
. 
urgency in uniting Europe, the doubt was soon dispelled. 
Monnet had been elected as the first President of the High 
Authority of the ECSC, and his liberal use of the supra-
-
national powers vested in that body by the Treaty had 
brought cries of indignation from some quarters of the Coal 
and Steel Community. 2 Even the French Government of Premier 
Mendes-France had sought to dull their compatriot's fervor 
by proposing in August of 1954 amendments to the then falter-
ing EDC Treaty which would prohibit any member .of the ECSC 
High Authority from being appointed to the proposed Defense 
Community until five years after such a member had resigned 
h . . t. 3 is pos1 ion. Through it all, Monnet kept sight of the 
ultimate goal to be achieved, and six months after EDC, on 
the occasion of Great Britain's association with the Coal 
2 
For example, "M. Monnet was successful in g1v1ng the 
High Authority a commanding position in the working of the· 
Community, though relations between the High Authority and 
the Council of Ministers were not at first very good since 
the Council objected to M. Monnet's attempts to present it 
with fai ts-accomplis. '' Political and Economic Planning, 
QQ· cit., p. 238. In one case Monnet somewhat arbitrarily 
attempted to make prices more flexible by allowing steel 
companies to deviate from published selling price lists by 
2.5% up or down. The French and Italian Governments appealed 
the action and the Court reversed it. Haas, QQ· cit., p. 492, 
and Eric Stein, "The Court of Justice of the European Coal 
and Steel Community: 1954-1957, The American Journal of 
International Law, LI (October, 1957), p·. 822. -
3 . . 
New York Times, August 14, 1954; Furniss, QQ· cit., 
p. 98. 
and Steel Community, Europe's leading advocate of unity 
. 
reiterated his stand by declaring: 
For Europe, the problem is to outgrow the 
rivalries of the past, now a terrible source of 
weakness, by uniting its many nations under single 
government. • • . Integration in Europe and a 
successful association of that united Europe with 
Britain would be our most effective contribution 
to our own common.future4and to the peace and prosperity of the world. . · 
A hint of the functional course the hew drive would 
17 
take was quick in coming. On April 20, 1955, in an address 
in Washington before the National Press Club, the 2nd Vice-
President. of the High Authority, Albert Coppe, underlined 
the need for the nations of free Europe to pool their re-
sources for the industrial use of atomic energy. Stressing 
the fact that the development of atomic energy "will not be 
feasible in our small, sectionalized economies" the Belgian 
High Authority member warned that unless community action 
was taken, the European countries would find themselves in 
last place in the atomic field among the nations of the free 
world. Mr. Coppe then offered his comments on the recent 
failures in attempts to integrate when he said: "Despite 
the rejection of EDC, I do not believe that the idea of 
political integration is dead, or that economic integration 
can be anything but a steppingstone to the political goal!'5 
4 
Bulletin from the ECSC. No. 5, February-March 1955, 
5. I p. 
5Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 7, May 1955, P· 2. 
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Mr. Coppe's statement was significant for a three-
fold reason. In the first place, as ~ Belgian and a member 
of the High Au~hority, he was acutely aware of his own nation's 
6 dearth of primary energy-producing sources, other than coal. 
And the Belgian coal situation had been a particular problem 
for the High Authority from the moment that body commenced 
operations in 1952. From that time,,. owing to the increasing 
cost of extraction, coal production fn Belgium· had declined. 7 
In addition, in order to make their coal competitive on the 
common market, the Belgian coal producers were subsidized by. 
the Community's "equalization fund." However, subsidization 
was not permanent, and in fact was scheduled to decrease pro-
gressively until expiration in 1958. 8 Therefore, Mr. Coppe 
had ample reason to'equate Europe's energy needs with in-
dustrial atomic power. 
In the second place, .the Benelux Governments from the· 
beginning had supported European integration, and were stunned 
6Belgium and Luxembourg, taken together, produced in 
1955 no measurable amounts of lignite, oil, natural gas and 
peat, and less than one-tenth of one percent of Western 
Europe's (including the U.K.) hydroelectricity output.· 
J. Frederic Dewhurst, et al, Europe's Needs and Resources 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 570.· · 
7Ibid., Appendix 18-1, Table F. 
8 . 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 8, June 1955, p. 8. 
For the special provisions relating to Belgian coal see 
"Convention Containing the Transitional Provisions" attached 
to the Coal and Steel Treaty, Q.P.· cit., p. 125. 
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by the defeat of ED,C. 9 Recognizing a· ~ossi:tJle hostility on 
,. 
the part of France toward any further political "machina-
tions," the only avenue of progress left open was a return 
to the so-called functional approach similar to the process 
that brought ECSC into existence. Consequently, the stress 
. . . \ 
on eco~omic integration, particularly in the atomic field 
where vested iriterests had not yet developed, seemed both a 
propitiatory and opportune course of .action. 
Finally, by his acknowledgement of past failure on 
-
the political plane, the High Authority's Vice-President 
appeared to accept an extended timetable in the move toward 
unification--but nevertheless, t~e political goal remained. 
In May of 1955, the pressures to resume the European 
movement mounted considerably. At its third annual regular 
session, from May 10th to the i4th, the 78 member Common· 
Assembly of the ECSC, in a pre_cedent-setting mood, put on 
its.political mantle and appealed directly to the six member 
. . t t. 10 governments to resume the drive toward economic in egra ion. 
9The Belgian and Dutch lower houses and the 
Luxembourg unicameral legislature had overwhelmingly 
approved the EDC Treaty. For a tabulation of the voting 
see Haas, QQ.· cit., pp. 156-57. 
10Precedent-setting in that the Treaty does not con-
tain provisions dealing with Assembly recommendations to 
member governments. Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 8, June 
1955, p. l; and Coal and Steel Treaty, op. cit., p. 21-23, 
"The Assembly." 
Specifically, the-parliamentarians a~ked _that the foreign 
. .· . .-
. 
ministers of the· Community, in their meeting at Messina, 
.Sicily, in June: 
1. invite proposals from the ·community on an 
expansion of its competence and of its powers 
needed to carry out its· ~ask efficiently; 
2. propose one or more inter-governmental con-
ferences to draw up, with the help of the Com-
munity's institutions, draft treaties required 
for the realization of further stages in European 
integration of which the European Community for . 
Coal and Steel is the first step.11 
20 
Shortly after the Assembly's action, the Benelux 
Governments responded by drafting a set of specific proposals 
calling for further economic integration. And at the same 
time Jean Monnet, who had announced in November of 1954 his 
intention to resign the Presidency of ~he High Authority in 
order "to take part with complete freedom of action and 
speech in the construction of European unity ," offered 
to reconsider his action because of the promise of the Bene-
12 lux proposals. However, the Fr~nch coalition Cabinet of 
Premier Edgar Faure refused Monnet and proffered the names 
of two other candidates for the approval of the ECSC Council 
11 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 8, June 1955, .P• 1. 
12 . Bulletin from.the ECSC, No. 8, June 1955, p. 2. 
21 
. . . . ·. 13 
of Ministers. Consequently, in that M. Monnet had ex-
.• 
piicttly linked ·his continu~d presence on the High Authority 
to concrete proposals for advanc~ in European integration, 
the aura of .hostility to such proposals once again emanated 
from Paris. However, the French Government immediately 
sought to modify this impression by announcing its willingness 
to discuss the Benelux proposals at the impending Messina 
Conference with an eye toward establi'Shing "conditions under 
which the development of European ~conomic institutions can 
.· . 14 
continue.'' The result of this diverse approach to the· 
iss.ues at hand was such that until the Euratorri and Common 
Market Treaties were ratified by the French Assembly in the 
summer of 1957, the other members of the Community viewed 
French pronouncements with a wary eye. Robert Schuman did 
very little to dispel this impression of unpredictability 
when, in answer to a query about French intentions concerning 
integration, he replied: 
It is not up to me to predict.what the inten-
tions of the French Government are. Coalition 
1-?rbid. Also, Article 10, p. 18 of the Coal and 
Steel.Treaty, 212.· cit., sets forth provisions for the elec-
tion of High Authority members. In this situation. France 
held a veto power. The two candidates proposed were ex-
Premier Rene Mayer and former Minister of Commerce and 
Industry, Jean Marie Louvel; Mayer was chosen. 
14 . 
Bulletifi from the ECSC, No. 8, June 1955, p. 2. 
governments are subjected to the kind of 
s~rvitude from which other countries with 
stable and disciplined majorities ~re free.15 
At the time, M. Schuman was French Minister of Justice. 
THE MESSINA CONFERENCE 
22 
On May 20th, 1955, the Benelux Governments had sent 
formal proposals to Germany, Italy and France calling for 
agreement upon new moves toward unity "which may be best 
taken in the economic field." The proposals included the 
setting up of a common organization to study the European 
tr~nsport problem, a comprehensive study of methods for 
coordinating power policy, the progressive harmonization of 
social legislation in the member states, and progressive 
integrat~on of the national economies through a common marke} 
wider in scope than that of coal and steel. In the atomic 
field, the Benelux nations asked for "the setting up of a 
common authority for the development of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes with the pooling of investment funds, 
technical knowledge, and research facilities.''. In order to 
implement the program, the six nations would call a con-
ference which would work toward the creation of three 
treaties, the first dealing with the pooling of transport, 
15 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 8, June 1955, p. 2. 
Schuman made the remark at Strasbourg on May 9. 1955 at a 
meeting commemorating the fifth anniversary of.the "Schuman 
Plan." 
23 
··power, and atomic energy, the second with gBneral economic 
" integration, and the third with the setting up of instifu-
tions to carry .out the. program. 16 
At the foreign ministers' meeting at Messina, the 
objectives of the Benelux proposals ~ere accepted, in part, 
but the means of implementation were discarded entirely ~nd 
new procedur·es put forward. 
The resolution adopted by the·six ·ministers stressed 
the fact that their intention was to inaugurate "a fresh ad-
vance towards.the building of Europe," that the advance "must 
be achieved, first of all, in the economic field," and, finally, 
that such a step -was indispensable if Europe was "to maintain 
her position in the world, regain her influence and prestige 
and achieve a continuing increase in the standard of living 
of her people. 1117 
The resolution also laid particular emphasis on the 
~ development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, proclaiming 
optimistically that in the near future the industrial use of · 
16 
Ibid., No. 9, July 1955, pp. 2-3. 
. the Benelux proposals is given. A "common 
necessary powers would also be established 
market. 
A summation of 
Authority'' with the 
for the common 
17Text of the resolution is given in Parliament of 
Great Britain, Correspondence arising out of the Meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers of the Governments.of Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands held at Messina on June 1-2, 1955. Cmd. 9525, 
Western Europe, Miscellaneous No. 13, 1955; (London: H.M. 
Stationery Office, 1955), p. 1. 
the atom would "open up the prospect of a new industrial 
revolution out of all proportion to that which has taken 
place over the last hundred years·." Therefore, the six s ig-
na tories considered it necessary "to study the creation of a 
common organization to be entrusted with the responsibility 
and the means for ensuring the peaceful development of atomic 
· energy. 
" 
The "means" included the following four factors: 
a) The establishment of a common fund derived from 
contributions from each of the participating countries, from 
which provision could be made for financing the installations 
and research work already in process and planned. 
b) Free and sufficient access to the raw materials, 
and the free exchange of expertise and technicians, by-
products and specialized equipment. 
c) The pooling o~ the results obtained and the grant 
of financial assistance for their exploitation, and 
d) Cooperation with nonmember countries. 18 
However, instead of calling for an immediate treaty-
drafting conference as proposed by the Benelux nations, the 
six foreign ministers directed that an intergovernmental 
. committee of official representatives assisted by experts, 
under the ·chairmanship of a "political personality responsible 
18Parliament of Great Britain, Cmd. 9525, 2..!2.· cit., 
pp. 2-3. 
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for co-ordinating the work in the different fields" be estab-
lished to draw up proposals for further economic integration •. 
The committee's report "covering _the whole field" was to be 
submitted to the foreign ministers by not later than the 1st 
of October, 1955. In addition, the committee was directed to 
invite representatives of the High Authority, the OEEC, the 
Council of E_urope and the European Conference of Ministers · 
of Transport,· to give assistance. And, once again expressing 
. . 
the desire to bring Britain into the movement as a partner, 
the Six extended an invitation to the. United Kingdom to 
attend committee meetings. 19 
The relatively clear call made by .the Benelux Memo-
randum for a "common authority" to oversee atomic energy 
development as well as the common market was somewhat muffled 
by the Messina Resolution. Regarding the common market, the 
Reso.lution merely recognized the fact "that the establishment 
19Parliament of Great Britain, Cmd. 9525, QR• cit., 
p. 3. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Harold MacMillan, accepted the invitation with the following 
expressions of obvious misgiving: 
"Her Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to en-
sure that due acGount should be taken of the functions of ex-
isting organisations such as OEEC and that work should not be 
necessarily duplicated. 
"There are, as you are no doubt aware, special diffi-
culties for this co).mtry in any proposal for 'a European com-
mon market.' They will be happy to examine, without prior 
commitment and on their merits, the many problems which are 
likely to emerge from the studies .... " Ibid., p. 4. 
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of a European market, free from all customs duties and all 
quantitative restrictions, is the objective in the field of 
.• 
economic _policy. . . • " Other than s~a ting that "the 
appropriate institutional means'' ·for its realization and 
operation would be studied, the ministers offered no commit-
ment to estabiish a "common authority" to supervise the 
d . . 20 propose economic union. 
With respect to the atomic field, that ~art of the 
. . - . . 
Resolution which called for a "common organization" to.hold 
responsibility for ·the peaceful development of atomic energy 
was perhaps more close~y aligned with the·intent of the 
Benelux Memorandum, but it too failed to sat:isf.y the inte-
grationists. M. Monnet,_in particular, expressed his mis-
givings concerning the Messina Resolution. In a dramatic 
appeal for a resumption of the drive. toward building a United 
States of Europe the resolute Monnet stated the-following: 
The Benelux proposals on which (the foreign 
ministers) based their agreement stre~sed in 
every field the need to delegate authority to a 
common executive with powers to act in the 
interests of all the member countries as a 
whole. The communique issued nowhere commits 
the Gov~rnment on this central issue. 
If the Governments decide . . . to maintain 
the old national prerogatives and national 
approaches which in the past have led to their 
present weakness, then we shall hear talk of 
cooperation. If, on the othe~ hand,· the Govern-
ments decide to change conditions in Europe, 
.
20Ib id. , p. 3. 
then we shall learn that they have agreed to 
delegate to common institutions the powers they 
are unable to exercise separately to the full 
advant~ge of their people •.•• 21 
However, it appears reasonably certain that at the 
time of the drafting of the Messina Resolu~ion the six 
27 
foreign ministers, although unsure as to the course negotia-
tions would take in the attempt to establish a common market, 
were of a common mind with regard to an atomic community 
having the best chance of matching the successful accomplish-
ments of the Coal and Steel Community, and that this new 
community could very well be patterned after its predecessor, 
the ECSC. 22 
Lending credence to this stand was the fact that short-
ly after the Messina Conference both tae French and German 
representatives to the United Nations convention on the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy expressed strong belief in 
the possibilities of setting up a European atomic energy 
pool. 23 it the same time, in an article presented as 
, background information on the Intergovernmental Committee's 
21 New York Times, June 16, 1955. 
22 
. However, the question concerning the degree of supra-
national power to be vested in the executive body of the 
proposed community was by no means a point of common agree-
ment. Cf. post p. 30. 
23United Nations, Proceedings of the International 
Conference on the P.eaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, 
August 1950New-York: 1956), VO!. I, P·. 27. 
progress printed in the ECSC's Information Bulletin, it was 
noted that the Committee on Nuclear Energy "was the only 
Committee to deal with a field that would eventually require 
a separate executive similar to th~ High Authority of the 
Coal ahd Steel Community. 1124 
Over the period of almost a year following Messina, 
the Intergovernmental Committee would indeed turn out pro-
posals for both an atomic energy community and an economic 
community with the latter eventually being considered as the 
primary achievement. However, during the year-long period of 
~ormul~tion and negotiation, the atomic energy proposals . 
drew the greatest attention and stirred up the most sig-
nificant intergovernmental controversy. 
The eminent "political personality" chosen to shepherd 
the Intergovernmental Committee members through their tedious 
assignments was Paul Henri-Spaak, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister, himself a staunch advocate of the "European idea." 
The elaborate organization of expert? and government dele-
gates began work at Brussels on July 9, 19)5, and although 
the Messina ministers had called for a completion date 
24 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 10, September-October 
19)), p. 2 (italics mine). The article also stated that 
"present thinking on the nature of the proposed European 
atomic energy pool shared by delegates from severai nations 
is that its strncture would follow that of the Coal and 
Steel Community and would, in fact, share some of the same 
federal ins ti tut ions. . . . " 
29 
(rather unrealistically) by October 1, the completed repo~t 
-. 
was destined not to be submitted for governmental inspection 
. . 25 
until April of 1956. . In the interim period, M. Spaak kept 
enthusiasm for lhe projects at a high pitch by delivering 
progress reports to not only his associated foreign ministers 
but also to the Co'mmon Assembly of the ECSC. His actions, 
aimed at eliminating national differences through ready com-
·promise and by bringing parliamentary· pressure to bear on 
member governments, coupled with the pressure-lobbying 
tactics of M. Monnet's newly organized Action Committee for 
a United States of Europe,. eventually culminated in the 
26 
acceptanc'e of the· ''Spaak ·Report. 11 However, the length of 
time taken to formulate the treaty-making proposals, over 
that which was thought necessary, attests to the difficulties 
that had to be surmounted. 
THE SPAAK REPORT 
Working under the two-fold premise that atomic power 
would be the essential resource over the long range for 
25 . 
Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 15, May 1956, p. 1. 
However, various details of the report had been appearing in 
the United States and European press over a period of several 
months prior to its submission for approval. 
26 
M. Monnet announced plans for hi.s Action Committee 
on October 14, 1955. It was formed as "an independent or-
ganization designed to break through existing political and 
national barriers Jn the path of federation." Ibid., No. 11, 
December 1955, p. 1. Cf. post p. 37. 
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industrial progress, and that the European nations acting 
alone had neither the scientific know-how nor the fiscal 
capacity to take part -in this "new technical revolution" 
the Brussels Intergovernmental Committee, under ~he chair-
manship of M. Spaak, sought to work.out, as part of its 
task, a common organization which would ensure Europe's 
participation in atomic industrial advance. 27 Duri~g the 
period of their labors, from July 9, 0 1955,until the finished 
report was handed to the member governments in early April 
1956, the Committee members were forced to grapple with 
difficulties of a political as well as technical nature • 
. The most significant of these included the following: 
a) Reaching a common accord as to the degree of supra-
nationali ty an atomic community should have, as expressed by 
the_powers to be vested in its executive body. As noted 
previously, the.Messina Resolution appeared to side-step 
this question, and, as evidenced by various itatements 
emanating from those officials in contact with the Committee's 
day~to-day efforts, the national differences on this subject 
were not easily resolved. As if to accentuate this fact, 
27 . . 
The Brussels Intergovernmental Committee assigned 
tasks to four committees (nuclear energy, common market, 
conventional power and transport) and four sub-committees 
(air transport, irrv~stment, social ~roblems, and postal 
affairs). Pierre Guillaumat of France chaired the Committee 
o~ Nuclear Energy. 
31 
the Netherlands•J. W. Beyen, the acting chairman of the 
. 
foreign ministers' meeting which was convened on September 
6, 195~ to hear M. Spaak's first interim progress report, 
stressed the fact that the Committee, in its first two months 
of deliberation, had avoided entirely the supranational 
question. 28 One month later, following Monnet's announce-
ment forming an Action Committee to press for supranational 
atomic and economic communities, the -German Federation of 
Industries reacted by publishing the following statement: 
Supranational interference must be rejected 
in the field 6f atomic energy. Room must be 
left for private enterprise. The creation of a 
· High Authority would handicap the development 
of German Industry.29 
M~ Spaak did his best to counter criticism of this 
nature. Speaking to the Council of Europe's Consultative 
Assembly on October 21st, the Brussels Committee chairman 
charged the member governments with a lack of daring. "The 
atom and automation are the future," he said. "Europe is 
terribly behind in these fields. There is no longer any 
28 
New York Time~, September 7, 1955. 
29 Quoted in the Bulletin from ECSC, No. 11, December, 
1955. The ECSC High Authority's power to raise funds by 
imposing levies on the production of coal and steel, a sig-
nificant power in that it gave the High Authority the ability 
!o influence investment policies, undoubtedly had a great 
influence on this stand taken by German tndustry. Sig~ 
nificantly, this power was not given to the Euratom or Common 
Market Commission. Coal and Steel Treaty, QQ· cit., p. 32; 
and Political and Economic Planning, QQ· £_it_., p. 239. 
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reason to be proud of being born a European, because within-
25 years the countries of our continent, unless they get 
. 30 into.the ring again, will be underdeveloped areas.'' The 
question of supranationality would remain unsolved until short-
ly before the Euratom Treaty was signed in March of 1957. 
b) Whether or not the member nations of the proposed 
community should be allowed to engage in nuclear weapons 
development. In this respect Germany.was excluded from 
consideration by virtue of treaty obligations incurred at 
the London Conference of 1954. And Italy and Benelux neither 
had the physical capacity nor apparently the desire to build 
a nuclear force .. Therefore, France remained as the sole 
irritant in this area of conciern and. eventually saw it resolved 
to her liking.31 
c) To what degree the community institutions should 
control the supply of nuclear materials. The major controversy 
here took place between France and Germany, with the former 
calling for complete community control over nuclear material 
(with a later modification to exclude that used for defense 
purposes) and the latter, particularly influential industrial 
interests, calling for a free enterprise system with the 
30Bulletin from the ESSC, No. 11, December 1955, p. 3. 
31 Cf. post p. &5. 
33 
comrnuni ty being represented by its own purchas.ing agency in-
compe{i tion with national representatives.32 
.· 
These three areas of disagreement appeared at times 
to be :formidable enough to halt the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee's work. But M. Spaak, holding to a pragmatic concep-
tion of the task at hand, by-passed those difficulties that 
could not be. immediately overcome and compromised others, 
while all the time pressing his comm~ttee for a final report. 
. . 
The results of his efforts produced a much more narrowly 
conceived set of pr<;>posals for a European Atomic Energy 
.Community than was originally envisaged but nonetheless a 
framework upon w~ich a treaty-drafting conference could be 
- convened while governments i'roned out the remaining major 
points of conflict. 
Spaak, as it turned out, was correct in his assessment 
of the situation. In order to keep the "new drive" moving it 
was necessary to show concrete evidence of advance, however 
limited. And although he and Monnet did not realize the full 
achievement of their original aims, they did, indeed, wit-
ness the continuation of the move toward unity in the 
acceptance of the Euratom and Common Market Treaties. In 
essence, Europe was again moving in the right direction. 
32N y , 56 ew orK Times, October 19, 19 . Cf. post p. 65. 
The Intergovernmental Committee's report consisted of 
.. 
150 pages divided into two parts, the first concerning a 
"Common Mark~t" and the second, a European Atomic -Energy 
Com~unity offi?i~lly named Euratom. Part II of the report 
outlined Eura tom's purpose as "to contribute to the forma·-
tion and the rapid growth of a nuclear industry as well as 
tb the application of nuclear development in industry and 
the economy as a whole: 
11 1. By developing research and ensuring the broadest 
dissemination of knowledge and techniques; 
''2. By establishing and seeing to the enf6rcement of· 
uniform safety-norms for the protection of the labor force 
and of the general population; 
"3. By facilitating its investments and creating the 
fundamental installations which cannot be undertaken by 
isolated industries or by individual countries; 
11 4. By providing it with security and equal treatment 
in its conditions for supply of nuclear ores and fuels; and 
"5. By assuring it wide outlets and the best tech-
nical means by the merger of markets as regards materials, 
supplies and specialized equipment, and by the unrestricted 
migration of specialists. 11 33 
33The Brussels Report on Euratom, . .cm unofficial trans-
lation of Part II of the Brussels Intergovernmental Com-
mittee's Report (Luxembo11rg: ECSC, The High Authority, 
May 19 56) , p. 2. 
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\ Specific tasks to be undertaken by the proposed Com-
munity would include the setting up of a joint nuclear re-
search center and schools for training specialists; the 
building of common installations basic to atomic energy, 
such as a uranium isotope separation plant, the establishment 
of a common market for nuclear materials, and finally, ex-
clusi~e control over the price and supply of nucl~ar 
. 
materials including priority rights to purchase available 
ores produced within the Community and its overseas terri-
tories .34 
In order to carry out these functions the Report 
called for the organ.iza t ion ~o "rest on the Council of 
Ministers, the Court and the Assembly" which were provided 
for the proposed Common Market, and which would "exercise 
their functions and their control according to the same 
rules. 1135 In addition, as the executive body, a European 
Atomic Energy Commission would be created by the member 
governments, to be responsible to the Assembly, and to.act 
in the Community interest. The Council of Ministers, 
representing the member governments, would determine general 
34 Ibid., p. 3-9. 
35 . 
The Brussels Report on Eura.tom, .QQ• cit_.~ .P 2-3. 
The institutions are discussed in detail.in The Brussels 
Report on tl":.2 General Common Market, an unof!'TC'ial trans-
lation Of the ma:i_n portion of the Brussels Intergovernmental 
Committee's Report (Luxembourg: ECSC~ The High Authority~ 
June 1956). 
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pplicy and, under certa~n conditions, review actions taken 
·. 
by the Commission. ··And the Court, acting for both Communi-
ties' would settle arguments arising out of the applica.tions 
of the treaty •. · 
With regard to the vitally impor~ant question of 
nuclear armament, the Report, in its final paragraph, stated 
the following: 
They (the Heads of Delegation)"have considered 
that the problem raised by the possibility of the 
use· by certain states of atomic energy for military 
purposes presents a political character such that 
it goes beyond the limits of their competence . 
. They have not believed they should answer it in the 
present report.36 
Thus, of the three particularly significant areas of 
controversy mentioned above, the Int~rgovernmental Com~ittee 
came to grips with only the one dealing with the control of 
nuclear materials. The "supranational" question as well as 
the nuclear weapons controversy· were postponed pending 
settlement at the top levels of government. And compromise 
would be the keynote there. 
Shortly before the Spaak Report was released for pub-
lication, the ECSC Common Assembly, having heard M. Spaak 
on March 14, 1956,report on the need for an atomic community, 
split along political lines and proposed different courses 
of action to be taken by a treaty-drafting conference. The 
3 6 I b .id . , p . l 0 . 
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Socialist group, recalling that "one of the essential objec-
tives of the whole Socialist Movement is and remains general 
and controlled disarmament" called for the outlawing ·of 
nuclear weapons manufacture within the member states of the 
proposed Community, and asked for exclusive Community cont_rol 
over nuclear materials. The Christian Democrats and Liberals, 
while agreeing on the peaceful role of Euratom; .were much 
less eager to see private enterprise • excluded from having 
a say in the purchase and supply functions.37 These argu-
ments were in turn transmitted to national parliaments and 
the battle lines were dr~wn for almost another year of 
painstaking negotiations. 
MONNET'S ACTION COMMITTEE 
The official developments taking place in the "new 
drive" for unity were paralleled by the activities of Jean 
Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe. 
Formed in October of 1955, the organization was widely 
hailed by all but the extreme left and right in political 
circles. One commentator succinctly summed up Monnet's 
intentions with the statement: 
37 New York Times. March.17, 195~and Bulletin from 
the ECSC~ No.~ May 1956, p. 5. 
M. Monnet had to build the Coal and Steel 
Community by working through governments. 
Governments, however, often are hampered by 
political considerations which may temper 
their zeal. 
Learning by experience, M. Monnet has reversed 
the operation this time. Now he intends to work 
with the elements in democracy which produce the 
power of which the governments are the expression. 
By gaining the support of these elements, he hopes, 
the governments can be made more responsive.38 
38 
Monnet's Committee was composed of key representatives 
from all six Community countries, the three leading political 
parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals), 
and all the non-Communist trade union federations. Notably 
absent from representation were industrial interests, and 
the German Federation of Industries was quick to denounce 
the aims of the Committee.39 
In all, membership totaled 33 leading political and 
trade union leaders. Significant among these was Eric 
Ollenhauer, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, 
who had bitterly opposed the unification -moves incorporated 
in EDC. -
38
volney Hurd in the Christian Science Monitor. 
October 15, 1955. A New York Times editorial of October 16, 
1955 called Monnet's action "a customarily timely and 
brilliant one," to which the French Communist publication 
Liberation replied: "Who could doubt after reading this 
editorial that the so-called original 'ideas' of M. Monnet, 
Schuman and other Europeans come straight from Washington?" 
Quoted in Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 11, December 1955, p. 4. 
39 . Cf. ante p. 31 • 
39 
At its first meeting in January of 1956,. the Action 
Committee adopted a "Joint Declaration," to be submitted to 
member parliaments, which called for the organization of an 
Atomic Energy Community operating under supranational con-
trol. In addition, it also recommended that such a community 
be devoted to peaceful purposes. and that member nations 
aband~n their right to manufacture nuclear weapons. 40 - This 
latter proposal drew an immediate adv-erse reaction from Paris, 
where right-wing National Assembly elements and some members 
of the new Mollet Government were adamant about maintaining 
41 Fra.nce 's right to continue its nuclear weapons program. 
Monnet's Committee met again in July and September of 
1956, continuing its drive to keep pressure on the member 
governments to adopt a Euratom Treaty. At its September meet-
ing the Committee noted the success of its "Joint Declaration" 
in successful passage through the Parliaments of Benelux and 
Germany, and proposed that a three-man study group be or-
ganized to prepare a blueprint for Euratom progress. The 
result of this study, published in May of 1957, was A Target 
40Action Committee for a United 
Joint Declaration, 1st Session (Paris: 
p. 3-4. Committee membership is given 
see New York Times, January 19, 1956. 
41 
States of Europe, 
January 18, 1956), 
on page 10. Also, 
New Yo!'k Times, January 27; 1956, and February 22, 
1956. At the end of January Premier Guy Mollet had set up 
the 23rd postwar Cabinet. 
4o 
for Euratom drawn up by Louis Armand of France, Franz Etzel 
' 42 
of Germany and Francesco Giordani of Italy. 
Undoubtedly, the work of Monnet and his Action Com-
mittee, along with the efforts of M. Paul Henri Spaak, were 
. I 
predominant amorig factors which led the way to the successful 
creation of .a European Atomic Energy Community. 
NATIONAL VIEWS: FRANCE 
Monnet's Action Committee, at its third session in 
September.1956, proposed that Euratom be put into operation 
at the beginning of 1957. One primary reason for the Com-
mittee's sense of urgency was attributed to the Suez Canal 
crisis, at that time in its preliminary stages. Pointing to 
the "mortal danger" facing Europe because of its inability to 
produce sufficient en.ergy for its industrial needs, and to 
the 70 million ton (coal_ equivalent) energy deficit Europe 
was theri experiencing, the Action Cornmittee'.s President 
asked ·the Community nations to pool all their resources and 
create "without delay, a large capacity for the production of 
nuclear energy. 1143 Undoubtedly, Suez underlined Europe's 
42 
Action Committee for a United States of Europe, 
report of the 3rd Session (Paris: September 19-20, 1956), 
·p. 1, 3-6. 
43
Action 0ommittee for a United States of Europe, 
report of the 3rd Session (Paris: September 19-20, 1956), p. 3; 
and Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 18, Septcrnc::or, October 1956, 
p. 3. 
·dependence on imported primary energy sourc.es, and conse:; 
quently, made an atomic program that much more attractive. 
Also, it was reasoned that Italy and the Benelux nations were 
eager to sign a treaty. However, the Governments of Germany 
and France, and particularly the latter, were still in the 
process of lining up popular and parliamentary support for 
the proposed Community. Indeed, France would remain a ques-
tion mark until the day of treaty ratification. Therefore, 
the Action Committee's resolution, even though rendered at a 
particularly opp6rtune time, appeared as an expression of 
Monnet's enthusiasm rather than of the political realities 
of the situation facing the French Government. 
The French election of January 1956 had produced a 
National Assembly which appeared on balance to be no more 
nor less in favor of European integration than its predecessor. 
However, the .coalition government formed following the elec-. 
tion placed the Socialist Guy Mollet at its head, and Mollet 
. 44 
long had been an ardent champion of the European movement. 
The new Premier's investiture was Breeted more favorably by 
the leaders of the "new drive" and Mollet immediately added 
to this confidence when in his opening addres~ to the French 
Assembly he pledged his government's "full support to_ the 
44 Mollet, while Secretary-General ~f the French 
Socialist Party, had joined the Monnet Action Committee. 
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work undertaken by the Brussels Intergovernmental Com-
. 
mittee to put into operation the resolutions of the Messina 
Conference." He continued by calling for the co"nclusion of 
a treaty before summer (1956) setting up "a European atomic 
commission,'' asked for a system of control which ''strictly 
guarantees the peaceful character. of European nuclear activi-
ties" and emphasized this point with the following: 
Must we create a European nuciear industry 
allowing the manufacture of ·atomic bombs--manu-
facture unrealizable4o5n the national level? My rep'ly is clear: no. 
Mollet's words, no matter how bravel~ uttered, fell 
on deaf ears for the most part. In the first place, the new 
Premier's Republican Front coalition could count on something 
t 2 t . 5'96'. 46 t. less han 00 vo es in an Assembly of ConsBquen ly, 
his voice was hardly that of France. 
In the second place, the French had spent almost 343 
million dollars on atomic· research and development since the 
end of World War II, and those that looked fo'rward to the day 
. when France would join the exclusive nuclear weapons club 
reasoned, and rightly so, that in a matter of ·a few more 
years they could explode their first atomic bomb. 47 Thus, 
45 
New York Times~ February 1, 1956. 
46 
Ibid. 
47 Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d' In-
formation, Euratom: Six Nations to Pool Research and De-
velopment (New York: European Affairs-Ro. ll, June 195'7), 
p. 3. 
certain military leaders, members of the Pr.emier 's cabin~t, 
·, 
and elements of the National Assembly held out for the 
48 French right to·continue an atomic weapons program. 
Actually, Mollet's remarks could easily have been in-
terpreted as having a dual meaning. Being a Socialist, he 
was expected to call for an atomic energy com:nunity devo~ed 
to "peaceful" activities. Being a Frenchman and having wit-
nessed the French Assembly's reaction to German rearmament 
in EDC, he was also expected to make the statement that 
"Whoever possesses nuclear fuel is in a position to manufacture 
the atomic bomb. The (French) Government will ask that the 
European atomic commission should have the exclusive owner-
ship of all nuclear fuels and that it should keep it through-
out its transformation. 1149 In other words, Germany's treaty 
obligations of 1954 notwithstanding, the Feaeral Republic 
should not be tempted with ready and unchallengeable access 
to potential weapons-making material. However, this state-
ment did not jibe well at all with the previous remark (part 
of the same address) that atomic bomb manufacture "was 
48
nissenters included Marshal Alphonse-Pierre Juin 
and the nonagenarian~ General Maxime Weygand, and Cabinet 
Members Pierre Mendes-France (Vice-Premier), Jacques Chaban-
Delmas (Minister of State), and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury 
(Minister of Def~nse). N~w York Times, March 28, 195~. 
49 . . 
Premier Mollet' s investiture adr~:::-ess can be found, 
in part, in the New York Times, February 1, 1956. 
unrealizable on the nationai level." Thus, those that 
were io inclined ~ere able to recognize in the Premier's 
speech the intent to suppress any possible German entry into 
the ~uclear weapons field,· while France, the continental 
leader in atomic technology, could get on with its.weapons 
p-rogram which was, as a matter of fact, fully "realizable" on 
the national (French) level. And those that were not of this 
inclination. readily saw in Mallet's .address the -intention 
:that_ the proposed community, including its six member_nations, 
would devote all efforts in atomic technology towards peace-
ful application. 
Uncoubted~y, the Premier intended that nuclear weaponry 
should be barred from the continent, but within two weeks 
(February 12), on the occasion of an ECSC Council of Ministers 
meeting, the New York Times' Paris correspondent, Harold 
Callender, reported that ''the ~inisters seemed to share the 
doubts' of Paul Henri Spaak •.. regarding a commitment by 
t_he pool members never to make nuclear weapons." Callender 
went on to note ho~ Christian Ptneau, th~ French Foreign 
Minister, had "suggested the right to make such arms should 
be reserved even though the aim was to _pool nuclear resources 
for peaceful purposes."50 
50 . New York. Times, February 13, 19 56. 
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Atomic Energy Community_ and a Common Market. However., the 
.. 
questions of "supernationality" and the military use of the 
atom were again shunted asid~, to be taken up "at a later 
date. 1153 · 
Spurred on by the positive action taken by the Com-
munity nations at Venice, the di~sident factions within ~he 
French Cabinet were able to reach a measure of agreement on 
the nuclear weapons controversy base~ on the Pin~~u compromise, 
and early in July Premier Mollet brought the French version 
54 
of the Euratom plan before the National Assembly for debate • 
. Pulling out all the stops in his effort to get the Assembly 
to approve French· ~articipation in the impending treaty 
. . 
negotiations, the Premier brought in expert testimony (e.g., 
Louis Armand, President of the Industrial Equipment Committee 
of the French Atomic Energy Commission) to argu~ his case and 
present the view that France could not develop an adequate 
atomic program alone. The Premier even went so far as to 
indicate that his government would resign if the French role 
was rejected.55 Seeking to mollify all antagonistic opinion 
within the Assembly (except, of course, those radical elements 
53New York Times, May 30, 1956; and Bulletin from the 
ECSC, No.-r:b, June 1956, p. 1. 
54 
of the debate Accounts are given in the New York 
Times, July 6, 7, and 11, 1956. 
55 
.New York Times, July 7, 1956. 
that were obdurately opposed), the Mollet Government t·ouche-d 
on ali the controversial issues that might seemingly produc~ 
a·~ejection. Maurice Fa~re, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Af.fairs, told the parliamentarians that Eura tom's supra-
national powers would be strictly functional, that is, 
only those that were necessary to.ins~re its· success.56 
Foreign Minister Pineau allayed fears that the task of 
running Euratom would be given to th~ institutions of the 
"supranational" ECSC, and promised that the atomic energy 
community's institutions wuld be kept separate.57 And De-
fense Minister Bourges-Maunoury, Faure, and Mollet himself 
all attested to the fact that at the end of Euratom's four-
year transitional period France would regain complete free.dom 
of action with regard to nuclear weapons, and ~hat during 
.this· period it would retain the right to conduct preliminary 
' 58 
research in weapons development. Mollet's "revised" 
position was stated as follows: 
France commits itself not to explode an A-bomb 
before January 1, 1961. Taking account of the de-
lays necessary for study and manufacture, this 
moratorium can entail no slowdown. At it~ expira-
tion France will recover its full freedom, unre-
stained by any Euratom provision or any agree-
ment~ • . . I can therefore state that at the 
56 
Ibid. 
57Ibid., July 11, 1956. 
58
rbid. 
end of the moratorium France will have the 
legal and material capacity to start ~ilitary 
production immediately.59 
Thus, rightist criticism concerning the suprana7 
tionality of Euratom and, more important, Ftance'~ !ight 
. . 
to pursue a nuclear weapons.capability, was propitiated. 
However, in order to lessen the reaction this latter posi-
tion would create· within the ranks of the "p~ace-loving" 
Socialists, M. Bourges-Maunoury told khe Assembly th~t the 
Government's position· would allow "a reasonable and re- · 
strained". program for nuclear armaments, and M. Pineau 
stated that under existing political, economic and tech-
nical conditions it was "not in the French interest to 
produce a bomb. 1160 
48 
-Co~sequently, it was not surp~i~ing that the French 
Assembly, by a vote of 342 to 183, approved the Euratom pro-
posals in principle by authorizing its Government to negotiate 
61 
a treaty. All of the majot elements in the Assembly had 
receiVed, to a varying degree, some ~easure of assurance 
that their desires would be met. However, the remaining 
five nations of the Community, recalling M. Schuman's re-
mark concerning French intention~, 62 undoubtedly could have 
59 Quoted in Furniss, QQ.• cit., p. 265. 
60 ·. New York Times, July 11, 195'6. 
61Igiq., July 12. 
62cr. ante p. 21. 
been no more certain of what course the French negotiators 
would.take after the Assembly vote of confidence than before. 
And, indeed, negotiations rema~ned difficult. 
Ho~ever,. a~ a result of the bargaining that foliowed 
the French Assembly's action, at the Brussels treaty-drafting 
conference and between heads of government, a concrete French 
. . 
position, stripped of its inconsistencies, did evolve·and 
can be delineated as follows: 
1. The French would insist that the Gommunity nations, 
with the exception of Germany, be allowed to follow their 
national interests and desirei with regard to the manufac~ure 
of nuclear weapons. In this respect, of course, France would 
be the only nation affected at the time. 
2. To enhance further their unique position as com-
munity leader in atomic techriology and development, the French 
Government would ask that Euratom be given strict control of 
the supply, purchasing and pricing of nuclear ores within the 
community, with the exceptbn that those countries (only 
. ~ . . 
France in this case) which had nuclear materials in use 
for "defense".purposes and had established their own sources 
of supply, could maintain them on a national basis·, free 
from the scrutiny of Euratom.63 
63Nav Yor_ls, Times, January 13, 1957. 
50 
3. France would hold out for a Eura.tom "Commission" 
\ 
which would be, to a greater extent than the High Authority 
of the ECSC, dependent upon the Council of Ministers. Thus, 
the supranatiohality of the organization would be tempered. 
4. The French would also ask that only Euratom be 
allowed to import nuclear ma teri.als fr~m "third" countries. 64 
By the time the Eura-tom Treaty was ready for signature 
in March 1957, France had won, with some minor modifications, 
t f . t . d 65 mos o 1 s m~Jor emands. However, this was not sur-
prising in view of the fact that France held a predominant 
position as the continental leader in atomic technology and 
could therefore be expected to have the greatest voice in 
treaty negtiti~tions. Moreover, and perhaps much more sig-
nifi~aµtly, the French Assembly's continuing affinity for 
inconsistency, going back to th~ debacle of EDC, worked to 
the benefit of the French Government in that the remainder 
of the community nations, eager to see Euratom and the Common 
Market accepted, tended to pay undue deference to the seemingly 
whimsical vacillations of French parliamentary procedure. 
Only Adenauer's Germany was able to wrest some form of 
concession from the French. 
64Ibid. 
65 Cf. post p. 64. 
NATIONAL VIEWS: GERMANY 
However inconsistent it appeared at various times, 
French support for Euratom, within the Government, the 
Assembly, and throughout French industry, was stronger 
~l 
than that accorded the proposals for a Common Market. Some 
of the factors contributing. to this included France's pre-
dominance in atomic technology, the tact that no vested 
interests in the field had yet evolved which called for · 
protection, and p~rhaps most important, because France, 
like all of Europe, felt the effects of the Suez crisis, 
and not having yet developed its Sahara oil fields, was 
inordinately dependent upon imported energy sources. Hope-
fully assured of a major voice in the Community's atomic 
energy program, the French Assembly, for the most part, 
could envision the great benefit attached to Euratom member-
ship. 
The vision of the Common Market, however, was not 
quite so clear. There was doubt in industrial· circles con-
cerning France's ability to compete with a revitalized 
Germany. The French social welfare structure was infinitely 
more elaborate than its neighbors, and equalization measures 
would have to be introduced. There were vested interests, 
particularly in agriculture, which defien a free-trading 
solution and the French commitment to the overseas 
' 
territories would have to be reorientated. Thus, the 
Commod Market and not Euratom presented France with its 
greatest problems. 
52 
In contrast, the German view was reversed. While not 
openly enthusiastic about the prospects of a Common Market, 
. . 
German industrial interests· and some high government 
officials appeared to accept the idea of ·an economic com-
munity, if for no other reason than qecause of the inherent 
political ramifications. However, the idea of a European 
Atomic Energy Community evoked open hostility· from the same 
groups. In the words· of one observer "the industrialists were 
believed not to fear the common market since their productive 
power is such they might dominate. But they are • • ·dead 
against the nuclear pool, which would subject future West 
German nuclear operations to an international if not supra-
national authority. 1166 
The German indus~rialists, in the main, rejected the 
idea of a supranational Euratom because they felt that 
Germany, acting with American help, would develop its own 
atomic industry without Community assistance. However, if 
Germany joined the Community, the industrialists reasoned 
that a "suspicious'' supranational authority would seek to 
impose limitations on a German atomic program, thus 




hampering, and not helping, its proper development. In 
partidular, the industrial leaders_feared a community control 
over the purchasing, selling, importing and leasing of nu-
clear materials. When it appeared in the fall of 1956 that 
the German Government was moving to complete acceptance of 
the Euratom proposals, the industrialists proffered their 
own plan whereby a European Purchasing Agency representing 
the Community would buy nuclear mate~ials, not with a 
priority, but with equal rights with national purchasing 
. t• 67 Th . . organiza ions. us, in essence, a free market. in nuclear 
materials would prevail in Europe, with Germany controlling 
its own nuclear supplies whenever it felt this was necessary 
in the national (and commerc'ial) interest. 
German indus.try was ·not alone in its open hosti'li ty 
to the Euratom proposals. Such prominent members of the 
Adenauer cabinet as Ludwig Erhard, the Minister for Economic 
Affairs, and Franz Joseph Strauss, the Defense Minister, gave 
their backing to industry's stand and were v6ciferous enough 
to bring the Euratom treaty-drafting conference to a stand-
still in October of 1956. 68 However, Chancellor Adenauer 
remained as the dominant factor in German political life, 
and he insisted on bringing the "new drive" to its ·successful 
67New York Times, October 19, 1956. 
68
rbid. October 22, 1956. 
-- ' 
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conclusion. In his words firm support for ~uropea~ unifica-
tion continued as ''the gu~_ding principle of the foreign 
policy of the German Federal Gov_ernment. 11 69 
Working with the support of the two major parties in 
parliament, the Chancellor was able to overcome the repeated 
attempts by German industry to sidetrack the Eura~om pla0.70 
In March of 1956, the German Bundestag voted unanimously to 
allow its Government to pursue negoti.ations leading toward 
71 
the establishment of a European Atomic Energy Community. 
Again, at the Venice Conference of May 29, 1956, the German 
State Secretary, Walter Hallstein, expressed the Chancellor's 
wishes and ignored industry's pressure by accepting a German 
ro~e in the Treaty-making process.72 And finally, when treaty 
negotiations broke down in October over the question of 
69Ibid., June 12, 1956. 
?OAdenauer's party, the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) had from the early 1950's followed the Chancellor 
in supporting European integration. However, the Socialists 
(SPD) at first had opposed the trend· toward unification 
but by 1955 they reversed this stan~ a0d g~ve their.sup-
port to the 11 new drive." An early ::-ndication of this . 
change in attitude appeared when Er::-ch Olle0hauer, Chai~­
man of the SPD, joined Monnet's Action Committee. 
71 •t 156 Haas, QQ• Q_., p. . 
72New York Times, May 30, 1956. 
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Euratom's control over nuclear materials, .it was the 
Chancellor himself who ended the stalemate by entering into 
dir~ct consult~tlon wiih the Fre~ch Premier Guy Mollet.73 
Two weeks prior to the Adenauer-Mollet meeting in· 
Paris, the reports emanating from that city concerning the 
deadlock in the Euratom negotiations had left little doubt 
·tha~ the treaty confer~nce had degenerated into a Franco-
German debate with the other four nations seeking only to 
find a common ground hetween the two protagonists. Sig-
nificantly en6ugh, while the Paris Minister's meeting was 
taking place; representatives of France and Germany were also 
meeting in Luxembourg for the purpose of settling the long-
standing controversy over the Saar Territory and the Moselle 
Canal. When, on October 27th, the Luxembourg meeting cul-
minated in the signing of a series of agreements bringing 
the Saar issue to a close, tbe air was cleared sufficiently 
enough for the two major powers of the Community to revitalize 
their efforts to reach agreement on Euratom and the Common 
Market.7~ Prior to this, another spur to action in creating 
73New York Times, November 7, 1956. 
4 . 
7 Under terms of the Luxembourg agreements, the Saar 
:would be returned to Germany politically on January 1, 1957, 
and economically three years later~ Fra~ce, for her p~r~, 
was assured of adequate supplies OL Saar coal. In add1t1on, 
the Moselle and Alsace Canals, which would provide Lorraine. 
ore with cheaper outlets to the north ~nd west, could be paid 
for in part with German funds. Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 
19, November 1956, P· 4. 
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an at~mic c.ommuni ty had been provided by a published report 
of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
.which pointed out Europe's C1ose ·dependence on petroleum 
supplies from the Middle East und~~normal conditions (the 
Suez crisis was reaching its peak at this time), the 
dimin~shing position of. the American Hemisphere with regard 
to .oil exports and a projection of ·Europe's energy needs 
over the following two decades.75 
'Thus, these significant factors underlining the prudence 
in setting up an Atomic Energy Community as quickly as possible 
loomed large .as Adenauer and Mollet s~t dowh at the conference 
table in early November of 1956. Having passed the Saar over 
to German cbntrol, Premier Moll~t looked for a German concession 
regarding Euratom's cbntrol over nuclear materials. And in 
thi~ respect Adenauer proved amenable. The heads of state re-
solved that Euratom would have prior purchasing rights over 
all the nuclear resources ·of the Community's member nations--
. . 
over their supplies of unprocessed uranium and fissile 
material like Uranium 235--with the exception of course that 
France, being the only country already having a nuclear pro-
gram in prog~ess, w~uld be allowed to utilize its own re-
sources first if they pertained to its nuclear weapons 
75New York Times, Octobe:r 1, 1956. The report pro-
jected Europe's-Consumption of oil as doubling before 
1975. 
L 
program. In addition, to prevent Germany from purchasing 
" 
material from_"third country" sources (i.e., the United 
States and possibly Br~tain), Mollet sought to give the 
Euratom Commission a monopoly of control over the supply of 
materials within the Community. Thus, "third countries" 
would only sell to Euratom, and direct buying between a 
Community nation and an outsider would be eliminated. 
Adenauer accepted this proposal also.with the one exception 
that if prices as set by the Commission exceeded world prices 
or if Euratom'.s supplies were short, direct buying from out-
side nations might be permitted with Commission.approva1.76 
. The London Economist, commenting on the "remarkable progress" 
made on Euratom at the Adenauer-Mollet meeting, noted that 
the Chancellor had come to Paris "ready to make valuable 
concessions," and that in order to dq so, he ha.d. "evidently 
bro~ght his ministers to heel. 11 77 Thus, German opposition 
to Euratom had been dissolved by the end of 1956, and .the 
way app~ared clear for the successful signing of a treaty. 
76New York Times, November 17, 1956. In addition, 
with regar~to the Common Market, Adenauer conceded another 
point which would allow.f?r the ~r.~longation of the initial 
4 year period for equali~ing socia~ c~anges among member 
nations if France so desired. Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 
20. December 1956. 
; . 
77Economist,· November 10, 1956, P~ 498~ 
THE ROME TREATIES 
With France and Germany in agreement, the treaty-
drafting· committee, originally convened in June of 1956 
58 
under Chairman Spaak, was able to complete its task, and both 
·the Common Market and Euratom Treaties were ready for govern-
mental signature in early March of 1957. As n?ted previously, 
the Benelux countries and Italy were .eager to see this event 
come to pass, and as such they offered no significant problems 
during _the treaty-drafting process. 
However, as the two prolix and complex documents were 
being worked into their final form, the Dutch Foreign 
Min~ster, Joseph M.A.H. Luns, implicitly raised the question 
of big-versus-small nation relationshi~s within the Community 
by voicing his nation's dissent with regard to the proposed 
voting procedures. Under the voting rules of the ECSC 
Treaty a qualifi~d majority in the Council of Ministers con-
sisted of the votes of four of the six representatives of 
the member states, including the vote of "the representative 
of one of the States which produces at least twenty percent 
of the total value of coal and steel produced in the Com-
munity. 1178 Thus, the Benelux nations, if the need ever 
arose, did have the power to prevent actions undertaken in 
78coal and Steel Treaty, QQ• cit., p. 23, art. 28. 
concert by the three large powers, France, Germany and 
Italy: However, under the voting proposals for the Common 
"Market and Euratom a weighted system was offered with the 
three large nations receiving four votes each, Belgium and 
the Netherlands two each, and Luxembourg one; and a qualified 
majority vote as outlined by the Treaties would consist of 
any twelve votes. In this case, therefore, France, Germany 
and Italy voting ·together would be ab.le to bypass the Bene-
lux nations 'in the Council of Mints ters. 79 
Consequently, Mr. Luns offered a counterproposal calling 
for a qualified majority of 15 votes which would insure a 
B 1 . . 11 C · 1 d . . . Bo I t th. ene ux voice in a ounci ecisions. n answer o is 
M. Spaak, who at this point eagerly sought to conclude the 
work of drafting the tre~ties, however general they might be, 
opposed the position of his neighbor to the north and went 
so far ').s to indicate that the Netherlands had replaced 
France as the difficult member and was in fact jeopardizing 
the negotiations at this last and critical stage. Luns 
79New York Times, January 29, 1957. It should be 
noted thatt°he Council of Ministers for the two new Com-
munities Euratom and the Common Market, would be the 
dominant'bodies whereas the High Authority held this posi-
tion in the ECSC with the Coal and Steel Council of 
Ministers relegated to a secondary role. Thus, the voting 
procedures for the Council of _Ministers to?k on added 
significance as the new treaties were readied for approval. 
8oNew York ~imes~ January 29, 1957. 
formally protested ·spaak's remarks but lacking any support 
for his position begrudgingly gave ground to the majority 
viewpoint. However, when the tw~ treaties were presented 
for signature in March, the Council's voting procedure did 
pay some deference to the small power position. As out-
lined by Article 118 of the Euratom Treaty, a Council de-
c.ision requiring a qualified ·majority would be obtained as 
follows: 
• • • twelve votes in cases where (the) Treaty 
requires a previous proposal of the Commission, 
or" 
• . • twelve votes including a favourable vote by 
at least four members in all other cases.Bl 
Thus, Chairman Spaak's penchant for compromise and 
ability to guide the negotiators to agreement on important 
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issues was again present in eliminating this final obstacle 
in the way of the successful conclusion of the treaties. 
On March 25, 1957, in Rome, the statesmen of the six 
Community nations took their second big step toward the eco-
nomic unification of Europe when they signed the Treaties 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the 
·European Economic Community. Attending the elaborate 
81Treaty Establishing the European Atomic En~rgy 
Community and connected documents (Brussels: Interim 
Committee for the Common Market and Euratom, The Secre-
tariat, English translation, 195?), p .. so,~~rt. ~18. The 
Common Market Treaty, published in ~o~JU~Clion with.that 
of Euratom, contained the same provisions under Article 
148. 
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cerem~nies held in the historic Palace of the Conservators 
were West Germany's Chancellor Adenauer, Italy's Premier 
Antonio Segni, Luxembourg's Premier _and Foreign Minister 
Joseph Bech, and the Foreign Ministers of France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands.. Comments offered by the national repre-
sentatives expressed ~atisfaction with the results of the 
two years negotiations and optimism for future-progress in 
unification. The Benelux nations, aithough they- had 
·pressed for a more supranational approach to Community 
problems,·~specially with regard to Euratom, were neverthe-
less quite contented with the Euratom Treaty. They appeared 
to have no doubts concerning the substantial benefits that 
would accrue to them from membership in the new Community . 
. ' 
Foreign Minister Luns expressed his general satisfaction 
with the Treaties even if, as he stated, they were prepared 
a bit hurriedly. "Poli tics is the art of the right choice," 
he said. "The alternative, in my opinion, is certainly less 
attractive for many countries, and for the Netherlands in 
particular. 1182 M. Spaak, obviously cheered by the course 
of events, noted that "this time the men of the West have 
not lacked boldness and have not acted too late."83 
82 
New York Times, March 31, 1957. 
S3Ibid. 
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With the Treaties signed, the next and final task 
\ 
·was that of ratification. The major question mark in this 
respect concerned the actions of ·Germany's Bundestag and the 
French National Assembly. It was generally felt that if 
these two bodies accepted the Treaties, ready approval would 
be given by the parliamentary chambers of the Benelux nations 
and Italy. Not surprisingly, action to be taken by the five 
other Community nations would be completed only after the 
French Assembly had made its decision. ·A repeat of the EDC 
fiasco would not be allowed to take place again, at least 
not in the sequence that found the five nations of the Com-
munity, having ratified the EDC Treaty, standing by help-
lessly while the French procrastinated and finally rejected 
the Defense Community. 
However, on this occasion, the French Assembly acted 
with atypical clarity of purpose. Following a week-long de-
bate in which preliminary test votes on Eura tom and the Com-
mon Market produce~ a comfortable ma~ority for both, a final 
vote was taken on July 9, and by a 103 vote margin both 
Treaties were ratified. 84 The test votes had produced a 
335 to 243 majority for Euratom, and 341 to 235 for the 
Common Market. No tangible reason was in_evidence for the 
relatively greater acceptance of the Common Market Treaty 
8~-Bulletin from the ECSC, No. 24, June-July 1957, 
p. 1. 
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(in light of the fact that the Economic Community proposals-
had c~used. the French greater cioncern) other than, perha;s, 
the continued outburs~s of noted military figures against 
the· 11 undesirable 11 limitations Euratom would spread over the 
French·milita;y establishment. 85 The final vote, taken 
5imultaneously on both Treaties, showed a 342 to 231 vote 
majority. The Assembly also accepted a political convention 
to_ the Treaties pr.oviding for common .Parliamentary and po-
litical institutions for Euratom, the Common Market and the 
Coal and Steel' Community. This, of course, entailed a minor 
reversal in the stated Fren~h position of one year previous. 86 
Following the French National Assembly's acceptance of 
the Treaties, the ratification process quickened throughout 
the remainder of the Community. Five days prior to the 
French Assembly action, West Germany's Bundestag had ratified 
the Treaties, and shortly after the French Council of the 
Republic had completed French ratification. The German upper 
house the Bundesrat and Italy's House of Representatives 
. ' ' . 
followed suit. 87 Then, in October and November, the Italian 
Senate and the Benelux parliaments gave their approval and 
Euratom and the Common Market became effective as of 
85 New York Times, June 27, 1957. 
~---
86cf. ante p. 47. 
87 . t• f th ECSC No 2~ Seotember-Bulle in rom e , ,- · :;, -. u. 
October 1957, ·p. 1. 
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1 January 1958. Thus, in two and one-half years' time, the 
''new drive" had grown from an idea into a concrete format for 
f~rthering European integration. Now the Community institu-
tions, and the six nations themselves, faced the task of 
making a success of the organizations they had fostered. 
As the provisioµs of the Euratom Treaty were put into 
effect at the beginning of·1958, it was evident that na-
tional demands had mitigated against the creation of a 
strong c~ntral authority such as had been provided in th~ 
High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community. A brief 
review of the three major areas of difficulty experienced by 
the negotiators and their resolution shows the following: 88 
a) 81.lpranationality. The Benelux countries had con-
tinually advocated a Euratorri Treaty which would be "something 
more.than just a statement of general principles. 1189 In 
this respect, they called for a Community e~ecutive with 
substantial powers of co"ntrol. The French, on the other 
hand, were opposed to this concept except in the case of 
Euratom control over nuclear materials--with this latter 
position taken more in the national interest than for the 
Community's benefit. And Germany, with the major exception 
of its most important political personage, Dr. Adenauer, 
88 Cf. ante p. 30. 
S9New York Times, January 29, 1957. 
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··showed itself to be in favor of an organization modelled 
.. 
along the lines of the traditional concept of international 
organization with each state reserving an ultimate fr~edom of 
action. Thus, the compromises necessitated by these varying 
national positions resulted in a Community "executiv·e," the 
Commiss-ion, with quite a bit less freedom of action than its 
counterpart of the ECSC, the High Authority. In fact, the 
Council of Ministers, the protector of national interests, 
had for all practical purposes usurped the role of executive. 
In this.manner, therefore, the question of supranationality 
was resolved.· 
~) Nuclear Weapons. Briefly stated, Euratom was 
kept but of the nuclear weapons busines~ but its members 
were not. In this case, .the French position prevailed. 
c) Control a·ver Nuclear Material. Etiratom was given 
priority to purchase all nuclear mateiials produced by the 
nations of the Community. In the case of special fission-
able ~aterials, such as plutoni~m, U7233 and U-235, the 
Community was given a pro~erty right whereby these materials, 
although not actually in the.possession of the Commission, 
would be considered Euratom property. Furthermore, the 
Commission was given the exclusive right of concluding 
contracts for the supply of nuclear material from without 
the Community of the Six, with the exception (a concession 
to Germany) that if Community prices exceeded world prices 
I . 
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or if Community materials were in short supply, a member 
nation, after obtaining Comm:!_ssion approval, might bargain 
directly with "third countries." Considering these pro-
visions, Euratom control over nuclear materi~ls appeared to 
be all inclusive--with the major exception that the control 
system did not extend to nuclear materials intended for the 
defense purposes. Again, the French position had prevailed, 
with one minor concession going to Geymany. 
Thus, although Euratom was made in the mold of its 
predecessor the European Coal and Steel Community, it 
appeared to lack some of the more salient supranational 
characteristics found in that organization. Euratom, as 
well as its contemporary the Common Market, appeared as an 
expression for increased economic cooperation coupled with a 
lessening in intensity of the demand for federative charac-




THE EURATOM TREATY 
In its third annual report to the European Parliament 
on the activities of the Community, the Euratom Commission 
pointed out that "the European Atomic Energy Community, 
like the European Coal and Steel Community and the European 
Economic Community, is· founded on the will of the member 
. 1 
nations to build a new Europe." Certainly, Euratom's 
mandate in the building of a "new Europe" must lie in the 
political field as well as the functional. In the case of 
the former, Euratom and its sister Communities will strive 
to bring the six nations in membership into a closer po-
litical union. However, until now, the exact appearance 
this union should have or the formation it might take remains 
of an indefinite nature. 
On the other hand, the tasks of Euratom in the func-
tional field are more readily ascertained. The Preamble to 
the Euratom Treaty emphasizes the realization "that nuclear 
·energy constitutes the essential resource for . effecting 
· f 1 achi' evement" and calls for a common progress in peace u 
1 
. · f the European Atomic Energy Com-
The Comm1ss1on ° ~ J th Activities of the Corn-
muni ty. Third General Repor! on( _§. 1 . 1 96o)_p_7 --. -- - 5 ·1 l9b0 Brusse s. ..L ' • • muni tv ~ March 19, 9-A~r~ . ni tially cited by number and 
HC}'eafter, Repor 1-S wili bbe 1 ontly by number only. 
period of coverage and su·sequ~ 
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effort undertaken without delay "to create the conditions 
. 
required for the development of a powerful nuclear industry" 
to provide energy, mo~ernize technical processes, and con-
tribute to the·weli-being of the European people. 2 Article 
One then goes C?n to define the aims ·of the Community as: 
• • • to cont~ibute to the raising of the standard 
of living in Member States and to the development 
of commercial exchanges with other countries by the 
creation of conditions necessary for the speedy 
establishment and growth of nucl~ar industries.3 
·In order to attain these aims the Treaty confers upon 
the Community. certain powe!s in the various fields pertaining 
to nuclear energy. For discussion purposes these can be 
broken down into.the following major categories: Investment 
and industrial development; research and the dissemination 
of information; supply; security control and property rights; 
the nuclear common market; and health protecti~n and safety. 4 
Euratom's external relations, as an additional category, 
will be made a part of subsequent discussions wherever 
appropriate. 
INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The establishment and development of a nuclear in-
dustry has been and continues to be the primary objective 
2 Etuatom Treaty, the Preamble. 
3Ibid.-, art:. 1. 
4Ibid., a~ts. 4-106. 
of the European Atomic Energy Community. To accomplish 
. 
this, the institutions of the Community, and particularly 
the Commission, must f~cilitate and stimulate investment 
in nuclear power production and insure, primarily through 
the _efforts of individual ~nterprises, the· construction of 
the key installations needed. Incidental to this, and as 
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an incentive-, the Treaty requires the Commission to publish 
periodically certain production targets for nuclear energy 
within. the Community and the various type_s of investment 
necessary for _their attainment. On the other hand, invest-
merit projects undertaken by ent~rprises which relate to the 
aims of the Treaty must be communicated to the Commission for 
discussion and advice and, with permission, the Commission 
may publish this information to allow for coordination of 
the ·Community -e.ffort ~ 5· 
The Treaty also offers further incentive to industrial 
undertakings "of outstanding importance to the development 
of nuclear industry in the Community" by allowing these to 
be constituted as joint enterprises in accordance with 
·
5Articles 4o-44 relate to investment,and Annex II 
of the Treaty lists branches of industry within w~ic~ in-
vest~ent projects would be of concern to ~he 9ommJssion. 
Also, regarding production aims, the pu~lica ti on of A . . 
Target for.Euratom was in essence the first of the periodi-
cal reports. It ca-Jled for a capacity of ~5 million. 
kilowatts of nuclear electric power to be installed in 
ten years at a cost of $6000 million. 
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applicable Treaty p~ovisions.~ A project so designated 
might ~njoy numerous advantages over competitors. Some of 
these would b~ exemption from dir~ct taxation ahd customs 
duties, Community and third country financing, and acquisi-
tion of the character of a. legal person under European law 
which in turn.causes th~ enterprise not to be bound by 
mutual provisions governing the particular legal forms 
applying to joint stock companies.7 By theJend of 1966 
there were three undertakings which had been granted joint 
enterprise statu~ and a fourth had its application pending. 
8 All four are nuclear power plants. 
In addition to an industrial program aimed at in-
creasing the Community's output of nuclear power, Euratom 
has the secondary and sometimes overshadowed task of en-
couraging the member states and enterprises to utilize atomic 
energy applications not only in industry but also in other 
fields such as agriculture and medicine. The exploitation 
6 
Ibid., art. 45. 
7Ibid., arts. 45-51. Annex III to the Treaty lists 
advantages which may be granted to join~ enterprises. It 
should also be noted here that the "joint enterprise" idea 
was also considered a device to avoid duplication of effort 
between the Six and other members of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation by allowing O.E.E.C4 members 
to participate in designated projects. Political and Eco-
nomic Planning, Q.Q· cit., p. 321. 
8 . . 
Eighth G2neral Report, March 1961~-February 1965, 
p. 45. 
of radioiostopes and radioelements in these areas of 
' . 
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technological concern offer great promise. In order to add 
impetus to this piogram, therefore E~ratom organized a 
. ' 
Eurisotop Bureau in 1961- which, by promoting the development 
of suitable methods of use and materials, encourages the 
application in practice of radioiostope~ and radiations. 
The Bureau also serves to coordinate at the Community level 
the activities of the member states in this field of en-
deavor. 9 
It should be remembered that in matters of invest-
ment in industrial development very little authority has 
been given the Community. The Commission's role is that of 
an advisor and coordinator. The cooperation of the member 
states is essential to the creation of a sound nuclear 
industrial base. 
RESEARCH AND THE-DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 
Euratom has a two-fold task concerning nuclear re-
search, namely, to promote, facilitate and coordinate re-
search in the member states, and to supplement this by 
carrying out a research and training program at the Community 
levei. 10 The former obligation presents a most intricate 
• 
9nocumentation Attached to the Eighth General Report, 
p. 69. . 
10 . 4 Euratom Treaty, art. . 
and formidable problem for the Community institutions; the 
latter has been less so. 
7? 
With regard to coordinating nitional programs, the 
Euratom Commission must request that all research programs 
that are incorporated in a long list of energy research 
topics (as listed in Annex I to the Treaty) be communicated· 
to it-. 11 Following this, the Commission formuiates a 
reasoned opinion on each program and by means of such an 
opiniori attempts to discourage any unnecessary ~uplication 
of effort on the one hand and redirects research into sectors 
insufficiently studied on the other. The Commission may 
periodically publish a list of research projects it would 
. . 
like to see studied, but unless it has the. permission of the 
-;-. . 
state, person or enterprise concerned, it may not pubiish 
the details of a program communicated to it. 
In carrying out this part of the program, the Com-
~uni ty finds that it has no direct legal means to impose 
its views. In other words, the.Commission cannot compel 
governments· to make research information available nor can 
it compel enterprises to undertake r~search beneficial.to 
the Community goals. However, the Treaty has provided the 
11rbid. art. 5. The list se:t out by Annex I may be 
amended by the'council acting by means of a qua~if~ed m~jority 
vote on a proposal of the Commission. The ~o.mmissior:i, in 
turn must consult the Scientific and Technical Committee 
(of ~o scie~tis!s and experts in.nuclear indus~ry) erio~ 
to formula ting its proposal. Ibid.,· arts· 5 and 13 • · 
Community with indirect means to encourage. cooperation. 
-. 
These incentives to comply allow the Commission to: 
a) ~u~nish.financial as~istance, excluding 
subsidies, in respect of research contracts · 
· b) supply, for the purpose of carrying ~ut' 
these programmes, .any source materials or special 
fissionable materials at its disposal either 
against payment or free of charge~ ' 
c) ·place facilities, equipment o~ expert 
~ssistance at the disposal of Member States, 
persons or enterprises, either against pay-
ment or free of charge; and 
d) initiate joint financing by the Member 
States, persons or enterprises concerned.12 
Therefore, as an example, if a member nation cannot 
complete a nuclear progr?m because of the costs involved~ 
Euratom may provide material and financial assistance and 
by so doing enhance and reinforce its own position • 
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. The Community's own research and training programs 
are established by a unanimous vote of the Council acting on 
a Commission proposal. The programs are drawn up for a period 
nbt. exceeding five years and are financed on a yearly basis 
through the Community's research and investment budget. 
The Commission is required to implement the programs and 
makes an annual progress report thereon to the Council. 
The ·community's initial research and training program was 
delineated in Annex V of the Treaty and called for an 
• 12 
Euratom Treaty, art. 6. 
expenditure not to exceed 215 million European Payment Union 
units of account over the five year period ending in 1962. 13 
Euratom undert~kes its research programs in the in-
stallations of the Joint Nuclear Research Center which in 
. ' 
accordance with the T~eaty Pfovisions,_ were established by 
the Commission following co_nsuitation with ·the Scientific 
and Technical Committee. The Commission had the option of 
constructing its own· installations or· using where possible 
existing national facilities. Political, technical, and 
financial expediency caused the Community to opt for the 
existing research facilities, many of which were standing 
·d1 f .. h d 14 i e or un inis e • 
Because it was readily evident that the initial 
effort expended in establishing the Joint Nuclear Research 
Center would praclude extensive nuclear research in the 
first few years at the Community's existence, the Treaty-
drafters allowed Euratom an indirect means of proceeding 
13 I 
Euratom Treaty, arts. 7 and 215~ The Council, by 
unanimous vote, had the power to alter the amount of the 
money allotted, or, by a qualified majority vote, could 
amend the program as laid down in Annex V. Also, the 
European Payment Union unit of account (EPU u(a) had a value 
in grams of pure gold which equalled the par in gold of the 
American dollar. In 1959 the EPU u/a was replaced by the 
European Monetary Agreement unit of account ~EMA u/a{ having 
the same gold weight. ~ereafter, monetary figures will be 
cited ~n U.S. dollars. 
14Third GGneral Report, ·March 1959-April 1960, P · 9 · 
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with a research and training program. Article 10 permitted 
the Commission, by means of contracts, to "entrust Member 
States, persons or enterprises or also third countries or 
international organisations" with the implementation of a 
part of the .Community's research program. Throughout its: 
existence, and.as its own research installations have g~adu­
aily been brought into an operating status,· the Communit~ 
has placed 'a great amount of reliance on the letting of 
. ' 
research contracts. The system has proved satisfacto~y for 
not only the Community but also for national research in-
stitutes in general. 15 
Equally important as. the research which generates 
nuclear information is the di~semination of the information. 
From the time of the publicat.ion of the Spaak Report in 1956 
until the present, it has been insisted by Community ad-
herents that nuclear information~ as it betomes available 
and where it does not impinge on national security, must 
15 
. Eighth General Report, PP: 69, 70 .. The Com-
mission periodically publishes a list of proJects which 
it intends to handle under contract and then allots the 
contract either to be handled by the contractor alone or 
in association with th~ Community installations. 
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be given as broad a base of distribution as possible. 16 Th~ 
Community acquires information by varied means, the most im-
portant of which results from the execution of research con-
tracts let out within the Community, from the Community's own 
research work in the installations of the Joint Nuclear 
Research Center, and by virtue of agreements with inter-
national organizations and third countries. Generally 
speaking; the information generated from these sources is 
considered "information at the disposal of the Community" and 
·presents no great problem. in that member states and ente~­
prises can, by means- of application to the Commission, utilf."?e 
the information as long as they can effectively exploit it. 17 
However, with regard to what the Treaty calls "other 
information,-'' (i.e., . inf orma ti on to which Eura tom has no 
rights initially) the Commjssion comes face to face with 
16 The Brussels Report on Euratom, 212· cit., p. 4. 
The Intergovernmental Committee members recognized the in-
herent difficulties involved with .the dissemnation of 
information and wrote the following: 
'~o the fullest extent possible a way of reconciling 
·the rights of the inventors or owneis of discoveries and 
the interests of the Community will be sought through 
voluntary cooperation, for example, by promoting agree-
ments on the use of patents. In any event, th~ holders of 
patents will be fully indemnifieJ f~r the grant11;g of 
licenses with no expropriation having to be envisaged. 
"Nevertheless it appears indispen~able to provide 
.. ' f •t II complementary measures in cases o necessi Y· for 
17 . 
Euratom Treaty, art. 12. 
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the problem of reconciling the need to make useful informa-
tion and inventions available with the need to maintain the 
privileges and incentives of the member state~' patent systems. 
The.Commission, in keeping with the Spaak Report, endeavors 
to have the states, enterprises and persons communicate to_ 
it, "by friendly means," information and licensing rights to 
inventions which would be "useful to the Community in the 
pursuit of its objectives. 1118 Howeve·r, where owners of 
patented information are reluctant to share this knowledge' 
with the Community, and the information is deemed sufficiently 
important to be exploited by others, the Community has been·, 
given the right, by Treaty, to have the informatLon communi-
cated to it by the state holding the patent and even to grant 
licenses for use of patented .information and inventipns to 
other qualified applicants. This ex officio ·power to ex-
propriate industrial property is significant as one of the 
supranatio~al aspects of the Euratom Community. However, it 
is by no means an arbitrary power; the Treaty affords the 
patent holder ample opportunity to reach an amicable settle-
ment with the Community or, barring this, recourse to arbitra-
tion by a special committee appointed by the Cou~cil of 
Ministers of Euratom or to the Court of Justice of _the 
Community. In any case, the patent holder can delay having 
18
rbid., art. 14. 
• 
up to 20 months and is duly compensated for any use of his 
. 19 information or invention by other parties. 
SUPPLY 
Euratom's _supply system is basej on the principle of 
equal· access for all users of the Community's nuclear re._ 
sources~_ and_expreisly prohibits practices designed to estab-
lish privileged positions for a few to the detriment of many. 
The Community seeks to maintain a common supply policy and 
has established; as the instrum_ent of this policy, a Supply 
Agency which has been constituted as: 
~ ~ • having a right of option on all ores, source 
materials and special fissionable materials pro-
duced in the territories of Member States and having 
the exclusive right of concluding contracts relating 
to supplies of ores, source materials and special 
fissionable materials coming from inside or outside 
the Community .20 
. ·19Ibid., arts. 16-23; also Po~itical and Economic 
Planning, 92.· cit., pp.319, 320; Jaraslov G. Polach, Euratom 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1964), p. 74-76. 
·
20Euratom Treaty, arts. 2(d), 52. Generally speaking, 
the Treaty defines the different nuclear materials as follows: 
ores--any ores containing substances, in an average 
concentration as determined by the Council, from which 
uranium source materials can be obtained by chemical and 
physical processing. · 
. source materials--uranium as it occurs in nature, 
uranium depleted in the isotope 235: ~hol;'ium,.and metals, 
alloys and chemical compounds co~taining ura~ium. . 
special fissionable materials--plutonium 239, uraniu~ 
233, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233, .an~ material 
containing one of the foregoing, ~nd oth~r such fissionable 
materials as defined by the Council. Ibid., art. 197. 
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The idea for vesting control of nuclear materials in 
a ·community agency was based upon arguments which found their 
way into the Spaak Report in 1956, namely, that nuclear re-
. 
sources were une.venly scattered throughout the member states 
(and their overseas possessions) and that only through the 
channels of a common supply organization could equitable dis-
tribution be.made, and that such an organization would prevent 
one member state, at the expense .of the remainder, from enter-
ing advantageous bilateral agreements with third countries. 
Also, and to n.o small degree, Eura tom depended upon access 
to United States technical and material assistance, and such , 
an agreement in turn depended upo0 Euratom having acceptable 
security standards. The Agency provided a necessary part of 
these. 21 
In accordance with the Treaty, the Supply Agency's 
statute was laid down by the Council in July 1958. However, 
owing to fluid market conditions and to the Commission's 
. . 
desire to allow as much freedom as possible in dealings be-
tween producers and consumers, the Agency commenced only 
limited operations in June 1960, and did not begin to 
21The Brussels Report on Euratom, QQ• cit., P· 7; 
and Polach, .Q_Q. cit., p. 78, 79. 
Bo 
function fu1ly until six months later. During this period 
of tr~nsition the Commission approved material transacti~ns~ 22 
The Agency has been placed under the control of the 
Commission which, acting on its own or in behalf of a com-
plainant, may exercise a right of veto over Agency dec.isions. 
The Commission also appoints the Agency's Director-General 
and his deputy. In addition, it is consfdered as having a 
legal personality and financial autonomy. Capitalization 
of the Agency, of course, comes from the member states 
which, in accordance with the Agency's statute, contribute 
on a percentage basis. The statute, which may be revised 
by the Council, may also provide for a tax on supply trans-
actions thus adding to the Agency's capital when and as this 
becomes desirable.23 
. 22 
Third General Report, p. 65; Fourth General Re-
port, April 1960-March 1961, pp. 86, 87; the Commission 
exercised this right to approve nuclear material trans-
actions in accordance with the transitional provisions 
provided by article 222 of the Treat!. 
23 Euratom Treaty, arts. 53, 54. The initial sub...: 
scription amounted to 2.4 million with 28 percent pledged 
from each of the three large states, and 8 percent from 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Of this total, ·10 I?ercent was 
actually paid in to the Agency to commence operations. The 
balance may be called in as necessary. ~he tax on ~upply . 
transactions however has not yet been imposed. Giandomenico 
Sertoli ''Th~ Structu~e and Financial Activities of the Europea~ Regional Communities," European Reg~ona~ Communities, 
Melvin G. Shimm, ed. (New York: Oceana ?ublica tions, 1962), 
p. 186. 
The Agency functions in accordance with certain d~~ 
tailed but liberal T~eaty provisions. The Agen.cy' s "right 
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'of option u requires that all producers must offer to it any 
ores, source materials or special fissionable materials they 
may produce. Also, the Agency·perio~ically requests and 
receives user's requirements. Matching the supply and 
demand, the Agency acts as the broker in transactions without 
actually handling the materials. In some cases, even further 
liberalization of the supply function may take place, where 
consumers and producers negotiate contracts in accordance 
with preset conditions laid down by the Agency and forward· 
the contracts .for Agency approval. Provided there is no 
objection, the contract is considered not only valid but as 
having been "concluded" by the Agency. This greatly simpli-
fied Community procedures. 24 
Supply and demand.in a free market will establish the· 
nuclear material price structure. However, if price manipu-
lations or other abuses appear, the Agency may propose price 
adjustments, and the Commission may restore prices "to a 
level compatible with the principle of equal access "'; .. and 
24rbid., arts. 55, 60; also, Polit~cal and Economic 
Planning, Q.12· cit., p. 322; Polach, ..£.E· ..£1.!:, p. 82, 83;. 
and Pierre Mathijsen, "Proolems Conne;t~d with th~ Creation 
of Eur.atom," European Regional Communities, op. cit., 
p. 104. 
f inallyf the Council may fix prices by a unanimous vote in 
order~to preserve an orderly market. 25 
Although the Agency normally h~s an exclusive right 
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to contract with third na'tions and parties for the supply of 
nuclear materials, Community users may, with Commission ap-:: 
proval~ ·enter into a renewable one year contract for supplies 
outsiqe the Community when the Agency cannot meet the users 
demand or an excessive price is impossd. Counterbalancing 
this, however, is the ·community's power to ensure that member 
nations adequately exploit the Community's own mineral de-
p9sits, either in the positive manner by offering financial 
assistance for prospecting, or in a negative way by having 
the Council declare that a member state has failed to ex-
ploit its natural resources and consequently is to be denied 
equal access to Agency supplies until the situation is recti-
fied. 26 
Finally, taking into account the vagaries of a free 
market, and one which is even more susceptible to rapid 
change because it supplies an inchoate sector of the economy, 
the Treaty allows amendments to the provision of its Supply 
25Euratom Treaty, arts. 67-69; also, Polach, .Q...12.· cit., 
p. 81. As Dr. Polach points out, however, the Treaty pro-
visions concerning price-fixing and abuses are vague and 
would seem to offer an area for challeng~ before the Court 
of Justice. 
26Euratom Treaty, art. 70. 
Chapter, particularly if a general shortage of nuclear 
materlals should develop. 27 
SECT!RITY CONTROL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
83 
Euratom's safeguards.and contrbls system was put into 
effect in June 1959,and the first inspections of Community 
enterprises,- establishments and installations took place 
the following year. The system is based on the provisions 
of Chapter VII of the Treaty which in turn are more explicitly 
defined as to pature and scope in Euratom's Regulations No. 7 
and No. 8. 28 
The Community's control system is designed to accom-
plish a three-fold purpose: First, to ensure that within the 
27Ibid., art. 76. The Commission has in fact drafted 
proposals for amendments to the Treaty's supply provisions. 
These were tabled in the European Parliamentary Assembly in 
January 1965. Eighth General Report, p. 55. 
28 . 
Chapter VII, arts. 77-85, deals with Safety Control 
and Chapter VIII, arts. 86-91, with Property Rights. Regulations 
are published from time to time in the Community's Journal 
Officiel and serve as an extension of the Treaty provisions 
in governing the Community. In this case ~egulation No. 7 
outlines the conditions to be observed by states and enter-
prises in reporting the technical characteristics of facili-
ties which produce, separate or use source materials or 
special fissionable materials; Regulation No. 8 prescribes 
the data relating to stocks and movements of source materials 
or special fissionable.materials to be reported to the Com-
mission regularly by the enterprises concerned. Also, within 
the me~ning of Regulations 7 and 8, an enterprise may include 
several establishments, which in turn may contain a number of 
installations. Fuel fabrication plants, reactors, labora-
tories and fuel vrocessing plants are referred to as 




territories of the member states all ores, source materials 
... 
and special fissionable materials are not diverted from 
. . . 
their intended use as stated by the users; second, to.re-
quire that the Community's 'provisions for supply are 
observed; and third, to provide that agreements concluded 
. . . 
with third nations or international organizatio~s are 'care-
fully. observed. As noted previously, this third requirement 
provides the foundation on which agreements with the United 
States, and the United Kingdom and Canada as well, have been 
established and extended, without having to accept foreign 
controls and inspection within the territories of the member 
. 29 
states. 
Euratom's security control system is unique in that 
·it is compulsory for the membership. Other organizations, 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 
and the European Nuclear Energy Agency (a~ agency of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD), 
have established control rules but these are not binding on 
the member states and are applied only when the merribers 
voluntarily submit or, in some cases, where inspection is a 
precondition for receiving agency aid. 30 
29Euratom Treaty, art. _77; also Third General Report, 
p. 70 •• 
30 . t The Europe Year Book 1966, Vol. I,,~art.I, In.e:-
national Organizationsl"London: Europe Pub~ications Limited), 
p. 31, 251; Pierre Mathijsen, QQ• cit., P• 102. 
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The Community's control- provisions are carried out by 
communications to the Commission and inspections of nuclear 
industry. The Commission must be informed of the tech~ical 
characteristics of plants producing or using fissionable 
materials and records must be kept by industry to allow 
for Commission accountability of such materials. The Com-· 
mission may also ask that special ·fissionable materials in 
-
excess, that is, not in use or being readied for use, be 
deposited with the Supply Agency until requeste~ for use.·. 
·Euratom's inspectors, recruited by the ·commission, visit 
installations throughout the Community and make physic al and 
accounting checks on materials in·custody. Arrangements have 
been made with each member state whereby ·inspections may be 
accompanied by state rep~esentatives,bcl such an action 
must not impede the work of the inspectors or deny them 
. access to places, data or rersons which might prop.erly be 
visited in the course of ·their duties.· If such a denial 
takes ~lace, or i~ the inspectors point o~i security in-
fringement, the C:im::nission has the power to direct member 
states or enterprises to rectify the situation and, failing 
this, to impose penalties up~n the offenders. These penal-
ties, in order of .gravity~ may take the form of a warning, 
withdrawal of financial and technical assistance, piacing 
an enterprise under joint Community and state control for 
a maximum period of four months, or lastly, withdrawal of 
86 
source materials and special fissionable materials.31 This 
. 
power, of course, is another aspect of Euratom's suprana-
tional controi and may.well turn out to be the most ·sig-
nificant. But; for:now, this position must be tempe~ed by 
·the fact that. the Community's control is applied only to 
the "peacefu:f-·" sector of nuclear industry and "may not 
extend to materials intended for the pu~pose of de-
1132 fence. . . . 
The Treaty provisions regarding Community property 
rights mesh ciosely with those of security control, as they 
wer~ intended to do. Euratom's right of ownership extends 
to all special fissionable materials produced within the 
Community or imported. As opposed to the "right of option" 
which the Supply Agency may exercise when it desires to ac-
quire ownership of ores and for source material~, the special 
fissionable materials, solely by virtue of their existence 
within Community boundaries, are owned by the Agency which 
in turn permits member states and enterprises to use them 
31Euratom Treaty, art. 83. Forced execution of penal-
ties is governed by the rules of civil procedure of the state 
in which the infraction occurs. A writ of execution is 
served the offender by a domestic authority desighated by 
each state for this purpose, atid notice of the action is 
then forwarded to the Commission, Court of Justice and 
Arbitration Committee set up under Art. 18. Forced execu-
tion m~y only be sus~endedby the Cour~ o! Jus~ice .. H~wever, 
supervision of the measures of exec~tion,remain~ within the 
competence of domestic courts or tribuna~s. Ibid., art. 164. 
32 
Ibid., art. 84. 
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subject to obligations imposed by saf_ety control, health pro-
tecti~n and fair distribution. The Agency is also required 
to maintain a financial accountirig of special fissionable 
materials, having credited to the Community the value of 
materials produced or imported by member states or enter-
prises which have become the property of the Community. 
The book-balancirginvolved here and any value fluctuations 
that may occur in the process are not. intended nor permitted 
to· result in a financial gain or loss to the Community. 33 
The accounting is employed for the sole purpose of strength~ 
ening Euratom's control in this delicate area. Once again, 
however, it must be noted that Euratom's property rights 
end with its power to control. Materials intended for 
defense purposes are exempted. : 
THE NUCLEAR COMMON MARKET 
In order to provide a basis for the rapid growth of a 
nuclear industry within the Community, the Euratom Treaty 
called. for the establishment of a common market for nuclear 
materials and related equipment, abolition of restrictions 
33rbid., .arts. 86-89; also, it is approp~i~te.to point 
out that Euratom~s property rights do not c~nflicL_with third 
party ownership over the same nuclear materia~s which was the 
original thought read into Article 86. ~f this ~ere totbe_the 
case, ~uratom would be required to purchasP ~utrigh~ ma;erials 
it how obtains on a leased basis. The solution, which is con-
sidered legally and economically sound, ~s based o~ a th~ory 
of Euratom's administrative ownership.being com~~tible with 
t~e third party's property rights. Pierre MathiJsen, .Q.Q• 
cit., p. 10~. 105. 
on the movement of specialized labor within the member 
states, and provisions for the free movement of capital to 
facilitate nuclear investment.34 
The common market was, in fact, established as of 
1 January 1959. Only minor problems were encountered 
primarily because.only a very limited sector of the member 
nations' economics were inv~lved and bec~use industrial· 
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interests had not yet had time to raise protective barriers 
for what was a relatively new field of endeavoi. In addi-
tion, the_ Treaty-drafters eliminated any possible conjecture 
on the scope and application of this common market, by 
delineating in three lists, attached as an Appendix to the. 
Treaty, the nuclear materials, equipment and manufactures 
that are of concern to the Community market. The lists are 
classified as Al - principallu raw materi~ls; A2 - equipment 
designed for nuclear industry ~nd other raw materials not 
listed in Al; a~d B - materials and equipment which can be 
utili~ed in nuclear industry as well.as in conventional 
industry.35 For lists Al and A2, the Community became a 
34Euratom Treaty, Chap. IX, arts. 92-100. 
35Ibid. Annex IV· some specific examples are: Al -
uranium thori~m and plutonium including alloys and ores 
with th~se materials· A2 - deuterium and its compounds, nu-
clear .reactors' and ~quipment expressly. desi•$ned for . 
processing, handJ_ing and traJSporting radioactive materials; 
and B - unwrought metals of nuclear quality, parts for . 
nuclear reactors, cyclotrons, linear accelerators and radia-
tion detection instruments. 
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free trade area, that is,_all import and expdrt duties and 
'•· 
re.st.rictions to trade among the member nations were eliminated. 
·At the same time, 1 January 1959, a common customs tariff for 
items on lists Al and A2 went into effect adding the second 
essential part in the making of the common market, i.e., 
the creation of a customs union. At the outset, the 
materials in ·1ists Al and A2, including fissionable and 
nuclear materials and radioactive isotopes, were completely 
free from duty while most equipment items in list A2 carried 
a nominal duty.of from five to twelve percent with nuclear 
reactors assigned a ten percent rate. However, liberalization 
of trade practices was even the case here, because the ten 
percent duty for reactors was suspended until 1962 and the 
bther duties were reduced or suspended until 1964. Reexamina-
tions of the common customs tariff have taken plpce in 1962, 
1964 and, the most recent, in ·october of 1965. The general 
result has.been the continuation of a liberal trade policy 
with tariffs remaining reduced or suspended, with no items 
on lists Al or A2 having a higher rate than the seven percent 
that is currently assigned to nuclear reactors. 36 
Euratom encountered a bit more difficulty in setting 
up a liberal trade· program for the items on list B. In 
accordance with the Treaty, these items would be cionsidered 
36Third General Report, P· 59-60; Ni~~h General Re-
port, March 196 5-Feb.ruary 1966, P · 51, 52 · 
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a part of the nuclear common market only when they were 
covered by a certificate issued by the Commission to the 
effect that they w~re intend~d solely for nuclear purposes 
and also when a common customs tariff with regard to third 
countries had been established for them. These two require-
ments were necessitated by the fact that list B items had 
utility for nonnuclear industries and therefore had to be 
considered as a part of the general c·ommon Market which is 
being established in stages, with the completion to take 
place sometime prior to 1970. Therefore, the Treaty pro-
vided that items on list B could become a part of the 
nuclear common market only when the Council, acting on a 
Commission proposal, ·voted unanimously to apply what amounted 
.to an "early" common customs tariff to them .3 7 
Actually, in order to simplify matters,the ~.E.G. 
Council and Commission, working in close coordination with 
their counterparts in Eura tom, have now assumed responsibility 
for establishing all common customs tariffs for the Com-
munity~ including those for nuclear materials and products. 
Besides eiiminating duplication of effort between Euratom 
and E.E.C. this also has the added benefit of softening any 
legal probl~ms that may arise concerning the compatibility 
. 37 Euratom Treaty, arts. 93(b), 95) Polach, QQ· cit.,. 
p. 91, 92. 
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of the ~stablished nuclear common market and the General 
Agreement. on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.). Th~ E.E.C. 
appoints a· negotiator on behalf of both the general Common 
Market and the nuclear common market with the latter being 
considered as a part of the former, ~lbeit, a part that, 
because it has already been established, might better be 
considered a forerunner of the general ·common Mark~t.38 
With regard to the. free movement of specialized labor 
throughout the .nuclear community, the Treaty set forth broad 
guidelines and ·called upon the Commission and Council to 
provide the particulars of application. Artic.E 96 enjoined 
the member states· of Euratom to drop all barriers against 
the movement of nu6lear workers ba~ed solely on grounds of 
·-
nationality, but made this freedom of movement "subject to 
such limitations as may be imposed by the basic-requirements 
of public order,· public safety and public heal th." 
For its part, the Commission sought to implement the 
Treaty instruction by providing the Council of Ministers a 
set of directives containing, among other things, a defini-
tion of nuclear positions to which the Treaty applies, and 
·a specifi~ listing o~ ~ome jobs covered by the definition. 
Also, the :commission sought to eliminate excessive administra-
tive formalitie~ in.passing national~ of one state to another 
. . 
38 ,, · t 47·, N1·n~··i1 Gene.,.,al Report Eighth General Repor , p. u1 ~ , 
p. 52; Pierre Mathijsen, Qll• cit., P· 99. 
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' by calling simply for the presentation of a work contract 
on the· part of the would be employee. The Council accepted 
the Commission proposals in March of 1962 and by so doing. 
brought Euratom's labor movement policies in line with those 
of the general Common Market.39 
The third factor involv~d in the e~tablishment of a 
nuclear common market, that concerning the fre~ mo~ement of 
capital, has created no Jmportant obstacles thus far. As 
noted previously, Annex lI to th~ Euratom Treaty lists 
branches of nuclear industry which are considered key areas 
for investment. Therefore, the Commission, in accordance 
with Article 99, is permitted to make recommendations facili-
tating movements of capit~l whenever they pertain to these 
production areas.· And, of. course, the member states are 
obliged at all times to permit currency transfer when such 
transfer is necessary for the orderly flow in the common 
. 4o · 
market of goods and services. 
. 39Fourth General Report, pp. 81, 82; Fifth General 
Repoft, April 1961-March 1962, p. ?9; As one.a~t~or notes, 
·organized labor (i.e., European unions) has ini~ially shown 
little interest in the functioning of Euratom, simply be-
1 cause this Community, as the most parochiai of the ~hre~, 
has had little direct impact on labor. However, this will 
undoubtedly change as nuclear industry comes of .a~e. 
11 Meyer Bernstein, "Labor and the European Comm uni ties, · 
European Regional Commuriities, QQ• cit., P· 242. 
l+o 
• Euratom Treaty, arts. 99, 100. 
HEALTH PROTECTION AND SAFETY 
The Euratom Treaty called upon· the Community to 
"establish, and ensure the application of, uniform safety 
standards to protect the health of workers and of .the general 
public." Specifically, basic heaith standards were to be 
worked out by _the Commission in collaboration with members 
of the Scientific and Technical Comm~ttee. Following this, 
the Commission's proposals were to be forwarded to the· 
Council which in turn, after consulting the European Parlia-
ment, .would consider and, by majority vote, establish the 
Comm uni ty·r s basic standards. The Treaty then called for 
each of the member states to enact the administrative and 
.legislative provisions required to ensure compliance with 
the basic standards and called upon the Commission to make 
41 
recommendations in harmonizing the member nation's laws. 
To date, this is how the process of establishing a satis-
factory health and safety program has progressed, but the 
progression has been so~ething less than rapid and the 
cooperation of governments a good deal less than dynamic • 
. The first phase in establishing the health and safety 
programs, however, was accomplished rather expeditiously with 
• 
41
rb · d t 2 30 33 It should be noted here 
_ i •• ar s. , - • 
that under article: 161 of the Treaty "recommendations 
. . • have no binding force.'' 
the publication of the basic standards in the Journal 
Officfel No. ll .of 20 February·.1959. At the time, the 
Commission noted that the Euratom standards were favorably 
received by nuclear experts throughout th~ world and by 
other international organizations as well.42 
Basically, Euratom set for itself a three-fold task 
with the enupciation of the health and ~afety standards: 
First, it undertook to bring existing_ and. all future member 
nations_' nucleg.r safety ·laws into conformity with the basic 
standards; second, it set out to control the level of radio-
activity in the air, sea water, drinking water and soil bi 
monitoring certain areas set up by national authorities and 
by sending Euratom specialists to check on the work done at 
these monitoring posts; lastly, it sought to promote safety 
.iti nuclear installations ·by subjecting all new proposals for 
nuclear plant to careful scrutiny from the standpoint of 
·health and safety. Viewed in the light of present conditions, 
the latter two tasks .have met with a good measure of success; 
however, as noted previously, the apathy of some of the states 
in enacting .r~uired legislation has somewhat tarnished the 
overall health and Bafety program. Not surprisingly, Germany 
and France have put into effect the largest number of 
42Fourth Gen~ral Report, p. 91. The O.E.E.C. and 
the ·r.A.E.A. in Vienna both paid high compliment to the p~o­
posals by seeking to implement a majority of them throughout 
. their own membership. 
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regulations which cover at least a part of the field to which 
the basic standards apply. Both these nations are leaders 
, 
in the Community in nuclear industry development and there-
fore recognize the propriety of such actions. Italy, on 
the other hand, has been lax from the beginning in drafting 
and enacting this type of legi~lation, no doubt reflecting 
her smaller stake in nuclear development; however, recent 
developments show that Italy and the Benelux nations are 
slowly falling in line behind the two leaders in meeting at 
. 4 . 
least the minimum standards. 3 
As pointed out previously, the Community does not have 
the authority to enact binding provisions in the field of 
health and safety; only the member states can bring about 
the de~ired conditions. But Euratom has promoted harmonization 
of laws through recommendations to the states and by publish-
ing the basic standards; and, as a last resort, if the Com- . 
·mission at some time in the future refuses to accept a member 
state's procrastination or, perhaps, refusal to enact laws 
in compliance with the basic standards, then the matter may 
'be referred to the Court of Justice under article 141 of the 
Treaty. 
43Fourth General Report, p. 93; Ninth General Report, 
p. 82; Germany was the first t? en~ct su~h legislation doing 
so in 1959, with France following in 1962; Fifth General 
Report, ·p. 93. 
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Thus far, however, the Commission has proceeded with 
determined deliberation in prodding the member nations toward 
the desired health and safety goals. The Commission has stated 
its awareness of the fact "t·hat a thorough-going implementa-
tion of the Basic St~ndards requires an enormous amount of 
. . . 44 
detailed work .in the legislative and regulatory field." 
Nevertheless, progress has been made-, and to such a degree 
that recently the Commission was able· to announce that seven 
. . 
years after the publication bf the b~sic ~tandards (1959), 
"the health and safety of workers. and the population .at large 
can be regarded as effectively safeguarded by law in the 
Member States of the Community. 11 45 
44 4 Fourth General Report, p. 9 · 
• 
45Ninth General Report. p. 81; Documentation attached 
to the Ninth Ge~eral Report. p. 137-138, lists the latest 
health and safety legislation enacted and draft texts 
submitted for Commission opinion. 
'CHAPTER IV 
THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS 
The governing institutions of Eura tom, like those of 
the European Economic Community, were modeled after the in-
stitutions of the European Coal and Steel Community~ As 
n~ted previously, however, the des~re of the two largest 
nations of the Six, to tone down the supranationality of the 
new organizations in relation to the ·coal and Steel Community, 
led to significant treaty changes, particularly with regard 
to the distribution of powers.l There was little doubt 
that the decision-making power resided primarily in the nine-
· member High Authority of the ECSC, with its Council of Minis-
ters acting mainly to correlate coal and steel actions with 
thos~ of other sectors of the national economies. Ori the 
other hand, in Euratom ~nd the EEC, it is the Council of 
. . 
Ministers which usually makes the final decision, thereby 
often usurping the executive role. The Commission proposes 
and the Council disposes and in so doing attempts to coordi-
nate national policies with the policy of the Community. 
Consequently, it cari be restated that at the time the Euratom 
·Treaty came into force,. those that .desired increased economic 
·1 . Cf. ante pp.' 50,·5~,;·61.i-,:6~. 
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cooperation· coupled with a lessening in the drive for po-
.... 
litic~l-unity had seen their positi~~ predominate. 
?owever, with regard to th_e other Community ins ti tu-
t ions, the political forces that advocated European union 
were also visited with a ,measure of su~cess, albeit meager 
in relation to that of their opponents. The French, in 
. 
particular, had held out for three separate and distinct 
-·Communities organized around independent ins ti tut ions~ In 
.this way each of the two new Communities, Euratom and the EEC, 
would have its own Court of Justice and Parliamentary Assembly 
in addition to a Council and .Commission. In the end, however, 
~he French and other proponents of this stand gave in on 
this one point and allowed for a common Court of Justice and 
Assembly to serve all three Communities .. 2 Actually, a great 
deal was not being given up by this propitiatory action 
inasmuch as the jurisdictions of the Court and of the 
Assembly were to be exercised differently for all three 
Communities. The move was orie of economy of personnel and 
resources rather than of function; nevertheless, it did hold 
'out the promise that the three Communities' executive bodies 
could also be merged at a later d~te. And, in the sense 
2 This was officially accomplished by the Convention 
relating to certain Institutions common to the European 
Communities listed as a connected document to the Treaty 
Establishin~ the European Atomic Energy Community, QQ· cit., 
p. 195. 
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that this in turn could pave the way for a merger of the 
Communitie~ themselves, the action so taken was construed by 
the integrationists as a highly favorable one. 
THE COMMISSION3 
The Euratom Commission is the central executive body 
which serves to implement the provisions of th·e Euratom 
Treaty. Ideally, it .represents only· the interests of the 
Community for which it labors, whereas the Council of Minis-
ters acts to serve, or coordinate, the interests of the 
entire Community on the one hand and the interests of the 
individual nations on the other. The Commission, there-
fore, is rightfully held up as the personification of the 
'community spirit of integration. 
The Commission has a membership of five, all of dif-
ferent nationalities.4 They are chosen for their general 
expertise in Community matters and are theoretically 
3Euratom Treaty, arts. 124-13~ On July 1, 1967, 
the executives of the three Communities (ECSC~ EEC and 
·Euratom) were merged to form one new Commission and Council 
to serve all three. However, other than having its member-
ship changed from five to fourteen, .the new Commission (and 
Council) still administers Euratom as before, i.e .. ~ in 
accordance with the Euratom Treaty. Therefore, this dis-
cussion which describes Euratom's institutions before the 
merger,' remains valid· in al.l respects except for Corrunissio.n 
membe~ship. Cf. post p. 195· 
4Luxembourg sends only a permanent representative 
accredited to the Commission. 
'' 
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obligated in their perfcirmance 6f duty only to the Com-
~unity. The Commissioners agree to refrain from any action 
which would undermine the independent character of their 
duties; at the sam_e time, the member states are committed 
to respect this character and to refrain from seeking to 
influence the decisions of the members. 
The members of the Commission are appointed by the 
member nations acting unanimously with the term of appoint-
ment set at four years. The appointment can be renewed. 
Once in office, however, the Commission, as a body, is po-
litically responsible only to the Parliamentary Assembly 
which has the power to censure the Commission and thereby 
force its resignation. On an individual basis, "if a member 
of the Commission no longer fulfills the conditions required 
for the performance of his duties or if he commits ~ serious 
offense, the Court of Justice, acting on a petition of the 
Council or th.e Commission, may declare him removed from 
office."5 Naturally the Court, as the guardian of Community 
law~ may also annul any Commission action which, after due 
process, it determines to be illegal. 
The Commission has a president and vice-president who 
are elected for a two-year renewable term. They are also 
appointed by common agreement among the six nations but, 
5Euratom Treaty, art. 129. 
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·inasmuch as the conclusions of the Commission are reached by 
a· simple majority, the positions are more ceremonial than 
functiona·l. 
6. 
Finally; with regard to Treaty provisions, a 20-man 
Scientific and Technical Committee made up of scientists 
and leaders in atomic industry is attached to the Commis~ion 
as a consultative body. Its members serve foi five years 
with ~enewable terms and are appoint~d by the Council after 
consulting with the Commission. They may not be bound by 
any mandatory instructions and are consulted by the Com-
mission in all cases where provided by the Tre~ty and when-
ever the Commission considers it desirable.7 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERs8 
The Council is the only Community institution whose 
members are representatives of the national governments; 
each of the six sends a minister to the Council meetings, 
6The Euratom Presidency has traditionally been given 
to a French~an (Loui~ Armand, Etinne Hirsch, Pierre Chatenet) 
perhaps signifying the position of leadership of the French 
nation among the Six in nuclear technology. A German has 
always headed the Common Market and an Italian, the ECSC. 
7Euratom Treaty, art. 134. This Committee is not to 
be confused with the Consultative Committee for Research which 
was set up in 1961 by the Council in order to bring national 
viewpoints before tbe Commission with regard to the Community's 
continuing nuclear research program. This latter body consists 
of national nuclear. financial and budgetary experts who meet 
with the Commissioners· under the chairmanship of the Com-
mission's President. Mic;hael Curtis, Western European Inte-
gration (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), P· 227. 
·8Euratom T~eaty. arts. 115-123. 
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preferably "one whose expertise or governmental po~ition 
qualifies him to discuss the particula~ matters which are 
to be included in the 9ouncil's agenda. On many occasions, 
particularly during periods of crisis within the Community, 
meetings of the Council have been held at the foreign 
minister levei.9 
Whereas the Commission has a formal meeting on a 
weekly basis; the Council meets when.called by the acting 
president, either at his own initiative or at the request 
of another member of the Council or Commission. The riffice 
of .president is rotated every six months through the Council 
membership based :upon the alphabetical order of the member 
t . 10 na ions. 
As mentioned previously, the Council serves both the 
interests of the Community and those of the member states. 
9For example, in May and June of 1965 the Council 
met under French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville 
to hold critical discussions concerning budgetary considera-
tions in recasting the second five-year research and develop-
ment program. Ninth General Report, p. 99. · 
lOFrom Euratom's beginning in 1958 until the end of 
1965, the Council held 105 sessions, with the sessions last-
ing from one to three days. However, the yearly variations 
are too great to consider an annual average. During the 
first three years the Council met .24 times; during the one-
year period from March 1964 to February 1965 they met 21 
times· this total was almost halved the following twelve month~ when only 12 sessions were held. First to Ninth 
General Reports, passim. 
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It is usually the dquncil that makes the final decisions for 
the Community, but this power is tempered to a degree by the 
provision that, in most cases, Council decisions must be 
taken on a Commission proposal. In those instances where 
the Council wishes to act on a Commission proposal which it 
has amended, .it may do so only with unanimity. Thus, the 
power balance of Euratom has bee~ reoriented when compared 
with that of its predecessor, the ..European Coal and Steel 
Community. More will be said of ·this in a subsequent para-
11 graph of this chapter. 
Council decisions ·are taken in one of three ways; 
unanimously, by simple majority, or by a qualified (weighted) 
majority. These variations are, of course, employed to 
bring ~s much equality as possible to Council discussions 
while at the same time recognizing the political and eco-
nomic realities of life among large and small countries. To 
do otherwise, that is, to ignore the desires of any ~wo of 
the three large nations at a given time would either split 
the Community or render the Council worthless. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the Council makes all important 
b .. t. 12 decisions either by a qualified majority or Y unan1m1 y. 
11 
Cf. post p. 118 · 
• 12 It is j~portant to note that unanimity is not 
voided by abstentions. Euratom Treaty, art. 118. 
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This would include such sensitive areas as price control, 
investment, rationing of nuclear supplies, the creation of 
joint enterprises and others where the vote of each of the 
three large states is given twice the value of that of 
Belgium or the Netherlands and four time~ over the vot~ of 
Luxembourg. In all other cases, where the Treaty does not 
provide differently, decisions are based upon a simple 
. . t 13 maJor1 y. 
At the time of the drafting of the Rome Treaties, the 
negotiators realized that in o~der to afford consistency to 
Council meetings and to prepare.the groundwork for every 
meeting, it would be necessary for each nation to provide a 
permanent delegation in whatever place the Community institu-
tions were to establish residency. Both the Euratom and 
EEG Treaties, unlike that of the ECSC, reflected this 
realization by allowing the Council of Ministers to rrprovide 
for the establishment of a committee· composed of representa-
tives of Member Sta testr. whose task and competence would be 
determined by the Council itselr. 14 
l3Refer to Appendix for a tabulation of voting weights 
and financial quotas assigned the six member nations. 
i4 . . Euratom Treaty art. 121; Common Market Treaty, art. 
151. The ECSC Treaty did not call for such a.committee, but 
one was organized by the states ou~ of. necess1 ty < and ~ras 
desigria tea the Co:nm·i ttee for Coordination (COCORJ. This 
later became the model for the committee s~t up to.serve 
the new Communities. Political and Econcmic Planning, 
.Q.Q• cit., p. 309. 
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The Committee of Permanent Representatives was there-
fore established to serve both Communities, and each nation 
was represented by one member of ambassadorial rank who· 
served as head of his nation's delegation. The size of the 
delegation was left to national desires and eventually all 
delegations stabilized at 20-25 members, with Luxembourg 
the obvious exception, needing a membership of only three. 
. . 
With regard to Euratom alone, each of the six nations has 
assigned at least one high-ranking official to look after 
matters concerning the Atomic Community. The Belgium repre-
sentative, for instance,. is the second-ranked official be-
hind the Ambassador in that country's delegation.15 
The Committee of Permanent Representatives, and their 
-delegations, have come to play a vital role in the workings 
of both Communities. They are normally represented not only 
on pra~tically all committees and working groups organized · 
for the Council, but are also in attendance at group meetings 
f th C . . . 16 of experts working under the aegis o e omrn1ssion. 
l5In the beginning, ·Belgium provided delegates for 
both the EEC and Euratom, but later merged the two groups to 
conform with the practice of the other nations. As noted, 
the head of delegation has been given ambassadorial rank, 
and all delegates have been given diplomatic immunity ex-
cept of course the Belgians. Emile Noel, "The Committee ~f 
Permanent Representatives,'' Journal of Common Market Studies, 
V, No 1 3 (March 1967), pp. 219-221. M.:No~l ha~ held the post of Executive Secretary of the ComrnJ.s.sion since 1958. 
16Ibid., p. 224. 
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Thu,s, they present their national views to the Communit~, 
qnd ~lso exhibit before their own governments the overall 
Community spirit. 
THE COURT OF JUSTICEl7 
The Court that originated with the European Coal and 
Steel Community iri 1951 now serves Euratom and the EEC. It 
·is composed of seven members, assisted by two advocates-
general, elected· for a period of six years by the member 
countries. There is no requirement as to the number of 
·judges which may be elected from any one state and, in fact, 
no specification that· they be of the nationality of one of 
the Community's six states •. They must, however, be persons 
.. of "indisputable independence who fulfill the conditions 
required for the holding of the highest judicial office in 
their respective countries or who are jurists of a recog-
. 18 
nised competence." 
17 ' Euratom Treaty, arts. 136-160. 
18 . Ibid., art. 139· The requirements her~ ref~ected 
a change from article 32 of the ECSC Treaty wh~ch simply 
called for judges appointed from among ~pe~son~ of recog-
nized independence and competence." T~is implied ~hat 
formal legal training was not a necessity for appointment 
and, in fact, one of the Court's first members, P.J.S. 
Serrarens from the Netherlands, was not a lawyer but 
' rather a Catholic labor leader, well knqwn on the con-
tinent for his work in international trade unions. Mason, 
QQ• cit., p. 41. 
.. 
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Although the six-year term, with eligibility for re-
appointment, does not compare favorably with the tenure of 
judges in the courts of Western nations, the Community judges 
are relatively secure during their time in office inasmuch 
as they rtmay be deprived of office • • • only if, in the 
unanimous opinion of.the judges- and advocates-general of 
the Court, they no longer fulfill the required conditions 
or meet the obligations resulting from their office.rrl9 
The most striking aspect of the Court is the diversity 
of juris~iction, rrror in some respects it is international, 
in others administrative, in others civil and in others 
criminal. 1120 Thus, international jurisdiction is evidenced 
by the fact that disputes between member states concerning 
application of the Tre~ty, or violition of ·any rule of law 
relating to its application, may be submitted to the Court 
by one or both of the disputants without any special agree-
ment between them; 21 administrat~ve decisions of the Coun-
cil or Commission may be challenged.before the Court by 
l9Protocol on the Statute of .the Court of Justice, 
art. 6· listed as a connected document to the Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, .Q.!2.• cit., 
p. 177· 
20n. G. Valentine, rrThe First Judgements of the 
Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community,rr 
Modern Law Review, :XX (November 1957), P· 597. 
21 4 Euratom Treaty, art. 1 2. 
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member states or enterprises on the grounds of lack of 
. ;, 
legal competence, errors of substantial form, violations of· 
the Treaty, or abuse of powers; 22 civil jurisdiction is 
included in·article 151 which allows the Court competence 
to hear cases concerning compensation for damages against 
the Community, where the damage has resulted from an action 
by the Community institutions or by its employees in their 
performance of duty; and, finally, c"riminal jurisdiction is 
conferred on the Court by the provision that it may remove 
any member of the Commission who is found by the Court to 
have committed a serious offense. 23 
In.analyzing the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
Community law on one hand, and the member.states' jurisdic-
tion and municipal law on the other, Gerhard Bebr writes 
that 1t ••• in contrast to the principle of equality of 
legal systems which characterizes traditional conflicts 
rules, the Community law is in most respects superior to any 
24 brancih of ihe member states' public ·laws." This, of 
course, must necessarily be the case if Euratom and the 
22
rbid., art. 146. 
23Ibid., art. 129. 
24Gerhard Bebr, "The Relation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community Lmv to the Law of the Member States, 
A Peculiar Lega;_ Symbiosis," Columbia Law RevieH, LVIII 
(June 1958), p. 768. 
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other Communities are to attain the lofty objectives as out-
lined in the Treaties. If, on the other hand, the principle 
of equality of legal ~ystems were to remain, "the independent 
operation of the Community would be seriously threatened 
and the pursuance of its objectives frustrated. 112 5 The 
Court, therefore, theoretically exercises its jurisdiction 
without fear of repeated encroachment over the entire scope 
of what can be termed strictly Community matters, while the 
domain of private law is left to the jurisdiction of the 
member states. Without such a Community jurisdiction "the 
independent, supranational aspect of the Community would be 
26 lost to the particularistic policies of the member states." 
It is true that at p~esent the Court serves three 
masters, the three Communities, and must function for each 
in accordance ~ith the particular Treaty provisions. 27 
However, it is also true that the Court, because it serves 
all three Communities, can provide a powerful unifying force 
25Ibid., p. 769. 
26 Ibid. 
27with regard to Euratom, the Court had very few 
cases brou~ht before it during the early years of the Com-
munity rs e~is tence primarily because nuclear industry vlas 
then in its infanci. Activity ha~ increased lately, how-
ever and the future undoubtedly holds more, not less, 
Court action for this Community. First-Ninth General 
Report passim· th~ Ninth General Report makes reference 
to 16 ~ases br~ught before it for the period March 1965-
February 1966; p. 101. 
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to assist the entire Community undertaking in the quest for 
ever· closer economic and political ties. The Treaties, for 
all practical purpos~s, have established an autonomous 
legal system,- independent of the member states, the charac-
ter of which cannot be compared with the traditional form 
of international organization. In accordance with the 
Treaties, the member states are committed to take all nec-
essary measures to facilitate the pursuance of Community 
objectives, and their national courts are obliged to re-
solve conflicts between Community law and national law in 
favor of the Community. Even where the supremacy of the 
Treaties over national legislation is not guaranteed, the 
states are committed not to pass legislation which is 
contrary to Treaty provisions. Thus, the supremacy of 
Community law cannot help but to serve as a unifying in-
.. 
fluence. 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY28 
Like the Court of Justice, the European Parliamentary 
Assembly serves all three Communities in accordance with the 
28Euratom Treaty, arts. 107-114. As originally 
conceived in the ECSC Treaty, the name given to the Com-
munity's parliamentary body was the Common Assembly; this 
was altered in March 1958, when it was enlarged and 
rechristened the European Parliamentary.Assembly; co~mon 
usage since then has shortened this to European Parliament. 
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provisions of the respective Treaties. It is composed of 
142 members appointed from the six national legislatures, 
with the three large ~ations each holdirig 36 seats, Belgium 
and the Netherlands having 14 seats each, and Luxembourg 
,· 
assigned 6. The members pay due deference to the spirit of 
the European movement by sea ting themselves not ac.cording 
to national.ity but by party affiliation. The three major 
political parties of the Six are represented, namely, the 
Christian Democrats, today the largest, followed by the 
Sociaiists and the Liberals.. At present, the European 
Democratic Union, consisting of 15 Gaullist delegates from 
the French Na tio.nal Assembly, is also represented~ Theo-
retically, all the delegates are there as representatives 
of the people and not the states. 29 
The power of the Assembly, if it can be called that, 
lies on the fringe of what is normally considered parlia-
mentary sovereignty. In other words, the Assembly does 
·not hold the legislative function; this belongs to the 
Council in concert with the Commission. Its power is 
29The notable absence of the Communist Party from 
representation in the Assembly appreciably affects the com-
position of the French and Italian delegations. However, 
with the Communists obdurately opposed to the unification 
movement, their absence has probably prevented the Assembly 
from being unduly employed as a platfor~ to exacerbate po-
litic~l party antipathy rather than to seek reasoned com-
promise. 
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largely dependent upon the influence it can foster through 
public political debate concerning the operation of each 
Community, and upon the usef~lness of the Committee work 
which insures that the Assembly's r~le is not a passive 
one, but is in active su t f th · · 30 ppor o. e Community's efforts. 
The Assembly also has the right to force the resignation of 
.the Commission based upon a vote .of censure passed by a two-
thirds majority. However, this action does not have 
entirely the same meaning with regard to Euratom as it does 
with the ECSC where the High Authority is the decision-
makirig body. The Council of Euratom (and the EEC) is the 
policy maker and it serves with impunity in regard to its 
relations with the Assembly. Therefore, removal of the 
Commission by the Assembly would show· little more than that 
the delegates were disenchanted with Community progress and 
30 
Although the number may vary from time to time, 
twelve committees presently contribute to the Parliamentary 
effort. The majority of these consist of 29 members with 
the desired representation including seven from each of the 
three large nations. 4 each from Belgium and the Netherlands, 
and 2 from Luxembourg. The smaller committees have seven-
teen members with a ratio of 4:2:1. Those that concern 
Euratom the most are the committees on Energy Policy, 
Scientific and Technical Research, and Administration of 
the European Parliament and the Budgeting of the Communi-
ties. Franz C. Heidelberg, "Parliamentary Control and 
Political Groups in the Three European Regional Communi-
ties, 11 European Regional Communities, _.QR· cit., P • 86, 87; 
and European Community, No. 101 (Washington: European 
Community Information Service,.March 19??), P· 21. Here-
after cited as European Community Bulle~~n. 
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had decided to show this dissatisfaction. However, a new 
C.ommission would then have to be reelected by the states, as 
.before, and the same conditions might prevail ·inasmuch as the 
. . 
policy-making _Council would remain untouched and int~ct. 31 
Unlike national parliaments which have the right to.approve, 
change or reject legislation brought before them, ·the 
European Pa~liament is empowered only to hear and offer an 
. . 
opinion on Commission proposals before the Council takes 
action on them. However, it can neither veto nor alter a 
Council decision once it has been taken. In .this respect, 
the Assembly's influence is strongest just before a Com-
mission proposal. At this stage, the committees go to work 
with the Commission representatives, sifting ideas and recom-
mendations until a course of action emerges. Thus, the 
Assembly does have its sah and its influence can be trans-
. lated into Community action.3 2 
3lHerr Heidelberg points out, however, that a dif-
ference exists in the Parliament's powers with regard to this 
problem in the ECSC and Euratom. As he notes, "whereas the 
High Authority can be called upon to resign only once in the 
course of a year--on the basis of its General Report--votes 
of no confidence in the EEC and Euratom Commissions are permis-
sible at any time. The result may be that the Assembly gains 
a say in the appointment of the Commissions, inasmuch as it 
can go on moving and adopting votes of no confidence until 
the governments finally accede to its wishes." Franz C. 
Heidelberg, ..Q.£• cit.~ p. 87. 
. . 32European Community Bulletin, No;, 101,. March 1967, 
p. 22.· The suggestion is also made that even if the European 
Parliament had the power to veto the Council, in few instances 
so far (perhaps none) would it.have wielded it. T~e frequent 
disagreements between the Parli~ment and ~h? Counc~l of 
Ministers mainly concern ommissions: decisions which have 
not been made, delays, crises." Ibid. 
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Although the technical complexity of the Euratom 
Treaty has allowed this particular Community somewhat more 
freedom from scrutiny by the Parliament than that of its 
sister Communities, nonetheless it has not prevented regu-
lar parliamentary debate frcm•taking place on the nuclear 
33 problem. The Treaty provides that the Parliament must 
be consulted concerning such items as the preparation of 
the operational and research and investment budgets, the 
approval of security norms, property relations and the 
inspection system, among others. In actual practice, four 
main areas for discussion have come to the fore and can be 
delineated as follows: 
1. The development of a European nuclear industry 
on a comp~titive basis; 
2. Cooperation with nonmember countries, primarily 
the United States; 
3. The establishment of the basic standards for the 
protection of workers and the general public; and 
4-. The encouragement oT technical and scientific 
research in the field of nuclear energy. 34 
33Guy Van Oudenhove, The Political Parties j? 
European Parliament--The First Ten Years (The Hague. 
A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1965), P· 206. 




As might be expected, and entirely in consonance 
with the Community spirit, the varying positions taken by 
the three major political groupings concerning the nuclear 
Community have been roundly discussed and vigorously debated 
on more than just a few occasions. Generally speaking, the 
Socialists and the Liberals are diametrically opposed in 
their views, with the Christian Democrats taking a position 
somewhere between the two. The Socialists have argued for 
strict control of fissionable materials, for the placing of 
power plants in a public utilities category and therefore 
under authority control, and for limited private ownership 
in other categories only where the Community shares the 
profits as weli as_ the costs. The Liberal view demands that 
private enterprise play the main role, with gover11ments in 
a supervisory capacity, and with Euratom acting the role of 
coordinator and stimulator for greater effort. And the 
Christian Democrats call for coordination among all parties, 
asking for private enterprise where 9oits and lack of tech-
nical ability are not prohibitive factors, and calling upon 
governments to take over the tasks that the private sector 
- . 35 
in unwilling to risk or incapable of handling. Thus, the 
Socialists call for official intervention on a broad scale, 
the Liberals fear a dirigiste policy, and the Christian 









Democrats s~ek the middle ground; and the spirited debate 
serves to bolster, rather th d an ampen, the European spirit 
simply b.ecause it pays deference t o a Community movement 
rather than nationalistic whims. 
, 
Unfortunately, however, nationalistic desires have 
not always been eliminated from parliamentary debate, and 
although i"t t · appears o be the exception rather than the norm, 
this can be expected to continue in varying degrees for the 
foreseeable future.36 Not until the European Parliament is 
elected, not by the member nation~, but by general and direct 
sufferage, can there be any real chance of giving the 
Parliament the legislative power it needs to provide 
representation for all the people of the Community. The 
three Community Treaties carry a proposal for this action, 
36
one outstanding example of this concerns the Italian 
·· position regarding a Community energy policy. In January of 
1962, a draft resolution for the coordination of energy 
policies was brought before a plenary session of the European 
Parliament. Having been hammered ou~ in the Energy Committee, 
the program was considered to be acceptable to the three 
major political parties. However, the Italian delegates, 
disregarding their party affiliations and reflecting their 
nation's weak position in petroleum and coal resources, cast 
their vote as a national group against what they considered 
·too severe a limitation on their nation's need to import 
energy supplies from outside the Community. The outcome of 
this conflict saw the adoption of a resolution by a majority 
composed of five nationalities and three political parties 
against a minority consisting of Italians of all parties. 
As the author notes, this insertion of nationalism into 
Community debate which prior to this had consisted of "inter-
party compromise or supranati?nal st~ife" ~onstituted a back-
ward step for European Community policy. van Oudenhove, 





but inasmuch as it requires concurrent action by each 
national parliament, each of the six governments, and by 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament itself, 
the ch~nge will not be easy nor soon in coming.37 
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE3B . 
Brief mention must be made· of this consul ta ti ve body, 
composed of 101 members, which represents the interests of 
varied economic and social organizations throughout the 
Community. The Economic and Social Committee was conceived 
to ·advise the Commissions and Councils of both Eura tom and 
the EEC. It can b~ considered a more formal version of the 
Coal and Steel Community's Consultative Committee, with 
greater independence and more important powers.39 The Com-
mittee members, appointed by reason of their p~rsonal stand-
ing in the Community and not bound by national commitments, 
are elected for four years by the Council acting on a Com-
mission proposal. The Committee selects its own chairman, 
adopts its own rules of procedure, and divides itself into 
specialized sections. One of these handles nuclear problems. 
37Euratom Treaty, art. 108(3). 
38Ibid. arts. 165-170. 
-:----- ' . 
• 39Political and Economic Planning, .912· cit., P· 313. 
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In certain cases provided by the Euratom Treaty, the 
·committee must be consulted.4° For example, matters concern-
ing basic standards for the protection of health, problems 
of public· safety, and changes in the Community's research 
prograrifs, must be placed.before the Committee for its comment 
prior to Council action. However, the Commission and the 
C~uncil may consult with the Committee whenever such action 
is deemed appropriate. Judicious use of this panoply of 
talent- ·can only enhance the soundness of Community decisions. 
THE POLICY-MAKING FUNCTION 
In broad terms it can be stated that the Euratom 
Commission and Council jointly exercise the legislative 
power of the Community; they are empow~red to issue regula-
tions, directive~ and decisions which are binding upon the 
member nations, and upon persons and enterprises that come 
under the jurisdiction of the Community. 41 This, therefore, 
implies that Euratom, to some extent, exhibits the distinct 
features of the federal system. However, inasmuch as the 
40 Euratom Treaty, art. 170. 
41According to article 196 of the Euratom Treaty, 
the persons and enterprises referred to a:e natu:al persons, 
enterprises or institutions, whatever their public or 
private legal position, which are wh?lly o: ~a~tly e~gaged 
in the territories of member states in activities which 
come within the area defined by the Treaty. 
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Commission represerits the Community, and the Council repre-
sents· national interests, one must determine to what degree 
the Cmnmission can act independently of the Council and, 
when working with the Council, what relationships pertain, 
before ~n accurate p1' t f th · c ure o e federative characteristics 
can be developed. Inherent in such a discussion, which has 
stirred continuing debate since the inception of the 
European movement, is a comparison of the powers of the 
executfve bodies of all three Communities, i.e., the High 
Authority and the Council of the ECSC and the Commissions 
and Councils of Euratom and the EEC. 
It is generally agreed that Euratom's Commission was 
granted powers the number and potency of which lie somewhere 
between those of the High Authority of the ECSC and those of 
th EEC C . .- 42 e omm1ss1on. If anything, Euratom is closer to its 
sister Community the EEC than it is to the ECSC, although 
one close observer thinks that Euratom's Commission has 
powers which are "about halfway" between those of the other 
two Communities. 43 The essential difference between Euratom's 
42For similar discussion on the comparison of execu-
tive powers see Emile Benoit, Europe at Sixes and Sevens 
(New York: 'columbia University Press, 1961), P• 18; Haas, 
QQ.· cit., pp. 305-307; and A.H. Robertson, The ~aw ~~~Inter­
national Institutions in Europe (Manchester: Un1ver~1~y Press 
1961), pp. 29-31. 
• 43Former High Authority Vice-President Albe~t C~ppe 
in ttThe Economic and Political Probl?ms of Integration, 
European Regional Communities, QQ• cit., P• 6. ·· 
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Commission and the High Authority is that the latter may 
make irdecisions which shall be binding in every respect" 
while the former finds itself more often than not called 
upon to 11 formulate recommendations or opinions 11 and to 
"participate in the preparation of acts of the Council and 
of the Assembly. 1144 Some examples may help to point up the 
differences.. In the area of finance, the Eura tom Treaty 
establishes a fixed scale for financial contributions by 
member states in accordance with the size and productivity 
of each nation, Germany and France paying the largest 
45 
amount. . In addition, under article 173, the Treaty recog-
nizes the probabi.lity that member states' contributions may 
in the future have to be supplemented by the imposition of 
levies on nuclear industry thr.oughout the Community. Article 
173 continues by stating: 
For this purpose, the Commission shall submit to 
the Council proposals concerning the • 
particulars of collection of such levies. 
The Council, acting by means of a unanimou~ 
vote ••• may lay down provisions whose.adoption 
it shall recommend to the member states in ac-
cordanc~ with their respective constitutional 
rules. 
Briefly stated, the Commission proposes but the unanimous con-
sent of the Council is neciessary before action can be taken. 
44ECSC Treaty, art. 14; Euratom Treaty, art. 124. 






This alignment of power can be contrasted with the 
power vested in the High Authority of the ECSC in a similar 
si tua ti on. Under the heading "Financial Provisionst1 article 
49 of the ECSC Treaty states that "the High Authority is 
empower.ed to procure the funds necessary to the accomplish-
ment of its mission • •• by imposing levies on the production 
o·f coal and steel• • · • . 11 Article. 50 continues with the 
following: 
The levies shall be assessed annually on the 
various products according to their value; how-
ever, the rate of the levy may not exceed one 
percent unless previously authorized by a two-
thirds ~ajority of the Council. • • • The~­
High Authority may impose increases of not more 
than 5 percent for each three month 1 s delay in 
payment. • • • 
It is, therefore, easy to see that the.power structure as 
established by the two Treaties in this area diff~rs radi-
cally. Not only can the High Authority impose levies on its 
own initiative but an increase in such levies may be granted 
by less than full concurrence of the Council members. No 
one member can impose its will upon the rest of the Community 
to the detriment of the majority. No comparable power has 
been given to Euratom 1 s Commission. 
Another significant variation may be found in the 
area concerning price-fixing. If such measures are found 
necessary to maintain an orderly and sta~le market, both 
Treaties make provisions for the fixing of prices. In the 
·case of Eura tom, article 69 gives this power to the Council. 
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"The Council may fix prices acting by means of a unanimous 
vote bn a proposal of the Commission." On the other hand, 
and, again in direct contrast, article 61 of the ECSC Treaty 
has this to say: 
. On the basis.of studies undertaken jointly 
with the enterprises and their association 
••• and after consulting the Consultative 
Committee and the Council · ••• the High 
.Authority may fix for one or more products 
subject to its jurisdiction: · 
a. Maximum prices within the common market. . . . 
b. Minimum prices within the common market .• 46 
Granting the fact that price-fixing at present is of greater 
significance in the coal and steel sector as compared to the 
relatively new nuclear market, this in no way invalidates 
the consequence of the variation in po~icy-making control. 
In the coal and steel sector, the High Authority does the 
price-fixing after consulting the Council. In the atomic 
field, the Council fixes prices after hearing the Commission's 
proposals. 
Other similar examples may be given showing the 
variety in the policy-making functions of the t~rn Communi-
ties as provided for by their Treaties. The Euratom Com-
mission is particularly hampered in exercising control over 
the Community by the fact that its jurisdiction does not 
• 46Underscoring has been added in all cases to 
facilitate comparisons. 
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incluqe that part of the nuclear ipdustry which is in any 
way engaged in the military application of nuclear power. 47 
• 
It is not impossible to realize that in the future the mili-
tary aspects of nuclear research and development may account 
for a significant part of the entire nuclear program, at 
least in a few of the nations of the Comm_unity. 
In the area of "compelling'.' cooperation, the Euratom 
Commission may impose penalties where enterprises misuse 
Community supplied nuclear materfals, but no imposition of 
fines is allowea.
48 
In addition, in the area of research, 
the Commission can request but cannot compel member states 
to disclose to it important discoveries in the nuclear field. 49 
Also, states may negotiate with "third partiesrr (outside the 
Community) for purposes of the supply of materials, coordina-
tion of research programs, and the like, all in the name of 
defense, and do so free from Euratom's surveillance. In 
short, Euratom control over the nuclear sector of industry 
is anything but complete. 
47Article 84 of the Euratom Treaty states the fol-
lowing: "Control may not ~xtend t? materials int;nded fo:: 
the purposes of defense which are in course of be~ng specially 
prepared for such purpose or whic~, after bei~g so pr~pared, 
are, in accordance with an operational plan, installca or 
stocked in a military establishment." 
48cf. ante p. 8,5. 








tions of price structures, and concentrations and cartels; 
. . 
it can control production when conditions warrant such a 
measure, reg?late investment, and in general maintain a 
fairly tight rein on the activities of enterpriies through-
out the entire cpal and steel sector.50 In· short, the 
federative characteristics of the Coal and Steel Community 
are more readily discernible than those of Euratom. 
With regard to a similar comparison of Euratom and the 
EEC; the Euratom Commission appears to have a greater free-
dom for action without recourse to the Council than does the 
Common Market Commission, although the disparity does not 
nearly approach in magnitude the differences already dis-
cussed between Euratom and the ECSC. In the first place, 
the scope of the Euratom Treaty is much narrower than that 
of the Common Market, as it pertains only to the relatively 
small nuclear sector of the six-nation Community. Conse-
quently, actions taken do not impinge upon national interests 
as often as actions taken in the much more expansive sector 
of the Common Market. Secondly, the Euratom Treaty is a 
50ECSC Treaty, arts. 54-67, passim. 
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hi~hly 'technical document wh1"ch h as incorporated ~ithin it a 
.. 
good deal more legislation than does the less complex and more 
generally defined EEC ~reaty. The result of this is that 
fewer questions of policy remain to be decided for Euratom 
than for the EEC. Finally, the Euratom Commission had the 
benefit of starting work in an area where national interests 
had not yet been clearly defined. Therefore, the Community 
exercise. of power would tend to be criticized less fre-
quently by the member nations than would actions taken by 
the EEC Commission in such perennially contentious areas as 
farm support prices, tariff reductions, ·import controls, 
and the like.51 
Ore other area of notable difference between the ECSC 
and Euratom (and the EEC) concerns the method for selecting 
the members of the "independent" executives, th~ High Authority 
and the Commission. The desire to keep the members ·of the 
High Authority free from national influence was immediately 
5l0n this subject, the French jurist and political 
scientist Paul Reuter writes that "1,.1i th respect to ECSC and, 
to a lesser extent Euratom, the Member States could set 
· forth in the very text of the signed agreements the essen-
tials of the rules to be applied. Such was not true as to 
the EEC because of the wide range of the subject matter. The 
agreement creating EEC contains cer~a~n relati~ely precise 
rules on some points (such as the.t1~1ng for disappearance 
of customs and quantitative ~estr1ctions);.but,"as for the 
rest it contains only principles and promises. Paul 
Reut~r· rtJuridical and Institutional Aspects of the European 
Region~l Communities," European Regional Communities, 
.QQ• cit., p. 36. 
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evident in the formative years of the European movement. 
The nine memb~rs were nominated by.the Community nations 
for.the relatively long period of six years, and the 
. orig.inal members were given the ri· ght · f t o co-op ion in renew-
ing member?hip which, when viewed with respect to the govern-
mental po~er to ~ominate, helped to enhance the independence 
of the High AuthO'rity members. In. contrast with this pro-
cedure, therefore, the desire to protect the independence of 
the Euratom Commission appears to have wan~d considerably, 
for the Commissioners are nominated for a period of only 
52 four years and the right of co-option has disappeared. 
52 Actions of the French Gove~nment emphasize the 
debilitating effect this lack of subst~ntial tenure might 
have on the performance of Commission members. France re-
fused to renominate Etienne Hirsch, who had presided as 
President of the Euratom Commission, for his opposition to 
the French Government's position concerning Euratom sub-
sidies to nuclear industry. Instead, Pierre Cha tenet · .... 'as 
selected to replace Hirsch. The suggestion that Chatenet 1 s 
performance on the Commission has been less than stimulating 
and more in conformance with French desires than those of 
the Community as a whole, has been put forth on several 
occasions. For example, see Nucleonics week, Vol. 8, No. 29, 
July 20,1967. Also, this French action serves as a repeat 
performance in that, almost a decade previous, the.coalition 
cabinet of Premier Edgar Faure had refused to continue Jean 
Monnet as a member of the High Authority for precisely the 
same reason--his promotion of the Community position in 
opposition to that of his own government. (Cf. ante, P• 20.) 
This. in turn tends to point up the fact that at least 
with' regard t~ European integration, and its rate of progress, 
the Government of General de Gaulle has intensified, but 
not changed, the position of calculated opposition.which the 
Government of France has shown all along to the mo1e fervent 
advocates of European union. 
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Something must also be said about two ·other facets 
of the policy-making function in Euratom before closing this 
chapter. As pointed out already, the right of the Commission 
to make proposals to the Council scarcely- compares with the 
powers of the decision-making High Authority. Nevertheless, 
Commission proposals can, in some instances have an im-
. ' 
portant juriµical effect on Community proceedings, or lack 
thereof. It has been stated that if the Council wishes to 
change a Commission proposal, unanimity must prevail. 
Otherwise, for most cases, the proposals are either accepted 
by a qualified majority vote in the Council, or are rejected 
with the problem remaining unsolved. If the Council chooses 
this latter position, then the Commission can rework the pro-
posal for resubmission. In doing this, the Commission first 
sounds out the Council members in an attempt to strike a 
common ground. Thus, the Commission comes to play the important 
role of mediating national conflicts that break out in the 
c·ouncil, ·and also retains the initiative in directing the 
Community's attention to areas of its own particular concern. 
The second matter of importance concerns the actions 
of the Council of Ministers. The Council meets only periodically, 
and, even then, different ministers may be, and usually are , 
chosen in accordance with the nature of the problems under 
discus~ion. Thus, the national ministers· have come to rely 
heavily on the work of their permanent delegations in Brussels 
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and, concomitantly, the delegates have come to play an 
increasingly important and powerful role. Undoubtedly, 
theY are there to.represent the position of their national 
governments in Community councils; but' because they remain 
in Brussels and must necessarily work in close harmony with 
their counterparts and with the new breed of European, the 
C'ommunity European, or Eurocrat, then it just may be that 
they will provide a greater force in the future for European 
integration than was originally envisaged or.intended.53 
53For a discussion of this point see ~oel, ~· cit., 
· A recent example of the increasingly 
PP• 219-251 passim. t delecrations .have come to play import~nt role the perm~nen ~orke~ out first by the national 
is found in t~e compro~~se, ~nd to Euratom's budget crisis 
delegates, which brou~ .an l 20 1967. 
for 1967. New Yort Times, Ju_y ' 
CHAPTER V 
EURATOM IN OPERATION 
In May_ 1957, the report A Target for Euratom was 
published and was .widely acclaimed as a blueprint for 
. 1 
Euratom progress. Just as the work of Monnet and his 
Ac ti on Commi_t tee, along with the efforts of Paul Henri 
Spaak, had been predominant factors in the creation of 
Eµratom; so too would this study by the so-called "three 
wise men" have a profound effect on the course the Eura tom 
Commissioners would take in steering the Community through 
its formative stages. 
Unfortunately, however, the goals proposed by the 
study proved to be overly ambitious and not in keeping with 
the longer term economic and political realities which, al-
though temporarily obfuscated by the effects of the Suez 
crisis, ~ould become .all too clear in the Community's first 
years of operation. The enthusiasm which greeted the pub-
lication of the report was also short-lived when it became 
apparent that the case for nuclear power had been overstated, 
1 A Target for Euratom. A Report s~bmitt~d by 
Louis Armand, Franz Etzel, and Francesco G1ordani at the 
request of the Governments of Belgium, France, Ge'man 
Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembo~rg, and.the Netherl~nds, 
(Washipgton: Comrrunity Information Service, May 1957). 
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and reevaluations of Community goals began to appear shortly 
after·the Euratom Commissioners had begun their work. 
~~e three wise men made a strong case for the goals 
they prop~sed in their study by pointing to the Suez crisis 
.and Europe's dependence o~ Middle .East oil. They stated 
their position in the following manner: · 
• • • wi~hout nuclear p"ower, Europe 1 s dependence 
on the Middle East is bound to increase. ~he 
Suez crisis has given us a warning of what this 
could mean. As the quantity of oil imported from 
the Middle East increases, there will be a cor-
·re~ponding increase in the political temptation 
to interfere with the flow of oil from that region. 
A future stoppage could be an economic calamity 
for Europe.2 . 
The conclusion to be drawn from this was obvious. "The 
European economy must be protected against an interruption 
of oil supplies, by finding alternative sources of energy 
to limit the further rise in oil .imports. Only nuclear 
powe~, providing Europe with a new source of energy, can 
achieve this. 11 3 
The target set for Eura tom "\·!as the cons true ti on of a 
- 1 capacity capable of supplying 15 million kilowatts of 
. nuc __ ear 
electrical power to the Community by 1967. The target year 
is interesting for, ironically, the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
. June 1967 closed the Suez Canal for the second time in eleven 
2 Ibid., p. 4. 
31bid. 
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years and with it the Arab t na ions instituted an embargo on 
oil e~ports to some of the Western nations. Almost im-
me~iately cries concern.ing a Western European oil crisis, 
similar to th~ alarm in 1956, were heard in Europe and the 
United States, .and for the moment it appea.red that the three 
wise men had been astonishingly accurate in predicting that 
a rt future stoppage'1 would bring "economic calamity" to Europe. 4 
. . . 
However, this time other factors which were not present in 
1956 came into play, and an oil crisis for Western Europe 
never re~lly had time to develop.5 
4The United States sounded the first alarm and backed 
up its contention with statistics. On June 28. ~hree weeks 
after the Arab-Israeli war, the U.S. Interior bepartment 
warned that Western Europe "!las facing "an immediate petroleum 
shortage of critical proportions." The crisis was said to be 
worse than the situation in 1956-57 when the Suez Canal was 
blocked. At that time the probiem was primarily one concern-
ing the lack of transportation. This time, the Department 
noted, the· problem was compoundec:l by the closing of pipelines, 
a substantial loss in production, and the increased. consump-
tion of oil in Western Europe which had trebled in the 10-
year period. New York Times, June 29, 1967. 
5In less than two months the U.S. Interior Departm~nt 
had reevaluated the situation •. The Department noted that 
the U.S. had no plans for emergency shipments of oil to Europe 
and that its Emero-ency Petroleum Supply Committee, set up 
when the war brok~ out, had found that free-world oil supply 
and demand were in balance. Europe's problem never developed 
because a newer generation of tankers were capab~e 6f carrying 
·more oil around the Cape of Good Hope, North African producers 
.increased production, and the U.S. increas?d shipments ~o 
Europe. Finally, the Arab states, faced with an economic 
crisis of their own from lack of income, ended the boycott, 
reopened. the pipelines and resumed producti0n. New York 
Times, ~ugust 17, 1967 and September 2, 1967. 
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The· Suez crisis of 1956-57 had indirectly added im-
petus· to Euratom's program for nuclear power. In the post-
.Suez period·, with increasing supplies of oil and coal, 
cheaper conventional power plants, and a drop in freight 
rates, the program for nuclear power seemed much less attrac-
tive and so did Euratom. The Community lost a good portion 
of its initiative in the process and it has continually 
sought to recoup at least some of its lost prestige throughout 
the 10 years of its existence. The Suez crisis of 1967, 
unlike the one in 1956, has had no noticeable relation to 
ei t.her the Eura tom progr_ams or to those being conducted on a 
. national level. Yet, in 1967, nuclear industry began to grow 
in_earnest throughout the nations of the Community, just as 
the founders of Euratom had hoped it would a decade ago. 
But, unfortunately, Euratom is not playing the major role 
in this growth. Community effort has given way to national 
programs in too many cases. This has caused o.ne kn01.'1ledge-
a·ble ·observer to refer to Euratom as nothing more than "a 
6 
.·technical and research agency." However, such a description 
appears to be a bit harsh in the light of what Euratom has 
6Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe a~d t~e . 
Unitin of Latin America," Journal of Common MarKet 0tudi?s, 
v, N;.g4 (June 1967), p. 323. Haas n?tes that although wide 
control arid planning powers v.:ere put. :-nto th~ Eura tom Ttrhca ty, 
it nev~r attained the role played by its preaecessor, e 
Coal and Steel Community. 
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accomplished over the past decade. A discussion of Euratomis 
plans; problems and programs follows. 
INITIAL PROJECTIONS 
As already pointed out, A T t 
_ arge for Euratom ap-
peared at a most propitious time in relation to the suez 
crisis. However, there were other reasons for its complete 
acceptance as the Atomic Community's blueprint for success • 
. In the .first place, the ·authors of the report were dubbed 
the "three wise men" not so much as a tongue-in-cheek assess-
ment of their efforts but rather in acknowledged respect of 
their prestigious qualifications. They were established 
experts in energy and atomic.matters, and their report re-
flected this expertise in its preciseness and carefully 
thought-out con~lusions.7 Consequently, their proposal for 
.. ' 15 million kilowatts of electric power produced by nuclear 
plant was confidently and generally accepted. Secondly, 
the trio had traveled to the United States in search of sup-
port for their program and had returned with the enthusiastic 
71ouis Armand was a member of the French Atomic 
Energy Commission (CEA) and authored the first study about 
. the prospects for atomic power in Western Europe;. Franz Etzel 
was a vice-president of the Coal and Steel ~omrnun1t~; and 
Professor Giordani was chairman of the Italian Committee for 
Nuclear Research (CNRN). Appropriately enough, Armand later 
became·Euratom's first president. 
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backing of -the U.S. Governme~t at the highest leve1. 8 
. 
Finally, the report itself, at least at first glance and 
in· the_ absence_ of any .factual data on nuclear power plant 
operation, presented an economically pleasing picture of what 
might be expected in th~ nuclear revolution at hand. 
The report 1 s guidelines for Eura tom were als·o a plus 
factor in that they were simply and readily defined--the 
concentration of effort would be on the building of power 
plants to produce electricity. As stated.in the report, 
rrThough it may be used to propel ships and to heat urban areas, 
the real contribution of nuclear energy in the next twenty 
years will be to produce base-load electricity in big power 
.Station$ • 11 9 This was the recurrent -theme throughout the en-
tire report and Euratom was to be the vehicle by which the 
Community nations would s_ol ve their problems. yery little 
mention was made of the much wider role Euratom was originally 
intended to play in the economic and political fields of 
BA U.S. State Department release, commenting on the 
visit of Mr. Armand and h°is .colleagues, noted that "an ex-
.amination of the Committee's program indicates that its ob-
jective is feasible. Under present circumstances, the 
availability of nuclear fuels is not considered to be a 
limiting factor.rr In short, the U.S. was going to under-
write Euratom's target program by insuring a ready supply 
of nuclear fuel in addition to technical and financial 
assistance. United States Department of State Bulletin 
X:XXVI SFebruary 25, -1957), No. 922, p. 307· 
9! Target for Euratom, p. 4. 
-. 
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integration, in coordination of national efforts in all 
phases of nuclear industry (and not just that relegated to 
producing electricity), and in the particularly vital areas 
of research and training. 
The report admitted 'that a target of 15 million 
kilowatts of nuclear capacity was an ambitious one. 10 But 
its authors gave concrete reasons for the necessity of such 
~ goal and economic facts and figures to support the feasi-
bility of its attainment. They noted that electricity 
consumption in the Community· was doubling every ten to 
twelve years and even if the so-called "p_rivilegedn sources 
of power were developed to the utmost, all of these together 
could not meet more than one-third of the increased electricity 
needs. The remaining two-thirds would have to be provided 
by power-stations fired with imported oil and coal--unless, 
of course, nuclear stations were built instead. They es-
timated that the capacity of these power stations would 
lOibid., p. 6. The goal of 15 million kilowatts re-
fers to the amount of ele·ctric power which was. to be produced 
by nuclear power plants. This figure in its abbreviated 
form might appear as 15 million KWe (or 15,00o· MWe) with 
the lower case e being added to denote electric power as 
distinguished from power in the general sense, e.g., the 
thermal power rating of a nuclear power plant. Briefly 
stated the nuclear power plant is a highly sophisticated furnac~ which ttburnsn uranium to produce heat, the heat, in 
turn being used to ·turn water to steam. The remainder of 
the ~l~ctriciti-producing station consists of conventional 
equipment using conventional methods--turbine, generator, 
switches, etc. 
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amount to 60.5 mi.liion KWe by 1967 and that this, therefore, 
·was the field into which nuclear power could be fitted. 11 
The report stressed· the urgency of the nuclear pro-
gram in the following manner: 
Every year that is_ lost in constructing 
nuclear power stations means that conventional 
stations, requiring increased oil or coal im-
ports--and which will continue to consume oil 
or coal throughout their lifetime of twenty or 
thirty years--will be built instead. In ·view of . 
this situation, Europe must, within the limits set 
by the pattern of electricity production, con- 12 struct nuclear stations as rapidly.as possible. 
It was also noted that because nuclear plants required up 
to four years to build, nuclear power could not be expected 
to provide a big energy contribution before 1963. However, 
from that year on the nuclear contribution would be sig-
nificant and would effectively halt the rise in energy im-
ports. At the time of the report, the Community nations were 
importing 23% of their energy requirements which then 
amounted to slightly more than 100 million metric tons per 
11 5 rt Ibid., p. • ttPri vileged sources of energy were 
those fromWfilc h power could be .derived at sue h a low cost 
that nuclear power would not be in a position to compete with 
them, at least for the foreseeable future. The most im-
portant of these were lignite, blast furnace gas, refuse 
coal, hydr6electric powe~ and geothermic heat, and certain 
rich natural gas deposits. Third General Report, p. 45. 
12Ibid. 
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year (hard coal equivalent) •13 In· '10 years time, 1967, 
the authors estimated that energy imports would double (205-
210 megaton HCE) and would account for 33% of total energy 
consumption--if, of course, nuclear power was .not installed. 
However, with the nuclear target program being met, that is, 
with the installation of 15 million KWe of nuclear plant by 
the end of 1967, some 40-45 million tons of coal equivalent 
per year would be released tending to level imports in the 
1967-68 period to about 165 million metric tons. Taking 
into account the increasing total ~nergy consumption in the 
Community up to 1975, the report notes that a continuing 
nuclear construction program, after 1967 at a more moderate 
rate, would add that much more to the fuel savings and would 
tend to continue the leveling effect on imported energy. 
Thus, imports would remain level at about 165 million tons 
per -year, a point which would otherwise be reached and 
. 14 
passed in 1963. A tabular presentation of this would 
show the following: 
l3 Ibid. , p. 6 and Figure A, rtEnergy imports of six 
countries.n Sin~e oil has a higher calorific value than coal, 
oil tonnages are converted into their hard coal equivalent 
(HCE) to obtain comparable or total figures for energy im-
ports. Similar conversions are used with other sources of 
energy. SomP of the conversion factors used in a Target 
for Euratom are as follows: Hard.coal:--7000 Kcal/Kg; Soft coal--
2100 Kcal/Kg; Oil--10000 Kcal/Kg; and Natural gas--9000 Kcal/Kg. 
• l 4Ibid. , Fi~ure A and Annex III, . p. 32. The appeal 
of a Target for Euratom is perhaps made most obvious by 
these neat and sjmple computations 1.vhich rtsolved" the 
Year 
Without Nuc Pwr 
With Nuc Pwr 










1967 1970 1975 
205 .237 290 
165 165 ,165 
4o. 72 125 
Having shown the need for nuclear power and what it 
could do in stabilizing c~stly imports, the authors then 
turned to the economicaily touchy cost analysis of nuclear 
plant versus the conventional. Four general considerations 
were taken into account which formed the basis for the com-
putations and detailed analysis. These were as follows: 
1. The limited experience available at the time. con-
cerning full-scale power reactors preciuded nuclear electricity 
costs fr_om being anything but estimates. The authors formed 
their ~stimates after discussions with experts from the 
United States Atomic Energy Authority. Therefore; they 
considered their estimates reliable. 
Community's energy problems for more than 15 years into the 
future. However, in retrospect, it becomes all too apparent 
that many of the economic and political va~iables which 
could have effected the program (e.g., the lack of technical 
expertise, the minimum amount of data concerning the actual 
operation of nuclear plants in the Community, and the reli-
ance on outside sources for nuclear fuel as well as technical 
and financial assistance, etc.) were treated all too scantily, 
if at eill. 
. 15The table is based upon A Target for Euratom, 
Figure A ·rrEnergy imports of six c ountrie? 11 ? Annex III, p. 32; 
and Figure E "Capacity of therm~l electricity pl~nt ?rought 
into service each year." The figures are approximations. 
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2. The cos~ of electricity produced by a given re-
actor ·would decrease as operating technique improved. Cost 
estimates, therefore, would be based on an average cost over 
the life of the reactor. Also, fuel costs for a nuclear 
plant were less than half that ·of a conventiorial plant and 
would continue to decline wi th.:better use of the fuel. On 
tp.e othi:;r hand, conventional fuel would continue to rise in 
cost relative to the general level of prices •. 
3. Inasmuch as ·nuclear plants would be built to re-
place only.those new conventional plants which would have 
been burning imported fuel, the comparison of electricity 
costs would also have to take this into account. In short, 
cost comparisons would be made between nuclear plants and 
conventional plants using only imported fuel. 
4. It was ge.nerally agreed by all the best authori-
ties that the cost of nuclear energy, even for the first 
·-generation nuclear plants, would decline in the subsequent 
. 16 
ten to fifteen year period. 
Taking these considerations into account, the authors 
reached the conclusion that the range of costs ·for electricity 
" produced by nuclear reactors could be estimated at 11-14 mills 
per IGrn, while the cost of electricity for imported ·fuel-
fired conventional stations would ·be 11-12 mills per KVIB. 
16 Ibid., pp. 19, 20. 
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Also, while conventional costs would continue higher, nuclear 
costs·would decline. Therefore, the report noted, in view 
of the cost comparison it was clear that nuclear power could 
provide an economic means to stabilize energy imports; and 
it went on to call for the first placement of orders for 
nuclear plant by not later than the end of 1958. 17 
In retrospect, it can be said that the premises upon 
which A Target for Euratom was formulated were generally 
attuned to the conditions prevailing at the time they were 
introduced~ and would als~ probably prove to be sound, if 
not overly conservative, for the period commencing a decade 
after their introduction. However, in the years immediately 
·following the introduction of the target program, from 1958 
and the five years or so subsequent, the relaxation of po-
litical tension in the Middle East, a slight economic reces-
sion with an attendant drop in freight rates, and the .immeas-
urable factor of technological progress in conventional plant 
fueling and construction, all contributed to a widening of 
''the already considerable gap existing between the cost of 
e.lectricity from conventional thermal and from nuclear 
sources.n18 Unfortunately, the birth of Euratom coincided 
precisely with this period of weakening fervor for the 
l?Ibid., p. 20. 
18Third General Report, P· 41. 
building of a nuclear industry. Thus, some of the premises 
upon ~hich the target program were based were found to be 
erroneous, at least for the period in question. And the 
ambitious program for the construction of 15 million kilo-. 
watts of nublear power capacity by 1967 was a failure almost 
before it began. Consequently, the concept of nuclear 
integration and Euratom suffered aJong with it. 19 
REVISED ESTIMATES 
Under article 213 of the Euratom Treaty, the Com-
mission was called upon to make a general survey of nuclear 
industry in the Community and, within a p~riod of six months 
after taking office, required to present the findings to 
the European Parliament. Such a report was made in June 
1958, and, although it followed A Target for Eura tom by only 
19The London Economist laid part of the blame on 
Euratom's agreement with the United States to combine efforts 
in the construction of nuclear plants. Said the Economist 
"· •• the obvious reluctance of electricity undertakings 
even to put forward proposals for consideration under the joint _programme (U.S.-Euratom) is a warning to Euratom, if any 
warning were.nestled, that nuclear power on the present American 
pattern will not be accepted in Western Europe. The horse ~ 
refuses to drink.tr The Economist, March 19, 1960, p. 1138. 
However, it is difficult to imagine any other alternative 
for Euratom at the time inasmuch as United States assistance 
offered the Community its only chance for an immediate suc-
cess in the power field. The United Kingdom was dev~loping 
its- own nuclear industry but had neither th8 physical 
capacity nor, apparently, the desire to help Euratom. On 
this point see Folach, .QR• cit., p. 133. 
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a~year and was conducted under the guidance of Louis Armand 
as Commission President, the report reflected the waning 
en~husiasm for nuclear power and pulled back considerably 
from the Pro 1 d t . t . f l" 20 . . posa s an es ima es o a year ear ier. 
The report discussed the various applications of 
nuclear energy but stayed with the contention that the primary 
application of it would be in prov~ding elec~ricity. Follow-
ing the ·same line of reasoning used in A Target for Euratom, 
the r~port stressed the point that in meeting the incre&sed 
dema·nd for electrical power, nuclear energy would only find 
economical use in replacing conventiona~ stations using im-
ported oil or, ·in some cp.ses, coal. And, citing the increased 
demands 'for e],.ect.ri.ci ty, which it said would double from 1955 
to 1965 and would be trebled by 1975, fhe Commission calculated 
that from 1960 on, as nuclear power began to make an appear-
ance, it would take the following install~d capacities to 
meet the increase in electricity production: 21 
1965 - 10 million KWe 
1970 - 25 million KWe 
1975 44 million KWe 
20The Commission of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, Report on the Position.of Nuclear Industries in the 
Community (Brussels: Publications Department of the European 
Communities, 1958). 
21 Ibid. . p. 144. 
-- , 
143 
Therefore, the validity of A Target for Euratom, with its 
proposal for 15 million KWe by 1967 fitting nicely into the 
above timetable, was.upheld to this particular point in the 
new report. However, at this stage, th~ Commission admitted 
that ''~or technical and financial reasons" it would not be 
possible to meet these increases entir-ely with nuclear 
power. The report went on to state the following: 
The part which nuclear power stations can be 
expected to play in providing the increased capicity 
depends not only on the magnitude of the requirements 
but also on their nature, especially in terms of 
the difference between the peak and base load.22 
Thus, now the Comn'lissioners payed closer attention 
to yet another problem, one which had been discussed in the 
past but had not been allowed to affect apprecia?lY target 
goals. This involved the economical use of the first genera-
tion nuclear power plants. In order to be economically 
competitive with conventional plants, nuclear power stations 
would be required to have a high annual operating period, 
_somewhere in the neighborhood of an 8.0% load factor, equi va-
lent to about-7,JOO hours of operation per year. This was 
necessary to spread out the installation costs of nuclear 
plant which was more t~an double that of conventional plants 
and which, of course, made up a greater proportion of the 
22 4 Ibid. Base~load electricity is power produced 2 
hours a day,Bs distinct from peak-load which is reached 
for only a few hours a day. 
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cost of nuclear e~e~triC?ity. 23 In order ·to attain the high 
annu~l operating period, therefore, nuclear plants would have 
to be run mainly ·to produce base-load· electricity. This, in 
turn; would necessitate fitting nuclear· power stations 'into 
. existing power:networks with consideration being given to 
that proportion of the base-load which would be taken away 
fFom conventiorial plants. In that.the ~onventiohal plants 
also needed a sufficiently high annual operating period' . 
nuclear 'power· would be in competition with csmventional 
power in some areas rather than supplementing it and adding 
to overall output. Thus, it i's no~ too surprising that 
utility companies were reluctant to take on costly nuclear 
construction when it would, in some cases, result in a re-
duction in the economic efficiency of existing conventional 
24 plants. 
23 Ibid. Also, A'Target for Euratom, Annex III, p. 
35, which uses an average capital outlay of $350/KW for 
nuclear plant and $160/KW for conventional plant. 
24Report on the Position of Nuclear Industries in 
the Community, pp-.-1Ifli=145. The presumption that these first 
generation nuclear plants could be utilized at a load-factor 
of 80% for their entire useful life, according to one ob-
server "defied all economic principles." Inasmuch as the 
first ~lants would undoubtedly be replaced by more a~van~ed 
models they would, in their later years, be used primarily 
to meet peak demands only and thus their utilization time 
would decrease accordingly. This, therefore, also caused 
skepticism with regard to initial co~t es!imates. ~olach, 
QQ• cit., p. 126. Critical com~ent i~ t~i~ same v~in has 
also recently been made concerning Britai11·s planning for 
nuclear power. Economist, October 21, 1967, P• 302. 
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The report 'continued with a brief .description of 
nuclear power projects in each of the Community nations and 
noted that these projects represented a first step in the 
direction of implementing a large-scale nuclear program. 
However, the Commissioners said, it seemed unlikely that the 
existing projects would suffice to reach the target .goal of 
15 million KWe by 1967. Rather, it W?S felt that by 1965 the 
most that could be expected in the way of installed nuclear 
capacity for the Community would be in the region of 3.5-4 
million KWe. 25 Thus., the Eura tom Commission, and in particu-
lar its President Louis Armand, were forced to back away 
from the lofty goals ~hich Armand himself, and his colleagues, 
had deemed read j]_y attainable only one year previous. 
Approximately two years later the Commission took 
another look at the prospects for nuclear power and published 
their findings in the Community's Third General Report. 
Once again estimates had to be revised downward. It was now 
evident that the Community's installed nuclear capacity for 
electricity production would only reach 2 million l('Y,Je by 
1965. After that, however, the Commissioners looked for ap-
proximately 9.6 million KWe installed capacity by 1970, and 
more than 40 million KWe by 1980. This latter figure, it 
25Report on the Position of Nuclear Industries in 
the Community, r· 149. 
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was noted, would represent 30% of the total electricity pro-
duction estimated for 1980 for the 9ommunity, and would 
amount to an equivalent installation of 250 nuclear plants 
with each having a capacity of 150 KWe. 26 Thus, the Com~ 
mission's rep·ort reflected the immediate economic diffi-
cultie·s that faced· nuclear power bu,t, at the same time, 
clung to the 'belief that better days would surely come. 
In arriving at their-estimate·of 2 million KWe by 1965, 
the Commissioners acknowledged tha·t changing economic condi-
tions had imposed a "temporary cost ·handicaprr on nuclear 
power in its competition with conventional energy. 27 Thus, 
electricity producers had continued. to shy away from nuclear 
construction. Specifically, the estimated cost per KWH for 
nuclear plant remained at 11 mi~ls, as.in A Target for Euratom~ 
but the cost for conventional stations, rath~r than slowly 
increasing as previousl_y predicted, had dropped from the 
previous 11-12 mills per KWH to 8.7 mills per.KWH. This 
26Thir~ General R~port, pp. 52-53. The 1980 esti-
mate appeared overly optimistic in light of the prevailing 
·conditions and no doubt the Commissioners themselves felt 
this even ~s they sought to paint the best possible picture 
for the Euratom of the future. Yet, today; the estimate for 
1980 has been revised upward to a minimum of 60 millioz:i KWe 
giving a graphic illustration that nuclear power has finally 
arrived although perhaps a little later than initially pre-
dicted.' European· Community Bulletin, No. 104, July-August 
1967, p. 20. 
27 . 
Third General Report, P• 53. 
drop, of course, reflected surplus stocks of coal and oil 
(the former from the United States), in additiori to other 
factors previously mentioned.28 
~he Third General Report marked a low point in the. 
Community's hopes for leading its member nations toward 
rapid atomic industrialization and integration. Besides 
having to acknowledge that earlier estima·tes for nuclear 
·construction had been largely overstated and that nuclear 
power was not yet competitive with conventional power, the 
Commission found itself in the awkward position of having to 
take issue with the member nations for "acting in isolation" 
and, in many cases, for opposing the initiative taken by the 
Commission in attempting to set up_the Euratom-sponsored 
atomic program. However, in that the opposition to Community 
projects forced the Commission to shift its emphasis from the 
immediacy of nuclear power plant construction to the longer 
range view of research and development in all· fields of 
nuclear power, the Third General Report can be considered as 
281bid. p. 49. Unlike A Target for Euratom, the 
Commission-us8d'a single cost figure (e.g., 11 mills per KWH) 
rather than using a maximum and minimum hypothesis which 
they thought might erroneously suggest "that the truth la:y 
somewhere between the two. 11 Ibid., p. 43. Cf. ante P· 140. 
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an indicator of the new tack which the Community would take 
from that time to the present. 29 
PROMOTION· OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES 
Eura tom's hopes in the nuclear power .field were tied 
directly to the United States' offer of financial, material 
a~d technicai assistance as deline?ted in the U.S.-Euratom 
Agreement for Cooperation.3° Having signed. the agreement 
into law in the summer of 1958, President Eisenhower noted 
the great promise it held for. furthering European unity and 
out.lined its objectives as follows: 
Our joint program, which is Euratom's first 
· major project·, is designed to achieve the coristruc-
, ti on in Europe· of about six nuclear power reactors 
with a total installed capacity of about one 
million kilowatts of electricity and to improve 
power reactor technology through a research program 
of great scope. This joint program should prove 
.highly beneficial both to Europe and to the· . 
United States.31 
29The Commission noted that it was "marshalling all 
the resources at its command to foster the 'European spirit'." 
Ibid. p.· 8. Also see Polach, QQ• cit., who refers to the 
Third 'Report as rt.a definite break with the past." 
. 30Details are in United States Congress, Joint Com- ~ 
mittee ·on Atomic Energy, Proposed Euratom Agreements, Hearings 
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, B5th Congress, 
2nd Session, July 22-August 13, 1958 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1958). 
JlQuoted. in.First General Report, January 1958- .. 
September 1958, p. 79. The joint.program referre~ specific-
ally to nuclear reactor constructi?n and.made up ~ust one . 
part of the Agreement for Cooperation which also included .a 
The joint program called for the construction of 
those types ot first .genera ti on nuclear ·power plan_ts on which 
the United States had spent the great~st ~mount ·of research 
and development ~ffort and money. Participation was open · 
o~ an optional basis to public and private concerns. in the 
Community. The Commissi-on attempted to underscore the 
attractiveness of the program by noting that a·135 million 
dollar loan at low interest would be provided· by the U.S. 
to help offset the estimated 350 million dollar investment 
needed. Also, the U.S. agreed to bear half the expenditure 
required for the research ·program established in conjunction 
with nuclear plant construction.32 
The agreement called for the six nuclear plants to 
reach an operational status by 1963, at which time they were 
expected to become fully cost-competitive with conventional 
power plants. By then, the results of the program would 
have aided the United States in gaining valuable opera-
tional information under what was considered to be the 
more favorable economic conditions of Europe and, of course, 
-Euratom would have led the Community nations and their 
research a~d development program centered on the type of 
reactors to be built. Euratom representatives signed the 
Agreement in November 1958 and it entered into force in 
February 1959. Second General Report, p •. 58. 
32First General Report, p. Bo. 
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enterprises into a quick start toward a prospering nuclear 
industry.33 
However, by the time the,Third General Report was 
issued, in the spring of 1960, it had. become clear that th_e 
changing economic conditions had seriously undermined the 
joint program. In answer to the Commission's request for 
the submission of proposals for th~ const~uction of reactors 
to be built by 1963, only five letters ·of intent. were re-
ceived and of these only one resulted in the eventual con-
struction of a reactor. 34 The Commissioners admitted that 
. the economic conditions in Europe had altered 11 the premises 
on which the Agreement was originally based" and that rrthe 
lukewarm response to the power reactor p~ogram on the part 
of the manufacturers (was) a direct consequence of this 
33 . 
The two reactor types called for in the Agreement 
were pressurized-water (PWR) and boiling-water (BWR) re-
actors, both of which used enriched uranium and light _ 
(ordinary) water. At the time, nuclear power in the U.S. 
was cqnsidered much farther away from becoming competitive 
with conventional power and, therefore, Europe offered an 
economically sound proving ground for U.S. industry to test 
its nuclear theories. The two giants of the U.S. electrical 
industry General Electric and Westinghouse, pioneered the 
BWR and PWR respectively. Enriched uranium (U-235) was to J 
be supplied by the U.S. 
34Third General Report, pp. 54-56. Also see European 
Commu_ni ty Bulletin, No. 52, March-~pril 19~2, p. 9, which 
noted that althou~h five concerns nad submitted letters of 
intent rrthe adeq~acy of conv~ntional fuel sources deterred 
all but one from concluding a contract.rr · 
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development· tr· . They went on to say that negotiations with 
the u:s. were underway to amend the Agreement as necessary 
to take into account "the essential factors underlying the 
situation in Europe'!35 
A second phase to the U.S.-Euratom Agreement was 
established and again, in 1961, the Commission requested 
proposals for plants to be commissioned by 1965.36 The 
Commission sought to increase the attractiveness- of .the 
joint program, and nuclear construction in general, b~r offer-
ing added financial assistance through Euratom's own partici-
pation and by offering "joint enterprise" status to accepting 
concerns. However, the response was once again disappointing, 
so much $o" that this time oniy two concerns offered meaning-
ful proposals in accordance with program parameters. 
Therefore, rather than having the planned six reactors 
under the program in operation by the midsixties, the Community 
35 . . Ibid., p. 89; Cf. ante p. 87·· The Commission 
sought to have the United States provide its enriched uran-
ium to power plant operators on a leased basis rather than 
by outright purchase. As a result, a SUpplementary Agree-
ment came into force in July of 1962 providing for ttnot only 
the purchase but· also the hiring of nuclear materials." 
Sixth General Report, March 1962-February 1963, PP• 178, 179· 
36Actually, a last minute modification of the original 
Euratom-U.S. Agreement for Cooperation had provided for two 
nuclear power plants to be built and to commence operations 
·by the end of 1965 vice 1963. This, .ther~fore, was the 
basis for the second phase of the Agreement. Second General 
Report, September 1958-March 1959, P· 86. 
" 
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found itself with just three plants operating by the beginning 
of 1967. Of these, the first to be commissioned, in 1963, 
was a 150 MWe capacity BWR built at Garigliano, Italy, by 
the Societa Elettro-nucleare Nazionale (SENN); the remaining 
two became operable in the early part of 1967 and were a PIJJR, 
rated at 266MWe, and built at Chooz, France, by French and 
Belgian int~rests working togethe~ in the Societe d'Energie 
nucleaire Franco-Belge des Ardennes (SENA), and -a 237 MWe BWR 
at Gundremmingen, Germany, built by Ker.nkraftwerk RWE-
Bayernwerk GmbH (KRB).37 The three plants with a combined 
capacity of 650 MWe represented slightly more than half of 
the intended goal of six plants and one million kilowatts. 
Yet, it appears likely that "if the additional inducements 
_of Eura tom participation and joint enterprise status had not 
been. offered by the Commission, even these three plants might 
not have been built. The economic climate prevalent at the 
time was undoubtedly the primary factor in stifling incentive 
for nuclear construction. However, another factor also 
37European Community Bulletin, No. 104, July-August 
1967 p. 21; and Documentation attached to the Eighth General 
Repo;t, March 1964-February 1965, p. 9. Although the figures 
are not comoarable inter se because of varying interest 
charges, plant capacity, ancr-utilization time, the costs of 
electricity for each plant were estimated as follows (in 
mil·ls/KWH): Garigliano (SENN)@ 11.54; Chooz (SENA)@ 9.57; 
and Gundremmingen (~RB) @ 9.56. Thus, it appears that nuclear 
costs were in line with earlier predictions; however, as noted 
previously it was the estimates of costs of conventional 
power that'werc largely overstated in the earlier reports. 
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present was the nagging feeling that the reactor types 
' 
called for under the joint program would be.obsolete in 
Europe long before the_y had time to pay for themselves and 
that the research program connected with these particular · 
types of reactors would, if anything, be beneficial only to 
. 38 
the United States. Thus, the fact that three reactors did 
get built under the program can probably be attributed to 
the persistence· and flexibility of the Euratom Commission 
in· putting forth the right formula for Community participation. 
THE EURATOM PARTICIPATION PROGRAM 
' 
By the summer of 1960, the Euratom Commission realized 
that the electricity produc~rs were'. going to need more than 
38 . . 
On this point see the Economist, March 19, 1960; 
p. 1138. Cf. ante p. 141 . The Economist's contention in 
1960 that "nuclear power on the present American pattern 
(would) not be accepted in Western.Europett no doubt cor-
rectly reflected the conditions of the time. The London 
weekly also pointed to the Commission's awareness of the 
Community's feelings toward the matter by stating the 
following: 11 Euratom is trying to rid itself- of the obliga-
tion to carry out research into reactpr types which it con-
siders· obsolete and so to avoid waste of scientific effort. 11 
Now, however, it appears that this position was a bit too 
inflexible and, indeed, in light of present conditions, it 
has since been invalidated. In short, the reactor types in 
question, the so-called light water reactors (BWR, P'1tffi) have 
found a market in Europe, as well as in the U.S. and Japan, 
so much so that the Euratom Commission recently remarked 
that 11 the swift rise in the number of nuclear power plants 
equipped with light~water reac~ors confi~med the ou~look for 
a big industrial market for this type." Documentation 
attached to the Ninth General Report, p. 11. 
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tf ust verbal assurances and optimistic estimates to get them 
fo build a nuclear industry. The U.S.-Euratom Agreement ·pro-
rided some impetus in this direction but rnor.e was obviously 
.needed. Fearful that a lack of sufficient construction of ~ ~ull-size power plants would hinder research and technological ~eveloprnent, the Cornmi~sion proposed and the Council of 
i ' 
Ministers accepted, a plan for Euratom to participate 
. . . 
'~1 
financially in nuclear plant construction. The Council 
iJ 
·allocated $32 million for reactor projects with the money j 
~o be offered primarily to defray the expense~ involved in 
fuel element fabrication, the purchase of fuel supplies, 
! 
and the construction of certain reactor components. In re-
1 
I 
' turn for this help, the Commission would receive information 
l 
relating to reactor design, constructiGn and operational 
' 
lechniaues which in turn, would be put at the disposal of I - , 
all Community enterprises furnishing evidence of legitimate 
l interest.39 
1 The Commission received three requests almost im-
mediately after tendering the plan. Two of these were 
irojects already accepted for the U.S.-Euratom joint program, 
1 
the Garigliano plant (SENN) and the Belgian-French endeavor 
l also accepted for the Eura torn at Cho oz (SENA). Both were 
~ 
l '~ 
39Fourth General Report, PP• 74, .75; Surnm~~Y of 
Euratom Fifth General Report (Washington: Comrnuni y 
Information Servjce, April 1962), P• 2 · 
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lparticipation program, as was the third request which came 
l'from SIMEA, a concern in the private sector of Italian n~clear . industry, with the plant being c9nstructed at Latina, south . 40 
'.of Rome. The reactor under construction at Latina, with 
·Ian intended 200MWe rating, was a graphite-moderated gas-
. t . ' 
~cooled reactor (GCR) using natural uranium and therefore 
i ' 
1d · d not qua11· fy under the U S E t · · t 41 j i .. - ur~ om Join p~ogram. 
J Adding on to these. three projects, the C.ommission 
~ad, by 1964, signed contr~cts for participation in two more ~lants,. the one at Gundremmingen (KRB), also in the U.S.-
} 
Euratom program, and the fifth, and to date the final under-
1 
;taking, a small react or ( 50 MWe) to be built at Do odeward in 
the Netherlands by the Dutch concern GKN. This latter plant 
I is also of the BWR type but is not yet·a participant in the 
'*" 
t 42 U.S.-Euratom program. 
J . Of the five reactors included in the Euratom partici-
' 1ation program, all except the one at Doodeward are now in 
~ 







°Fourth General Report, P· 74. 
! 41 · · Nuclear Installations in 
1 The Euratom Commission, ~.~--~ ~~~---;-;----
. At c Energy Community, 
the Countries of ~ Europe~n5 ~mi 1964 the companies SIMEA (Brussels: June 19olJ, P• j • n ' ) ~ k 
· ·c1 t· 1 t) and SENN (Garigliano plant were ~a en over. byat~~an~w~~ createu enterprise Ente Nazionale per l'Energia 
Elettrica (ENEL). 






in early 1968. Thus far, the operational reliability of 
_1• 
\ 
these particular plants has been generally good. For ex-
ample, the Latina plan.t operated at an 83.% load factor during 
its first full· year in 1964.43 On the other hand, the reactor 
at Garigliano, after operating successfully at a high load· 
factor until its first scheduled shutdown date, was found 
to have several material defects which delayed its return 
to operational status for several months. 44 Thus, it is 
·evident that along with the success that is being realized 
with nuclear power, much remains to be done in the way of 
technological improvement. 
Access to information concerning the power plants in 
which Euratom participates is forwarded to the Commission 
through various channels: Contractors furnish documentation, 
· Euratom engineers and scientists work alongside the regular 
staffs of the various plants, and engineers and scientists 
of the regular staffs provide technical reports associated 
with reactor operation. The information received is then 
disseminated by means of printed publications, notices, 
microfilm and through technical seminars. 4 5 Documentation 
43 b.d 15 LL·' P• • 
41+ 4 Ninth General Report, p. 3° 
450ne such ~eminar in 1966, ~evoted solely to the 
Chooz plant attracted no less than 260 participants from 
108 firms a~d organizations 1n the Community. European 
Community Bulletin, No. 104, July-August 1967, P· 21. 
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is also assembled at Euratom headquarters where facilities 
are available for reviewing it. Also, inasmuch as the money 
Euratom contributes to each plant is, for the most part, 
~sed in purchasifig reactor parts and fuel elements fabri-
cated in the Community by Community .manufacturers, ther·e is 
little monetary loss to third-party interests.46 Thus, the 
Euratom prog_ra:rri of participation, while conducted on a 
relatively modest scale, has been an important factor in 
bringing a nuclear industry to the Community. 
JOINT ENTERPRISES 
The third program utilized by the Commission to 
enhance the Community's irnuclearizat_ion" was to confer 
joint enterprise status, in accordance with Chapter V of 
·the Euratom Treaty, on "undertakings of fundamental im-
portance to the development of nuclear industry:" As dis-
cussed in an earlier chapter, joint enterprise status carried 
~ith it several distinct advantages, in taxation and dustoms 
duties, third~country financing, legal status and the like, 
all of which might give a particular plant a decided edge 
over its competitors. 47 
46 Ibid., p. 44. Of the $32million allocated for this 
program, it is esti~ated that all b~t 5.4 million can be used 
in the Community. The 5.4 million will be used almost en-
tirely for enriched uranium purchases, mainly in the United 
States. 
47
cf. ante p. 69. 
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' The provisions of the Euratom Treaty concerning joint 
--
enterprises were first given effect in July of 1960 when the 
Council granted this status to t~e Belgian-French (SENA) 
plant then under construction.at Chooz. Following this, 
the Council conferred joint enterprise status on the German 
. 
plant at Gundremmingen (KRB) there.by making these two plant_s 
the only ones benefiting from all three programs of assistance 
engaged in by Euratom. Since then; two other plants have 
received joint enterprise status, one. -a· BWR .with 240 MWe 
capacity at Lingen, and the second, a PWR 283 MWe plant 
at Obrigheim, both being constructed in Germany by German 
interests (KWL and KWO, respec.tively) with commissio_ning 
48 
scheduled for the latter part of 1968. · 
The information Euratom rec.eives from the various 
plants under joint enterprise status, and the manner in 
which the information is disseminated throughout the Com-
munity, is similar to that of the Euratom participation 
progr_am. One noteworthy comment concerning the Lingen and 
Obrigheim plants is that they will be the first of their type 
to be constructed in the Community without outside help. 
T_hus, the U.S. -Eura tom joint program, if not c successful. on 
a wide scale, at least brought to the Community enterprises--
particularly in Germany--the technical know-how needed to 
48Ninth General RepGr~, pp. 46, 47. 
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build plants of this type on a competitive basis with the 
outside world. And, as the Commission rather proudly notes,_ 
"undoubtedly Community help, as provided by the nuclear 
power plant construction programme under the Euratom/US 
agreement, the Euratom participation programme and the 
. . 
creation of a number of Joint Enterprises, has facilitated 
this development.1149 
NUCLEAR SHIP PROPULSION 
Although A Target for Euratom did little more than 
mention the fact that nuclear power offered unlimited possi-
bilities for use in marine propulsion, the Commission was 
quick to realize the pot~ntialities~ not only for its 
_prac.tical application, but also as ano.ther means of promoting 
Community coordination in nuclear industry under Euratom 1 s 
leadership. In July 1959, the Commission sponsored a meetin_g 
of shipping interests in the Community in an attempt to 
head off any duplication of effort in the nuclear propulsion 
field. Two working groups were established with one devoting 
attention to the technical and economic implications of such 
a program and the other examining the equall~ importa~t but 
rather esoteric problems connected with the inte~national 
movement of nuclear merchant vessels. 
49 t t· tt h d t th N" th G 1 R Documen a l on a a'c e o e in enera e-
port, p. 11 •. 
50Third General Report, PP• 57, 58. 
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As was the case with nuclear power plants, the Com-
missioners realized that in order to play a key role in ~ 
program for nuclear ship propulsion, Euratom would have to 
offer financial inducements to Community interests consider-
ing entry into the program. Like th~ electricity-producing 
nuclear power plant, the promise of nuclear propulsion lies 
in the future, and hesitancy_to engage in.this type of con-
struction had to be overcome by material assurances. There-
fore, in 1961, the Council adopted the Commission's proposal 
to include in the Community's research and inv·estment budget 
a commitment of $6 million for· marine propulsion projects. 
In addition, the Commission set up a Nuclear Marine Com-
mittee, composed of representatives from the various projects, 
the governments and Euratom staff, to eliminate duplicatioµ 
. of effort. 51 
Euratom eventually entered into association with four 
research groups in the Community, with'participation in the 
rrotto Hahn" nuclear research ship project being the most sig-
nificant. Other projects include experimental work in 
constructing a pressurized-water marine reactor with the 
Dutch organization Reactor Centrum Nederland, a draft design 
for a nuclear powered tanker in association with the Italian 
companies Fiat (for the nuclear part) and Ansaldo (for the 
51 
Fourth General Rep,ort, p. 76. 
marine part), and ·11'.ith the German Geesthacht Center for 
general research into nuclear ship propulsion.52 
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In return for the technical and operational informa-
tion the Commur:iity will receive from the "Otto Hahnrr projec:t, 
Euratom has committed technical assistance and $4 million 
under its participation agreement. The ship itself is an 
ore-carrier type with research facilities on board and 
accommodations for a scientific staff of forty. It dis-
places 25,800 tons, and its pressurized-water reactor will 
provide for a speed of about 16 knots. ~he ship was launched 
in _June of 1964 and is expected ·to go into service in the latter 
part of 1967. 53 -With a vessel of this size, the Community 
hopes to obtain operating and test results applicable to 
vessels of higher speeds and displacements. It is felt 
.that for the foreseeable future, nuclear power will most 
likely reach economic practicality only on very high speed 
(30 knots and above), large capacity ships designed to· 
52nocumentation attached to the Ninth General 
Report, pp •. 71-74. The "Otto Hahn 11 project is in ·associa-
tion with a German firm (GKSS). ·However, French, Italian, 
Dute~ and other German business interests are taking part 
in the construction of the main components of the nuclear 
assembly making it truly a Community endeavor. 
53
nocumentation attach~d to the Eighth General 
Report, pp. 73, 74. 
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carry cpntainerized cargo over the longer trading routes. 
·Thus, ttOtto Hahn" is expected to provide the foundation of 
technical and operational knowledge on which the Community 
nations, five of which are maritime nations; hope eventual:J_y 
to build a profitable nuclear merchant fleet. 
THE JOINT RESEARCH PROGRAM 
Although it is still too early· to tell, perhaps 
Euratom's efforts in atomic research will provide the 
foundation for nuclear integration which has obviously not 
been provided by participation in industrial programs. In 
any case, research must now be ranked as the organization's 
most significant function. It should be remembered that 
Euratom's task was never to build commercial power stations, 
· but only to encourage and to help private and public or-
ganizations to do so. Euratom's financial participation in 
the building of commercial reactors, carried out under the 
first five-year program (1958-1962), was a temporary measure, 
not envisaged by the Treaty-drafters, and made possible only 
because money was available which was obviously not going 
to be used by the nascent research program. No such 
54This position was taken in the United States . 
Government Report on the IT·£· Savannah, First Year of Com-
mercial Operation 1965-1966, as reported· in the New York 
Times, April 6, 1967. The Savannah is currently the world's 
only operational atom-powered commercial vessel. 
provision was made under the second five-year program 
·(1963-1967) where the physical and financial emphasis re-
mains with nuclear research. 
As discussed previously, the Community's research 
activities include, on the one hand, the various national 
programs which the Euratom Commission attempts to coordinate 
and, on the other, Euratom's own program:which is employed 
to supplement the national activities.55 This latter pro-
gram is further divided into two distinct categories with 
approximately one-half of the research budget going·to the 
installations of the Joint Nuclear Research Center '(JNRC), 
and the remainder being contracted out to the member states 
or enterprises, 'or to third parties, i.e., either nations 
or organizations outside the Community.56 
Euratom's first five-year program called for the ex-. 
penditure of $215 million. Actually, the greatest part of 
the program was carried out in the three years 1960-1962.57 
55
cf. ante pp. 72-75. 
56A comparison of the magnitudes of national pro-
grams with that of Euratom shows the following (e.xcluding 
military costs): France-$400 million; Germany-$200 million; 
Euratom-$100 million; all others-$100 million. J. Gueron, 
11 The Lessons to be Learned from Eura tom, tr Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, Vol. XX:III, No. 3, March 1967, p. 17. 
(Figures are for the calendar year 1964). 
57rn addition to the research and investment budget 
Euratom also has an operational budget. Although five-year 
programs of expenditure are,laid down, estimates for each 
164 
Emphasis wa? placed on establishing the installations of 
the JNRC and initiating the research program under contract 
outside the Center. Four establishments were chosen to make 
up the Joint R~search benter and were envisioned as the main 
instruments 'in the Community's drive to supplement national 
programs. These were located at Ispra (Italy), Petten (the 
Netherlands), Geel (Belgium), and Karls.ruhe (Germany). The 
first two are general competence centers wh-ile the remaining · 
two engage in specialized research. Ali of the installa-
tions were operating by 1965.58 
Ispra; in northern Italy, belonged to CNEN but it was 
transferred to Euratom on March 1, 1961. It is by far the 
largest installation of the four with the number. of per-
sonnel engaged scheduled to reach L700 by.the end of 1967. 
Housed here is one of Euratom's major undertakings, the 
ORGEL project, which includes studies and research on a re-
actor· string Using natural uranium as fuel, heavy water as 
a moderator, and an organic liquid as a coolant. Also 
located here is the Community's Scientific Data Processing 
financial (calendar) year, for both budgets, are required 
by, the Teaty and must be approved by the Council of 
Ministers. Financial provisions are covered in the Euratom 
Treaty, arts. 171-183. Also, refer to the Appendix. 
5BThe information given here. is based mainly on 
The Euratom Joint Nuclear Research Centre (Washington: 
European Community Information Service,. 1965). . 
-~---· 
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Center (CETIS) which, in addition to its normal task of 
recording scientific and statistical calculations, is also 
engaged in a program aimed at computerizing reactor design cal-
culations. 
The first of the installations to commence ope!'ations, 
in 1960, was the Central Nuclear Measurement Bureau (CNMB) 
at Geel, located close to the Belgi.an Nuclear·study Center 
at Mol. The particular site was provided by the Belgian 
Government and included laboratories and a certain amount of 
infrastructure. The installation at Geel has approximately 
. 180 employees and includes among its research facilities a 
Van de Graaf accelerator and a Linac linear accelerator, 
both employed in obtaining precise measurements of nuclear 
data. The CNMB also represents the Euratom Commission and 
·the member states on the American-European Nuclear Data 
Committee, set up by Euratom and the OECD. 
The Petten establishment, located in the Netherlands 
along the North Sea coast, was originally constructed by 
Reactor Centrum Nederland but was transferred to Eura.tom in 
late 1962. By the end of 1967, the number of personnel as-
signed is scheduled to reach 350. Research at Petten cen-
ters on a materials-testing high-flux reactor which.probes 
the changes in nuclear materials provoked by the radiation 
. process. Technical coordination of research on a high-temp-
erature gas.reactor carried dut by Euratom in association 
166 
with other nations of the ENEA (the Dragon Project) is also 
·carried on at Petten. 
The last of the installations' to reach operational 
status is the European Transuranium Institute at Karlsruhe, 
Germany, built adjacent to the German nuclear research cen-
ter. The highly specialized res~arch at Karlsruhe will em-
ploy 300 people and seeks to deter~ine practical industrial, 
applications for the transuranium elements (elements above 
uranium in the periodic table) of which plutonium is 
presently the most important. The use of plutonium as a 
fuel relates to the Community's research into fast neutron 
breeder reactor strings, the so-called third-generation re-
actors (also called ttfast reactors rr or "breeder reactors 11 ) 
_which have the attractive economic advantage of "breeding" 
·new fuel faster than they consume it.59 
At the conclusion of the second five-year research 
program (December 1967), Euratom's ·Joint Nuclear Research 
Cente.r will employ 2,530 research workers, which represents 
a significant majority of the 3~50 maximum number of person-
60 
nel permitted for all programs under the research budget. 
However, right from the beginning, Euratom has had difficulty 
59 Cf. post p. 177. 
·
6
oThe Eura tom Joint Nuclear Research Centre, Q:Q.· 
cit., p. 4; Also, Documentation attached to the Ninth General 
Report, p. 147. An initial 'Personnel allocation of 3j200 was 
changed to ~150 by a Council .decision in May 1965. 
in· recruiting high caliber scientists and technicians. The 
apparent cause sterns from the fact that rather than accept 
the Euratorn program as a supplern~nt to their own, the member 
nations (and, more logically, the private sector of nuclear 
industry) compete with the Commission for qualified person-
nel. Inasmuch as the Euratorn budgetary allowance for 
salaries, as well as all other exp~nditures, is closely 
regulated by the Council of Ministers, it becomes obvious that 
without genuine cooperation on the part of the member states' 
Euratorn cannot afford to compete for the best of Europe's 
. . 61 
scientific community, and its programs must suffer accordingly. . 
In this context, it should also be mentioned that France, 
long the leader in nuclear technology among the Six, declined 
the Commission's invitation to establish a Joint Nuclear Re-
. search Center installation at Grenoble, the site of a prin- · 
cipal French nuclear facility, and was anything but generous 
in providing scientific personnel for other JNilG establish-
ments, thus reinforcing the impression that Euratorn competes 
62 
with rather than contributes to national programs. 
61 . Fourth General Report, p. 16; Also see Polach, 
~cit., p. 139, and Lawrence Scheinrnan, ttEuratorn: Nuclear 
Integration in Europe, rr International Conciliation,· No. 563, 
May 1967, p. 37, who notes that through their control of the 
budget, the Council of Ministers "have been miserly in allow-
ing salary increases, and with the steadily rising cost of 
living Euratorn has been unable to compete with salaries and 
benefits offered in national nuclear establishments and private 
ind us try. ff 
62
scheinrnan, .Q.£• cit., PP• 36, 37° 
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Dur.ing the time it took to bring Eura tom's JNRC into 
l 
operation, the Commission turned to a policy of contracting 
for "outside" assistance in conducting important research 
projects. Even today, Euratom depends heavily on this means 
of carrying on Community research, not only for the obvious 
informational benefits, but also, in the words ~f the Com-
mission, as tta technically and administratively effective 
means of entering on equal terms into researches launched at 
national level so as to coordinate related researches for 
the whole.Community.1!63 The contract system takes several 
forms, all of which involve the expenditure of Euratom's 
financial resources. As noted earlier~ contracts can be 
entered into with member nations (e.g., with the various 
national atomic.energy commissions), with Community enter-
.prises (the notto Hahnrt project), or with ttthird partyn 
nations and international organizations (the DRAGON project 
under the auspices of the European Nuclear Energy Agency). 
The contracts themselves may simply c;all for a Euratom 
financial contribution in payment for the research work per-
formed, or for Euratom's participation physically as well as 
financially in the performance of the work carried out in 
"associationtt with the contracting partner. In these 
associations Euratom was permitted, until recently, to 
63 \ Ninth General Report, p. 29. 
contribute up to 35% of the total cost of the p~oject ~hile 
' sharing in the·management and receiving_ all research informa-
. - 64 
tion therefrom. 
A~though the Commission looks upon the contract pro-
gram, and particularly the contracts of association (which 
account for slightly more than one-third of the $430 million 
appropriated- under the second five-year plan), as a primary 
means of coordinating the member nations'- research efforts; 
65 this coordination has yet to be realized. Up to now, 
the problems· encountered in awarding contracts have out-
weighed a good many of the benefits derived from the program. 
Some of these problems go right to the root of the difficul-
ties confronting Euratom and point out the necessity for 
cooperation among the Six in a Community context. Unfortu-
'nately, the trend of late has been a reversion t6 nationalis~ 
tic whims and desires. The problems are easily discernible 
but, as the Commission has pointed out repeatedly, not easily 
overcome, particularly so without the members' desire to 
cooperate. Thus, the Commission has had a continuing problem 
64
scheinman, QQ• cit., pp. 13, 14. A reduction to a 
maximum 30% contribution was recently decided upon by the 
Council of Ministers. Nucleonics Week, Vol. 8, No. 40, 
October 5~ 1967, P• 3. 
6 5Ninth Gen~ral Report, p. 29. 
year program research budget, approved 
ally called for an expenditure of $425 
this was raised to $430.58 million. 
The second five-
iri June 1962, origin-
~illion. Iri 1965 
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of reconciling the geographic distribution of contracts 
(among member states and enterprises) with the need for placing 
the research contracts in the hands of the most efficient 
and competent organizations where the money will do the most 
good for the Community. Also, in this same context, member 
nations have sought to maximize their share of Euratom's 
limited resources by starting up projects the benefits of 
which would accrue more to their national programs rather than 
that of the Community, but the success of which was closely 
tied to an association with Euratom and the resultant 
financial backing. In this manner, therefor~, national 
ri~alry in competing for Community financing has tended to 
fragment the Commission's efforts at_ establishing ·a coor-
dinated program of nuclear research for the Community. 66 
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECTS 
·A look at Euratom's allocation of funds under its 
second five-year program gives the clearest indication of 
. 
66 A recent example of this can be found in the con-
flict of the French and Italian positions with regard to 
Euratom financing of fast reactor programs. The French 
vetoed Euratom support for an Italian fast reactor proto-
type whereupon the Italians, noting that they had paid their 
share into Euratom's financial backing (35%) for a similar 
French project (the French Rapsodie reactor), refused to pass 
Euratom's research budget for 1967. This, in turn, forced 
Euratom to exist on a hand-to-mouth basis for the first half 
of 1967, with existing research programs being continued on 
monthly allowances provided by the six nations in proportion 
to the previous year's rate ?f expenditure. New York Times, 
July 20, 1967. 
.. 
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what the member nations consider the most promising area~ 
' for research. As originaliy ap·proved by the Council of 
Ministers in 1962, the second five-year program was given 
$425 million which nearly doubled the outlay ($215 million) 
for the first program. Also, even though $32 millipri of the 
first five-year program was used in Euratom's industrial 
r'eactor participation program, there was still left unused 
a sum of $25.8 million which was added to the new program. 
However, by 1964 it became evident to the Commission that a 
rapid increase in costs of materials and research contracts 
would either demand a cutback in various parts of the re~ 
search program or would necessitate increased contributions 
from the members. Of course, the Commission opted for the 
latter solution and requested an additional $50 million, an 
·amount which was, nof coincideritally, equal to the cut whi6h 
the Council had made in the Commission's initial request 
($475 million) for the second program in 1962. Unfortunately, 
the member nations did not, apparently, share the Commission's 
view of the urgency of the entire Euratom program; the Council 
-of Ministers, after more than a year of delay from the time 
the subject was first broached by the Commission in early 
1964, finally.reached a decision in May of 1965 to add 
slightly more than $5 million to the budget. Thus, for the 
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second five-year program the total allocation amounted to 
$456.38 million. 67 
The first five-year peri9d saw the launching of the 
Euratom research program, with the establishment of the 
Joint Nuclear Research Center, the recruitment of personne~ 
. and the signing of more than 300 research and association 
contracts a~ the principal achievements. The ~econd program 
aimed at continuing and expanding the work already.started 
with some changes in emphasis on certain projects resulting 
from the Council's decision in 1965. The most significant 
areas of revision included increased allocations for the 
ORGEL program at Ispra, and for fast reactor and thermo-
nuclear fusion research.· Credi ts fo_r proven-type reactor 
research as well as for certain ancillary activities 
. (irradiated fuels treatment, biological and heal th studies, 
. . 
radioisotope studies, and training programs) were cut back 
and in some cases destin~d for a virtual phase-out. 68 · 
67Euratom's Second Five-Year Research Program, 1963-
1967 (Washington: European Community Information Service·, 
1966), pp. 2, 3. Also see Scheinman, QI!.· cit., p. 43, who 
notes that the Council required a half-dozen meetings to 
reach its decision and that while the debate concerned 
"research orientation and priorities, and the polemic was 
conducted largely in budgetary terms,rr there actually existed 
"a political-economic crisis that put the very existence of 
Euratom at issue." 
68Euratom's' Second Five-Year· Research Program, QI!.• 
cit., p. 3; a.Lso, for a more precise breakdown of expenditures 
see "Allocation of Funds Under the Second Five-Year Programme 
in Accordance with the Council of Ministers Decision of 13 May 
1965,n Documentation attached to the. Ninth General Report, 
Document No. 29. . 
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Research into nuclear reactor design and associated 
studies accounts for slightly more than half ($238 million) 
of the s~cond program budget. The ORGEL project is the Com-
munity's own and receives $64 million of this amount but i~­
directly accounts for a much larger .expenditure inasmuch as 
it is carried out in the Community's research center at Ispra 
where Euratom's technicians and scientists do most of the 
. . 
work. The Orgel project includes study on a heavy water-
moderated, organic liquid-cooled and natural (or slightly 
enriched) uranium fueled reactor prototype which the Euratom 
Commission believes is especially promising for the second-
generation stage of nuclear power stations-. It is expected 
that these will be installed· in the.9ommunity in the early 
~970's and after. The primary advantage to be obtained from 
.the ORGEL reactor concerns the relative ease in fueling it 
. . 6 
(natural uranium) and the attendant low fuel cycle costs. 9 
The ORGEL project, of all the Community 1 s rese.arc h 
undertakings, would appear to have the best chance of reach-
ing a successful conclusion. Besides being economically 
attractive, ORGEL has the backing of both the French and 
Ger.mans, the two predominant nuclear powers in the Community. 
The French see a political advantage in the use of nitural 
69The ORGEL"project is described ·in some detail in 
Documentation Attached to the Tenth General Report, March 
1966-February 1967, PP· 19-31. 
uranium which would tend to lessen the Community's dependence 
ori the United States supply' of enriched uranium used in the 
first-gen~ration light water reactors: The Federal Republic, 
and Belgium also, support the French position, but for eco~ 
nomic reasons. Both these nations have ample conventional 
fuel supplies on hand and consequently view reactor research 
for intermediate or even long rang~ returns. Italy, on 
the· other hand, lacks indigenous fuel resources and conse-
quently urges greater expenditure for the proven reactor 
(light water, enriched uranium) program with an eye toward 
achieving immediate results in nuclear electricity generating 
capacity. Thus, although the Italians are not opposed to 
ORGEL research per _se, they are in opposition to the po-
litically inspired French position in support of natural 
·uranium reactors, and Germany's tendency to look only to 
the future.7° 
Research into fast-breeder reactors is a second major 
Euratom project. A total of almost $83 million, the largest 
sum for any single item, is devoted to this sector.71 
, 70Schienman, 2.2.· cit., pp. 45-47. The French position 
in favor of the natural uranium reactors can only be strength-
ened by recent announcements of French access to a major 
uranium ore discovery in Niger (by a monetary agreement be-
tween France and the Niger Government) and the location of 
more uranium reserves on the French mainland. Nucleonics 
Week, Vol. 8, No. 28, July 1, 1967, p. 7; 
71Fast-breeder react~r research is described in 
Documentation attached to the Tenth General Report, pp. 
53-56. 
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However, unlike the ORGEL project which has only about 10% 
of its total cost going to contractual work outside the Re-
search Center, practically all of the research work for fast 
reactors is being accomplished under contract. Included are 
five contracts of association, one with or in each of the 
member nations of Euratom excluding Luxembourg. As might be 
. ~xpected, the associations with France and Germany are the 
most significant and account for the lion's share of the 
funds allotted. The association with the French Atomic 
Energy Agency (CEA) has produced a sodium liquid-c'ooled test 
reactor (RAPSODIE) along with two other fast~breeder test 
installations. (HARMONIE and MASURCA), all three of which 
had reached criticality and were in operation for research 
purposes by the beginning of 1967. Euratom's association 
in Germany is with the Gesellschaft fur Kernforschung (GfK) 
organization and encompasses research work on a test reactor 
(STARK), a critical assembly (SNEAK), and a subcritical as-
sembly (SUAK), all of which are located at the German nu-
clear research center at Karlsruhe. All of these have 
reached an operable status, but the Community'·s shortage of 
enriched uranium and plutonium has caused the intermittent 
shutdown of two of them while the third is operated with the 
available fuel. Through this association with GfK Euratom 
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is also tied into a United States-German fast reactor prpject 
(SEFOR) under construction in Arkansas.72 
The Euratom associations with the remaining three 
countries account for less than 25% of. the ·funds available·. 
for this type research. The Belgian and Netherlands Govern-
ments have been brought into the Euratom/GfK association and 
deal with peripheral research projects related to fast reac-
tor operations. The Euratom association with the Italian 
Atomic En_ergy Commission (CNEN) calls for work on a fast 
ma terials.-irradiating reactor (PEC-Prova di Elementi di 
Comhustibile). The project itself can be considered a 
modest undertaking in comparison with the French and German 
associations. However, it has been -used by the member nations, 
particularly the big three, as a starting point from which 
natibnal viewpoints concerning the entire Euratom research 
program have been voiced. The resulting acerbity in Council 
debate ·and unwillingness to budge from nationally inspired 
positions has brought Euratom to its, most serious impasse. 
72The SEFOR experimental reactor was scheduled for 
critically by mid-1967 but technical difficulties have de~ 
layed the project. The French, never known for their sup-
port of Euratom, have attempted to use their Community mem-
bership as a lever for gaining active participation in the 
project. The U.S. Atomic Energy Agency, however, has de-
clared the association to be with GfK and only if the Ger-
mans agree can France be allowed in. Thus far, neither 
West Germany nor Eura tom have indicated that they would assist 
the French in gaining entrance. Nucleonics Week, Vol. 8, 
No. 28, 13 July 1967, P· 7. 
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The fast-breeder reactor has the potential for pro-
ducing electricity at a lower cost than any known power 
source. ·The fuel used originally for this type reactor is 
uranium 238, the abundant isotope of uranium, which, although 
relatively nonfissionable itself, can be transmitted in a re-
actor to the fissionable isotope plutonium 239. Therefore, 
by "breeding" plutonium, which can lat.er be us~d as fuel, 
at the same time that the fission process is producing heat, 
the fast-breeder reactor can produce as much or more fuel 
than it consumes. Thus, an essentially unlimited source of 
ene.rgy is provided and fuel costs are reduced to insignifi-
73 
cance. This fact has not been lost to the Community na-
tions, nor to .any of the world's industrial powers. Fast 
reactor research is rapidly increasing its share of national 
.research budgets. The Italian Government was not excepted 
fro~this but, with some of its financial resources going to 
Euratom, it felt that Community financial reciprocity was in 
order. However, an Italian proposal for a fast reactor 
73A detailed description of the process is given in 
R. Sarbacher, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Electronics and Nu-
clear Engineering (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 
p. 1044; also, see "The Next Step is the Breeder Reactor,'' 
Fortune, March 1967, pp. 121-123. The conversion ratio, or 
new fuel (Pu 239) from old (U 238); is estimated as ranging 
from 1.2 to as high as 1.6. However, it is also noted that 
''al thouo-h it comes closer to being a perpetual-motion machine 0 . 
than anything so fa~ invented, the breeder is not quite that. 
Eventually, most of the U 238 would be converted and would 
have to be replaced." 
project- (RAPTUS) was refused in its early stages by Euratorri 
whereupon CNEN offered the PEC reactor project as a compro-
. 74 
mise. 
The Euratom Commission initially had no objection to 
the Italian plan and out of some $9 million allocated from 
the second five-year program for Italiah fast reactor re-
search, CNEN was able to use $2.5 ~illion in starting the 
project-before France, in the Council of Ministers, vetoed 
the further use of Euratom funds for the Italian project. 
The French position was ostensibly linked to the fact that 
the PEC reactor, as a substitute for the RAPTUS project 
which was denied, represented a modification to the second 
·five-year program. Under the Eurato~ Treaty, this called for 
unanimity in the Council. The E~ratom.Commission, already 
·steeped in financial and political troubles and not wishing 
to precipitate the "ultimate" crisis, acquiesced to the 
French position ahd held up the signing of a contract for 
the extension of the Euratom/Italian association. 75 The 
Italians, for their part, promptly reciprocated by blocking 
74Nuc1eonics Week, Vol. 8, No. 29, July 20, 1967, 
p. 7. 
75
rbid.; and Documentation attached to the Tenth 
Annual Report, p. 54. 
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passage of Euratom's research budget for 1967 thereby.forcing 
the Community into a hand-to-mouth existence.76 
The ·underlying reasons for the' contentious behavior 
; 
of the French and Italians stems from their contrasting 
views of what course the Euratom research program should 
follow. As mentioned before, France wan.ts nuclear independence 
for Europe and shows this by plump.ing for reactor research 
unrelated to the use of United States (and, more recently, 
the United Kingdom) enriched uranium supplies. Inherent in 
this ppsition is the economically attractive prospect of 
capturing a larger share of the European industrial market 
for French reactors--unoppos~d by U.S. and U.K. inputs. 
France would also ·1ike to see the Co_mmun"i ty concentrate its 
.limited resources on a few major undertakings which would be 
·beneficial to all. Included here, of course, are the fast 
reactor programs, the ORGEL project, and research into the 
thefmonuclear fusion process. 77 In opposition to the French 
posit~on, the Italians fear that Euratom's concentration on 
the areas mentioned will detract from their own proven 
.. 76The stalemate was finally ended in mid-1967 when 
the Council memb.ers reached a compromise on the allocation 
of funds for the fast reactor programs and passed the 1967 
research budget and a revision to the second five-year re-
search program. Ne~ York Times, July 20, 1967, Cf. ante p. 176. 
77scheinman, 2..2.· cit., pp. 44-46.· 
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reactor program to such an extent that they will be forced 
' to carry on alone. Also, the prospects for an even greater 
imbalance in the allocation of funds would be undeniable 
inasmuch as France and Germany already have the largest pro.-
grams in the fast reactor and fusion.research fields and 
therefore would present the most lucrative opportunities for 
any Euratom contractual work. The .Italians note, with 
evident displeasure, that the $9 million originally appropri-
ated for their fast reactor research compares rather poorly 
with the $40 million given France and the $20 million for 
G~rmany, both of which, the Italians maintain, are ~oing 
~head with national research programs in this field which 
are in complete disregard for Eurato.m's efforts at coordina-
tion.78 Thus, the Euratom Commission stands virtually help-
·1ess while the member states, in pursuit of self-serving 
interests, threaten to emasculate the entire Community 
organization. 
In addition to the ORGEL and fast-breeder reactor 
programs, other major projects include the so-called proven 
type reactor research, high temperature gas-cooled reactors 
(the DRAGON project), and study into thermonuclear reactions. 
Proven-type reactor research has always been closaly tied to 
the U.S4/Euratom joint program and the corresponding enriched 
78 . Nucleonics Week, Vol. 8, No. 29, July 20, 1967, 
p. 7. 
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. uranium, light-water ·reactors. Recent indicatio_ns of a 
slackening in Community interest in this form of research, 
and the reasons for it, have alr~ady been discussed. However, 
the program has accounted for over 200 research contracts 
between Euratom and the United States representing commit-. 
ments involving $56 million. The ten~year joint program is 
s~heduled to expire in 1969. In addition to the light-
water reactor research, Euratom also has a limited number 
of contractual arrangements with the French proven-reactor 
(gas graphite) program.79 
The DRAGON project at Winfrith, England, represents 
the Community's main stake in high-temperature, gas-cool.ed 
80 
reactors (HTGR). Like the ORGEL project, these are con-
sidered to be promising as second-stage, or intermediate, 
producers of nuclear electricity for the 1970's. The DRAGON 
project was conceived by the British in 1959 and has as its 
main sponsor the OECD's European Nuclear Energy Agency. The 
project itself involved the construction of a· pressurized 
helium~cooled reactor using fuel elements consisting of a 
mixture of slightly enriched uranium and thorium. The latter 
can be converted by irradiation into the fissile uranium 233, 
79Tenth General Report, p·. 41; Documentation at-
tached to the Tenth General Report, p. 8. 
8oEuratom's Second Five-Year Rese~rch Program, 
QQ· cit., pp. 6, 7; Tenth Ge.Q.eral Report, p. 38. . 
182 
which can also be used as fuel,. thereby indicating economical 
fuel charges. The DRAGON reactor was operating at full 
power by mid-1966. Under the seqond five-year program, as 
amended in 1965, Euratom was allotted $24.5 million (with ~n 
additional $6 million carried over from.the first five-year 
program) for HTGR research. This has allowed the Community 
. 81 
to bear 22% of the DRAGON program'~ total cost~ The 
D~AGON agreement runs out in 1967, but the Commission has 
indicated a desire to continue the Community's participation 
until 1970 in order to benefit fully from the research in-
volved. However, as the matter stand; at mid-1967, the in-
ability of the member nations to reach a consensus on the worth 
of the program has place~ Euratom's ~ontinued participation 
in doubt. The Council has, however, given the Commission 
the go-ahead to continue its association but inasmuch as 
Euratom will have no more funds to contribute until a 1968 
budget is adopted, the Community has been excluded from 
receiving any further research information. 82 . 
81Euratom has also supplied 35 technicians to the 
·project, or slightly less than 20% of the total work force. 
82Nucleonics Week, Vol. 8, No. 29, July 20, 1967, 
p. 6. The British, for their part, have shown some aggra-
vation over Euratom's indecision and have indicated a desire 
to assume Euratom's share of the budget and to take control 
of the project or have th~ nations of Eurato~ ent~r.the pro-
gram on an individual basis. In any case, tne Britis~ would 
like a Euratom decision no later than June,. 1968. Ibid., 
No. 31, Augu~t 3, 1967, P· &. 
Confrolled thermonuclear fusion studies. represent __ the 
Community's ~nterest in the long-range hope for nuclear power. 
. . 
The rather substantial. sum of $34 million was allocated for 
this and relat~d areas of research indicating that although 
the problems associated with containing the fusion reaction 
for sustained periods (and thereby making heat recovery 
feasible) arB enormous, so too will be the rewards in 
limitless amounts of energy for all facets of human endeavor. 
The Euratom program is based primarily on contractual associa-
tions, one with each of the five member nations engaged in 
nuclear research. As the.Commission points out, "these con-
tracts of association cover a wide range of subjects which, 
unless we remember the nature of the- problems, seem to have 
little or nothing to do with controlled fusion."~3 However, 
it appears that with French and German backing, Euratom will 
continue with its research program in this particularly dif-
ficult area--if, of course, it is to continue at all.· 
83 . 
Documentation attached to the Tenth General Report, 
p. 57. 
.. CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
In March of 1967 the ·European Community celebrated the 
tenth anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaties. ·Over 
that period of time the great expectations held out for the 
Common Market have largely been realized, if not in the po-
litical sense, then sureli in the way toward achieving eco-
nomic unity. In contrast to this, however, the even greater 
hopes for success in peaceful nuclear integration have been 
repeatedly deflated to such an extent that, at present, the 
continued existence of Euratom in its contemporary form, and 
under its present terms of reference, has been gravely 
threatened. 
It is in this sense, therefore, that although the Com~ 
mon Market might be called an unqualified success, its sis- . 
ter Community, Euratom, must be termed a "qualified" failure. 1 
The qualification must be made, however, for Euratom still 
exists and if renewed interest in atomic coordination and 
1Thus prompting the Economist to remark recently 
that ''in Euratom, the dream or a pan-European atomic research 
and building programme is largely dead." The Economist, 
October 21 1967, p. 320. An equally unflattering remark is 
attributed'to Pierre Chatenet who, as President of the Com-
mission saw fit to refer to Euratom as "a disappointing, 
apparently sterile but very promising experiment." Quoted 
in Scheinman, QQ• cit., p. 26. · 
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l 
cooperation can be fostered in the member nations, either 
by reason of more forceful and meaningful leadership from 
the newly created 14 member Community Commission, or through 
economic necessity, or both, then Euratom might yet make a 
. 
significant contribution. 2 
PAST HISTORY 
The optimism that pervaded the Community nations when 
Euratom was conceived and began functioning soon turned to 
indifference when, in the space of one year, the industrial 
outlook for nuclear power lost its appeal. The termination 
of the Suez crisis, the lower costs for fuel oi~ and the 
European coal glut all were factors which undermined the 
. . 
Euratom Commission's case for an immediate start toward 
nuclear industrialization. 
Euratom's first problems, therefore, were properly 
considered primarily economic in character, and the'Euratom 
Commission, in its efforts to restore confidence and gain 
sufficient backing from government and industry alike, was 
forced to resort to measures which emphasized and, in some 
2 The merger of the Community's three executives, the 
Common Market and Euratom Commissions and the ECSC High 
Authority~ took place on July 1, 1967. A single Council also 
presides for the three Communities which, nevertheless, 
function as separate entities, in accordance with their re-
spective Treaties. The merger of the Communities themselves is 
called for as the next major' step toward unification. European 
Community Bulletin, No. 104, July-August 1967, p. 3. 
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aspects, exaggerated its supranationality. The most sig-
I 
nificant example of this was found in the Commission's initial 
attempt to subsidize a commercial reactor program with funds 
from the first-five-year research program. ·Etienne Hirsch, 
the Commission's second President and an ardent "European," 
was able to convince all but his own Fr~nch Government ~f 
the need for- such Community parti~ipation to prop up the 
lagging U.S./Euratom joint program. President de Gaulle's 
Government was vigorously opposed. The French, of course, 
had sufficient reason to resent United States competition 
in the commercial reactor program.3 Therefore, allocation 
of Euratom research funds to insure the success of the pro-
gram brought a French attempt to veto the move on the grounds 
3This, of course, was the practical economic issue 
which brought the U.S. enriched uranium, light-~ater reactori 
into competition with the French gas-graphite reactors fueled 
with natural uranium. More important, perhaps, was the · 
political issue involved. The French ~emanded European 
nuclear independence. Any support for the U.S./Euratom 
program meant increased reliance on Uni te_d States techno-
logical assistance and, more significant because Europe 
lacked fuel enrichment facilities, complete dependence on 
the supply of enriched uranium from the U.S. Scheinman, . 
QQ. cit., p. 44. See also H .1·. Nie burg, "Eura tom, A Study in 
Coalition Politics," World Politics, Vol. XV, No. 4, July 
1963, p. 597, who makes the rather surprising claim that 
E•.iratom' s original purpose was to create "an independent 
capability both for electric power and for the production of 
weapons material." However, becau.se of United States inter-
penetration and subsequent redirection and control of Eura-
tom through the U.S~/Euratom program, a ~uropean nuclear 
weapons program was thwarted ~y "depriving Frar:ice of any 
other continental nuclear aspirant of the combined resources 
of Western Europe for producing weapons material." 
that such a "misuse" of funds necessitated a unanimous Coun.:... 
.. · 
cil vote. President Hirsch, however, had convinced the other 
members that such was not the case, and that the $32 milli6n 
suggested for Euratom participation, while originally in-
tended for the research program, was obviously going to be 
in excess of the amount needed for research at that time, 
and was therefore readily available for other uses. Thus, 
the French Government was outvoted and the Euratom Commission 
had its participation program--and while the economic pro_blems 
associated with Euratom were mitigated to some extent, the 
political difficulties that resulted from the action easily 
negated any beneficial effect. 
Following this rebuff, the French Government failed to 
renominate Hirsch as Euratom President. and in his place 
. 4 H offered Pierre Chatenet. Consequently, the irsch episode 
marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Euratom Com-
munity, not only in the way it would henceforth be governed· 
·but also in the nature of the problems that w6uld beset it; 
Briefly stated, supranationalism now gave way to intergov-
ernmentalism and; with nuclear power becoming financially 
competitive in the mid-1960's, economic problem~ gradually 
4Nieburg, QQ• cit., p. 619;· and Polach, QQ· cit., 
p. 195; see also Scheinman, Q.!2• cit., PP:. 4?-42, _who notes 
that judging by the docility of the Commission since that 
time the lesson intended for overzealous ''Europeans" by 
de G~ulle's rejection of Hirsch was not lost. 
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subsiqed only to. be replaced by the more divisive tendencies 
inherent in political turmoil. 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
In·1965 the Euratom Commission drew up a target pro-
gram which outlined, in part, estimates of the Community's 
nuclear electricity generating capacity attain~ble by 1980.5 
Now, in 1967, upward revisions of these estimates have been 
made to reflect the growing interest of the member nations in 
nuclear power. These reports give a clear indication that 
nuclear generation of electrical power on the Western European 
mainland, while still largely experimental in comparison to 
the nuclear industries of both the United States and Great 
Britain, has finally turned the corner and sh~uld now show 
rapid development. However, the Euratom Commission's esti-
mates also underscore the Euratom dilemma; while nuclear energy 
appe~rs finally to have attained the recognition that its 
early advocates demanded for it, the'Euratom dream of chan-
nelling national efforts towa~d a common goal has been frus-
trated in the face of particularistic policies and the re-
establishment of national nuclear programs alien to the 
5This is in implementation of article 40.of the . 
Eura tom Treaty. whi er~ requires the Commission to "periodically. 
publish programmes indicatin~, in part;cular, the production 
targets for nuclear e~ergy a~d the ~arious types of invest-
ment required for their attainment. 
6 Community concept. In short, nuclear powe_r in Europe has 
come of age as a revolutionary new source of electrical ·· 
energy--but Euratom is neither sharing in, mr shaping, the 
revolution. 
The Commission's 1965 estimates pointed to a 40,000 
MWe nuclear capacity for the Community nations by 1980 which 
essentially matched the estimates published in the Third Gen-
eral Report in 1960.7 However, -after receiving r~vised. · 
estimates of nuclear programs by the national governments, 
the Commission's Tenth General Report published in the spring 
of .1967 now considered 60,000 MWe nuclear capacity "as the 
minimum objective for the Community in 1980. 118 A table de-
picting the various national inputs to this total is as 
follows (in MWe): 
. Year Belgium w. Germ . France Italy Neth. Community_ 
··1980 ~000 2~000 17,000 14000 · :;ooo 6~000 
Source: Tenth General Report 
6 . 
As an example of this, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium recently announced plans to engage jointly in a 
fast-breeder reactor project outside the auspices of Euratom. 
New York Times, October 12A 1967; for details of the project 
see Nucleonics Week, Vol. ~, No. 32, October 10, 1967, p. 7, 
which calls the action "a sharp psychological blow to 
·Eura tom.'' 
7Ninth General Report, p. 68; Cf. ante p. i45.· 
8 t 21.· renth Gens~al Repor , P• 
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However, perhaps even more significant than the overall 
growth of nuclear capacity in the Community is the individual 
national estimates that go into the total, particularly those 
of the three major powers. France, long the Community's 
leader in nuclear technology and industrial development, and 
presently still out front by a comfortable margin, neverthe-
less well may forfeit this position (at least in terms of 
the ·,peaceful development of nuclear power) ·to Germany over 
the next decade or so. Part of the reason for this·can be 
attributed to the great amount of effort the French spend 
on their so-called force de frappe which, of course, must be 
subtracted from industrial research and development programs. 
Howev_er, equally important is the fact that in France fric-
tion between the electricity industry and the national atomic 
authorities appears to be endemic and prevents the smooth 
development of the nuclear industry. 9 
The Federal Republic, on the other hand, has thus 
far adhered to the treaty restrictions that prohibit it from 
nurilear weapons development and, th~refore, is not saddled 
with that expense; nor is government-industry.friction a 
problem in a counfry where an Atomic Energy Commission is 
considered unnecessary and where private ind us try d.omina tes 
9For a brief discussion of this p9int see the 
Economjst, October 21, 1967, p. 320. 
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nuclear programming and deyelopment. The only pressing prob-
~em that Germany does have with respect to nuclear develop-
ment, and one which up_ to now has acted to retard this de-
velopment, is socio-economic in nature and relates to a 
staggering German coal surplus, now estimated at ~O million 
tons. Simply stated, government effort~ to trim coal pro-
duction ·would effect the 6o-8opoo miners in the Ruhr region 
undoubtedly resulting in some political unrest. However, even 
here recent signs show that general public and industrial 
pressure for less coal and more efficient fuels has moved the 
German Government to approve several new nuclear power 
. . 10 proJects. Thu~, estimates pf rapid nuclear growth for 
Germany now appear valid. 
Italy, as the least equal among equals, lacks the in-· 
digenous fuel supplies and industrial and technological base~ 
that sets Germany and France apart from the rest of con-
tinental Europe. However, the Italiaris realize that nuclear 
power promises independence from conventional fuel sources 
and, therefore, they can be expected to devote a proportion-
ately greater amou_nt of effort to industrial nuclear develop-
ment. Unfortunately, with France and. Italy at odds in 
Euratom, the Italians have had to look more and more to 
their own national efforts with possible assistance coming 
lOThe Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1967. 
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from ?µtside Euratom, primarily from Britain and the United 
States. 
~hus, with the three major powers, and Belgium and the 
Netterl?nds, pressing forward with their national programs; 
the e~pectation that nuclear power in. the Community has 
re;;i.ghed ttie stage where rapid development will follow ap-
pears well-founded; and it is also· probable that West 
Germ?ny will sometime within the next decade reach at least 
a point of parity with.France as the technological and in-
dU§trial nU9lear leader in continental Europe, while Italy 
remqins Qehind the two, But, for the present, France con-
tinµe~ ?~ the Community pacesetter and, therefore, the dominant 
voice in Community councils.· The m6st recent status of each 
nation'$ nuclear program attests to this and can be shown 
~~ f9ll9Wg {in MWe): 
Reactors ~elg WGerm France Italy Neth Community 
Corriml~ .... · ---




;it:n1ction 618 1535 ~ 2203 143 935 25'71+ 607 4307 
Planned 1200 1520 ~ 600 4020 Total 1343 2I+5? 3 7 1207 50 8329 
Source~ Tenth General Report11 
1111 :p1anned" reactors include those at the design 
study stage or projects with good chances of realization. 
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However, it still remains that even with substantial 
nuclear progress at hand, the Euratom concept of a coor-
dinated Community effort toward common goals has been stymied. 
In fact, since the Hirsch episode, Euratom has remained in 
an almost continuing state of crisis. The difficulties 
among the member nations, while politically inspired, have 
found their expression in budget c"rises. Unable to agree 
' 
on which course the Euratom Commission should take in de-
veloping nuclear industry, and where stress should be laid 
in the research program, all of the members have attempted, 
at one time or another, to impose their disparate views on 
the Commission. Consequently, with the thought of compromise 
and the desire to preserve ~he Community concept lacking, it 
is no wonder that the Commission has been hamstrung; and with 
each nation showing its displeasure by holding up budgetary 
decisions and allocations in the Council, it is also no won-
12 der that Euratom shows signs of fading out completely. 
It should also be mentioned that for its part the 
Commission, in recent years, has hardly lived up to the role 
12Adding to the Commission's miseries is the grow-
ing demand by the member states, in flagrant contradiction 
to the Community spirit, for adherence to the principle of 
le juste retour, meaning simply that each country should get 
out of the Community the equivalent of what it puts in. 
Italy's recent refusal to pass the 1967 budget, while cer-
tainly not the only clear example, gives a good indication 
of just how destructive thi~ attitude can be. Economist, 
December 9, 1967, p. 1069; Cf. ante p. 17"8. 
-· 
envisioned for it in the Euratom Treaty. Unlike his predeces-
_sors Armand and Hirsch, President Chatenet apparently lacks 
the zeal and enthusiasm that marks those who would have 
Europe unite. -The presidency of Euratom, by tradition, goes 
to France, and President de Gaulle, if he-erred in replacing 
Armand with Hirsch, found in Chatenet a man imbued with th·e 
same nationalistic spirit that is ~e Gaulle's, or one who 
simply feels as others do that the French President, if 
pushed too far, would not hesitate in aQandoning Euratom 
completely. In any case, up to mid-1967 when the Community 
executives merged,-the Commission under Chatenet had studi-
ously avoided the political wars by passing all on to the 
C . 13 t . ouncil. Thus, wha ever supranatipnal leverage the Com-
mission had been able to muster in the past, either by Treaty-
. . 
right or by its own efforts, is now gone; and whether or not ·the 
newly organized 14-member Commission will regain for Euratom 
some of this independence remains for the future. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
There are, of course, numerous factors which could 
effect the future role of Euratom, if indeed it is to have 
l3The most recent example of this is the Commission's 
hesitancy in making.a decision for cir against the Italian 
PEC reactor project, thereby turning thi~ French-Italian 
dispute over to the Council. 
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a future. The recent merger of the Community executives., 
·bringing with it a new leadership for Euratom, might well 
breathe life into what is now a dormant'situation. 14 Also, 
the second logical step in this process, th~ merger of the· 
I 
three Communities themselves under a single treaty, now 
appears attainable and, with the tying of Euratom to the 
Common Market, the former's chances for survival in one form 
or another might improve considerably. 1 5 Other factors of 
a more peripheral nature include the possible entry of Britain 
into the Community and Euratom's position vis-a-vis the re-
mainder of the nuclear world with regard to a nuclear non-
proliferation treaty. 
However, the single most important factor, as it has 
been all along, is the attitude of the member states toward 
14 Only one former Euratom Commissioner, E.M.J.A. 
Sassen from the Netherlands, was placed on the new Commis-
sion. However, Mr. Sassen is considered a dynamic and imagina-
tive representative and was instrumental in gaining a com-
promise in the Council between the Italians and French in 
the PEC reactor dispute thus clearing the way for adoption of 
the 1967 Euratom budget. The other member of the 14-man Com-
mission that will have a special responsibility for nuclear 
·matters, and therefore Euratom, is Fritz Hellwig, a German 
and former member of the ECSC High Authority, and now one of 
four Commission Vice-Presidents. European Communify Bul-
letin,,., No. 104, July-August,:::1967, pp. 6, 7; Nucleonics Wee~, 
Vol. ~, No. 29, July 20, 19o7, p.· 6. . 
l5Estimates are that-discussions concerning the 
drafting of a single treaty for the merger of the three Com- . 
munities could begin as early as mid-1968 with the actual .r 
merger taking place four to ~ive years hence. European Com-
munity Bulletin, No. 101, March 1967, p. 6; Nucleonics Week, 
J~. cit. 
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Euratom. Only if the members continue to ·agree that Euratom 
·Serves a worthwhile purpose will this Atomic Community con-
tinue to exist; and the manner of its existence will remain 
closely tied to decisions taken in its behalf by interg6ve~n-
mental cooperation rather than through any supranational effort 
on its own part. This. will remain the case'"unless, and until, 
the member nations feel moved to restore to the Community 
institutions the powers for independent action that were in-
ferred by the Treaty but never wholly relinquished by the 
members. 
In the sense that the welfare of Euratom depends upon 
the demeanor of its members, particularly upon the larger 
nations, a brief summary of their present positions sheds 
light on what can be expected for the Community in the im-
mediate future. In the first place, it does not appear to be' 
in the best interests of the Benelux. nations to abandon Eura-
tom. Politically, the Benelux countries inspired the nego-
tiations that led to Euratom and they have supported the 
Community concept all along, wavering only when their inter-
ests as a bloc were threatened by a big-power coalition 
against them. Economically., Euratom suppo_rt keeps Belgium 
and the Netherlands in the nuclear business--without it, their 
ld ff . bl 16 programs wou su er immeasura y. Secondly, Italy also 
16For example, the Belgians would be hard-pressed to 
continue operating the materials testihg reactor at Mol if 
Euratom were to remove its financial support. Science News, 
Vol. 91, No. 8, February 25, 1967, p. 184. 
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has its own political and economic interests closely attune·d 
to a viable nuclear Community, with the economic prospects o~ 
cheap nuclear power undoubt.edly being· the primary motivat.ion. 
This, therefore, leaves consideration of the attitude and 
actions of the French and West Germans ·as the key factors 
related to Euratom's continued existenc~. tlowever, in 
opposition to the commonly accepted thesis that France is 
Euratom's principal detractor, it may well be that Germany 
will usurp this role in th~ not-too-distant future. There are 
indications at present that point in.this direction. 17 
The French position toward Euratom evolves from the 
Ifrench President '.s concept of relations among states being 
conducted solely along traditional l_ines of intergovernmental 
cooperation. President de Gaulle has acknowledged the dis-
tinctiveness of the Community institutions which "are more 
or less extranationa1.n However, he has steadfastly maintained 
that although some technical value can be attributed to these 
organs, they nonetheless "do not have, they carinot have 
authority and, consequently, political effectiveness. 1118 
17Germany, like France, has apparently made the de-
cision to go ahead with a national fast-breederreactor pro-
gram to the exclusion of Euratom. The recently announced 
German-Belgian-Dutch fast reactor project, without Euratom, 
is based on previous cooperation among the three~ with Eur-
atom, at the German. Karlsruhe Laboratories. New York Times, 
October 12, 1967; Economist, October 21,·1967, p. 320. 
18President de Gaull~'s Third. Press Conference, Sep-
tember 5, 1960, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 152 (New 
York: Ambassade de France, September 1960), p. 8. 
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Thus, over the years, and particularly after he had rid 
France of the Algerian problem, d~ Gaulle has constantly 
opposed any independent action on the part of Euratom's 
institutions and has perpetrated by far the greatest numbe~ 
of crises the .Community has been forced to endure. Yet, the 
French President has also shown a pragmatic side in his deal-
ings with Euratom, particularly when the national interests 
of France were involved. Thus, the French were outvoted in 
their attempt to block the Euratom participation in the indus-
trial reactor construction program--and promptly opted to 
take part in the program by joining with Belgium in the SENA 
project at Chooz, France; 19 again, France has repeatedly 
chastized the Community for allowing. United States penetra-
tion into the European nuclear market--yet, the SENA reactor 
is a pressurized light-water r~actor of American design and · 
the French have actively sought participation through Euratom 
in the American fast reactor project SEFO~. The French 
have also found no conflict in the use of the plutonium and 
enriched uranium that the U.S. provides Euratom for use by 
.its members. The supply of these fuels has been vital to 
the French fast reactor program and has permitted them to 
use what little enriched uranium they produce domestically 
l9Cf. ante p. 1.54. 
answered this rebuff a few 
nominate Etienne Hirsch as 
Of course, the French President 
years later by refusing to re-
commission President. 
199 
for military purpos~s. 2° Finally, and perhaps most important, 
it is'extremely unlikely that de Gaulle, or those that re-
place him, will ever lose sight of the fact that the German 
potential for the production of nuclear weapons, which has 
existed to a varying degree for some time, will continue to 
expand at an ever quickening pace commensurate with the rapid 
growth Of th G 1 . d t 21 th e erman nuc ear in us. ry. · In is respect, 
therefore, the Euratom system of inspections and controls 
to prevent materials from being used for nonpeaceful pur-
poses, perhaps the Community's most singularly noteworthy 
achievement, and most surely an infringement of nationalistic 
sensibilities, would appear nonetheless to retain a con-
siderable appeal for France. Natura~ly, the demise of Eura-
tom could mean the abolition of these procedures and, there-
fore, because the French military nuclear program is not 
subject to inspection while Germany's entire nuclear industry 
20 The French operate the only gaseous diffusion 
plant (for enriched uranium) in the Community, but they have 
reserved its output for military use thereby e~cluding 
Euratom. The plant is located in southeastern France at 
Pierrelatte. New York Times, December 8, 1967. 
21Although weapons material can be taken from almost 
all types of nuclear reactors to a greater or lesser degree, 
the advent of the breeder reactor, producing plutonium in 
large quantities, will make it t~at much ~asier.to.produce 
a nuclear weanon. For a discussion of this subJect see 
L. Beaton, "Nuclea·r-For-All," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 4, 
July 1967, pp. 662-669. 
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theoretically is, t~e interests of France would appear to 
. 
be served best by Euratom's continued existence. 
The German position contrasts with that of France 
more by degree than in. substance.· The French have actively 
opposed Euratom thereby rendering its institutions ineffec~ 
tual. The Germans have treated the whole affair, both 
Euratom's ineptitude and the French opposition, with a 
minimal amount of concern, if not studious indifference. 
It must be remembered that although Germany had originally 
supported both the ECSC and Common Market ideas, it had 
22 
shown serious .doubts concerning the plan for Euratom. The 
German Government did finally accede to the plan when its 
leader, Chancellor Adenauer, insisted; but the action was 
taken more because Euratom was a part of the overall European. 
movement to which Adenauer was firmly committed, rather than 
because of its own functional promise. 23 .Howev~r, the power~ 
ful German industrial interests saw no need then for what 
they feared would be a dirigiste policy imposed by a supra-
national Euratom; arid today that feeling is apparently as 
strong as ever. The German Government, therefore, in accord 
with this feeling and well aware that nuclear research and 
22. Cf. ante pp. 5~, 53. 
23The suggestion i~ ~l~o.made that Euratom was looked 
upon as a vehicle fbr leg1t1m1z1ng G~rmany's reentry into 
the sensitive nuclear field. Scheinman, QQ• cit.~ p. 33. 
201 
industr~ are now firmly established in Germany, may come t6 
see little benefit in continuing Euratom. 
Thus, while French opposition to Euratom has been 
much more blatant than that of Germany, it may well be that 
German indifference will eventually pose the greatest threat 
to Euratom's continued existence. Also, as the German nuclear 
industry develops over the next fey.r years and approaches the 
point where it threatens the long-standing domination of 
the French, the French may decide that a Euratom program which 
serves to coordinate national programs is much less of a 
problem and certainly less expensive than the inter•nation 
competition that would be fostered by the development of 
nuclear programs on a purely nationa_l basis. In this re-
spect, the problems associated with the development of the 
fast-breeder reactor are proving formidable and may ultimately 
demand a greater effort and expense than any nation of the 
Six, including France and Germany, would eventually be will-
ing to .expend. 24 On the other hand, an orgatiization like 
24The United States experiment, the 6).MV-Ie Enrico 
Fermi reactor took seven years to build at a cost of $106 
million, 70% ~ver the original budget. Two months after it 
began operating in 1966, the reactor was shu~ down becaus? of 
technical problems and it has not operated since. The United 
Kingdom AEA has had ·similar problems and has also had to shut 
down its Dounreay fast reactor in Scotland. Both reactors 
use liquid sodium as a coolant which is an excellent heat 
d t r but difficult to control, potentially lethal and ~~~r~~e~y corrosive when contaminated wi ch ox~gen. _Be cause 
of these problems, therefore, the German-Belgian-Dutch 
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Euratom, where the efforts of all could be focused on fast 
reactor development, as well as other difficult areas, is 
ideally suited for the attainment of such goals with the 
minimum of cost, effort and time. 
As mentioned previously, there are other factors which 
might cpme·t? play an important role in Euratom's future. 
The much heralded and long awaited.nucle~r ponproliferation 
tr~aty has had the rather ironic effect of bringing the Eura-
tom nations together, if only briefly, in an outward show of 
unity in defense of the principles of Euratom. The Commission 
has served warning that only a treaty which is compatible 
with the security provisions of the Euratom Treaty can be 
signed by the member nations. This has at least given the 
superficial impression to the rest of the world that the 
member states are generally agreed in wishing to preserve 
their Atomic Community. 25 
project, programmed for completion in 7 years at a cost of 
$100 million ms caused British observers to consider its 
chances of s&ccess remote. unless British technology helps. 
New York Times November i2, 1967; Economist, October 21, 1967~ 320; Fortune, QQ• cit., p. 123. 
25European Community Bulletin, No. 104, July-August 
1967, p. 21. It should be noted, ~owever, th~t d~v~rgences 
exist within the Community concerning the desirability of 
such a treaty and particularly its provisions for inspec-
tion by the IAEA. West Germany has taken the strongest. 
stand in opposition, ostensibly because 9f the fe~r of in-
d t · 1 e~pi·ona~e This has placed the Germans in the us ria ~ "" · . h · ld o 
th k ·'ard po~ition of ~sing Euratom as a s ie • n ra er aw 1.v ~ • ff· · 11 · · 1 f the other hand, the French, while o 1cia y remaining a oo 
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Another factor concerns the British bid for entry 
into the ·.common Market which, if accepted, would undoubtedly 
be followed by membership in Euratom and the ECSC. In this 
case, the British would have considerably more to offer 
Euratom than either of the others. 26 Britain was an early 
entrant in· the commercial reactor field and at present, in 
1967,. produc·es nearly half the world's total output of 
nuclear generated electricity; and it is ·evident that the 
state of Britain's technology is equally advanced. Of 
course, the British lead in the generation of nuclear power 
is destined to be short-lived owing to the surge of interest 
in nuclear power ·in the United States. However, in the 
sense that Europe fears industrial domination by the United 
' States, brought about by the ever-widening technological gap, 
the best and perhaps only reasonable means of equalizing the 
effects of the American advance, particularly in the nuclear 
field, is to bring Britain· into the Community. 
from the entire proceedings, have let it be known that they 
would respect such a treaty and would be happy to see the 
Germans sign it. Economist, November 4, 1967, p. 488; see 
also J.E. Dougherty, "The Treaty and the Nonnuc).ear States," 
Orbis, Summer 1967, No. 2, PP· 375, 376. 
26Thus, the European Commission has been prone ~o 
consider British technology more in terms of the qua~ti­
tative effect it might have.whe~ added to the Community 
ff rt rather than its qual1tat1ve effect. Howeve~, ~ri~ish technological superi?rity in the nuclear field 
is unquestioned. ~ ~ T.imes,. October 5, 1967. 
.. 
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Even· with Britain in, however, there is no guarantee 
' 
that Europe can close the gap, particularly if Britain's 
entry fails to bring with it new efforts in coordinating 
the increasingly divergent national programs. One look at. 
the present status and pr~spects for·nuclear industry in the 
U.S. and Europe makes this clear. 27 The United States doesn't 
need nuclear electricity as much as Euro~e, but prices now 
make it competitive and technology has made it possible to 
put first-generation plants into operation while working 
with the second and third-generation prototypes. Continental 
Europe, on the other hand, has by comparison engaged in 
nothing more than an experimental program with first-genera-
tion reactors and has increasingly committed itself, 
materially and financially, to the third-generation breeder 
reactor. Failure in this category would be extremely damag- · 
ing, therefore, to both the economic and political prest~ge 
of Europe and underscores the argument that Europe should get 
together, that the six nations and Britain can do more 
27orders for 21 reactors were made in the ti.S. in 
1966; in the first half of 1967, 23 reactors have b~en or-
dered and the pace is expected to accelerate. By mid-1967 
the U.S. will have 2300MWe in operation, 11600 MWe under 
construction and 27400 MWe planned for a total of 41400 
MWe. The AEC expects the U.S. ~apacity in 198? to reac~ 
170000 MWe. Britain has an estimated 5000MWe in op~ra~10~ 
"th an additional 8000 MWe scheduled for comm1ss1on1ng 
now, Wl •t r· N y ~k b 1975. Cf. ante p. 192 for Commun1 Y igures. ew --2.=_ T~ July 23 1067· Tenth· General Report, pp. 19, 20. imes, , / ' , 
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together than apart, and_ that Eura tom is the ideal vehicle 
for i~. 28 
Finally, Euratom's future must be considered in the 
~ontext of a single Community structure brought about by a 
merger of the three existing Communities. The spate of 
optimism that brought about the creation of Euratom was 
linked, in part, to the knowledge that.its institutions 
would be working in a sector of the economy where vested 
interests were unknown and freedom of action seemed assured. 
In contrast to this, the task of making a success of the 
multisectored Common Market, wherein vested interests were 
rooted in decades of practice, seemed an almost impossible 
task. Yet, in retrospect, it has be~orne evident that in 
both cases the prognostications were wrong.· In the vertically 
structured Euratom, when political discord did finally erupt, 
the Commission was restricted to seeking compromise solutions 
only in the nuclear sector. Unfortunately, the restriction 
28
rt· must be added, however, that the intransigence 
of President de Gaulle makes British entry unlikely, at 
least during the French President'.s tenure. Recent indica-
tions are that Britain's late~t bid to enter the Community, 
made in the spring of 1967, will once again b; vetoed by the 
F h The reasons cited by the French President are eco-re~c : tu~e but it must be concluded that his opposi-
n?m1c. in na r· ly based on political rather than economic 
ti on is moNre. y1rmk Ti· mes July 5 1967; Manches tc!' Guardian' 
grounds. ew or ' ' . · · ~ 
967 ~··for a comprehensive discuss1or. OL May 11, 1 '.P· ' his c::ubject sec E. R. Goodman. "The 
de Gaulle's vh1DewsG0~1ie' s Looking Glass." Ore is. Spring World Throug e a · 
1967, No. 1, PP· 92-95. 
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was too mu.ch, the Commission ran out of bargaining room, and 
stalemate resulted. On the other hand, in the horizontai1y 
organized Common Market, trade-off between sectors has be-
come the nor~ and t~e result, although at times, painstakingly 
arrived at, has been an eminently successful Community opera-
tion. Thus, a merger of Euratom with the Common Market 
would allow the newly organized Community Commission to 
appr~ach Euratom's problems with the same degree of flexi-
bility that pertains now to the Common Market alone. The 
addition of the ECSC would enhance the prospects for com-
promise even further. 
SUMMATION AND EPILOGUE 
Amidst the excitement that belongs to any great 
innovation in international affairs, Euratom was launched a 
decade ago as one part of a two-pronged effort to revitalize 
a waning European Community spirit. The lessons that were 
learned from ~xperiences of the Coal and Steel Community were 
carefully applied to the Euratom Treaty. The political 
abrasiveness of a supranational High Authority was toned 
down in the institutions of Euratom by making the Commission 
more responsive to the Council and, therefore, to national 
desires. The entire concept of the Atomic Energy Community 
was geared to cooperation in the economic field with the 
hope that political coordina.tion would follow some time :in 
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the unspecified future. Consequently, when nuclear power 
was found to ·be economically unattractive in the face of 
deflated conventional fuel costs, the reason for Euratom's 
existence immediately became suspect and the impetus that 
spurred its creation was lost. Since that time, nuclear 
power:h~s come into its own, however belatealy, but Euratom 
has been unable to regain its lost-momentum. 
Thus, as the Atomic Community moves into its second 
decade of what has lately become a sterile existence, it has 
little to show for its past efforts in the field of nuclear 
integration. True, there have been certain accomplishments, 
a few of which might never have been achieved by the tradi-
tional means of cooperation. Euratom's control and inspection 
system, compulsory for the members, is perhaps the best of 
these. However, Euratom's research programs, the documenta-
tion of nuclear data, its dissemination of information, and 
other actions, while certainly to be included as worthwhile 
achievements, were hardly much more ~han what could have been 
accomplished through, and what have been accomplished by, 
international organizations structured along traditional 
lines· and in fact, this is the status of Euratom today, 
' ' -
an international organization devoid of federative charac-
teristics, a status forced upon it most prominently by 
the French but tn which most of the othe~s have contributed 
at one time or another. 
' 
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Euratom faces the future with little chance for suc-
_cess. The outgoing Euratom Commission, as its last gesture, 
proposed a budget of a~proximately $90 million for 1968. 
This has since ·be~n reduced to $82 million by the new Com-
munity Commission reflecting both the lack of enthusiasm on 
the part of the member states and the cutbacks planned for 
. Eura·tom' s future operations. 29 Th~ Commission _has proposed 
to the Council that Euratom continue to ope~ate the estab-
lishments of Joint Nuclear Research Center, and that re-
search work on proven reactor types and on nuclear ship 
propulsion be continued. However, present plans call for 
the remainder of the Euratom research effort, carried on 
through assoeiation agreements with ~he member governments 
and by direct contracts with Community enterprises, to be 
suspended indefinitely. 30 Thus, Eura tom's coordinating role 
29
rt is unlikely that the Council will accept even 
this reduced amount. The French and the Italians are pressing 
for further cuts. The French civil nuclear budget for 1968 
shows an allocation of $22 million for Euratom (down from $32 
million in 1967) which would suggest that the French, who pay 
30% of the total, would like to see Euratom's budget go no 
higher than approximately $70 million. The Italians, lately 
the staunchest advocates of le ,iuste retour, claim that since 
they have in the past failed to receive enough from Euratom to 
equal their 23% contributior.~ they too would prefer a greatly 
reduced budget. Ecor.omist, ~ecember 9, 1967, p. 1069; Nucleon3cs 
Week, Vol. 8, No. 41, October 12, 1967, p. 7. 
30Referring to the Commission's budgetary and.operating 
pr~blems for 1968 as "Euratom'~ Eurag?ny" th~ Economist ex~~ai~s 
the Commission moves as a holding action des1g11su L.u r;ive 71..se1f 
and the member states, amidst the confusion of the recent in-
stitutional merger, time to sort out Euratom's problems and re-
define its goals. Economist, December 9, 1967, p. 1069. 
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in fast reactor research would be lost, perhaps irretrievably. 
Understandably, in this period of uncertainty, the discussion 
of a third five-year research program, which normally would 
have commenced.in 1968, is also impossible. 
It is in this gloomy atmosphere, therefore, that 
Euratom faces its uncertain future. Perhaps as a part of 
a.reconstructed Community, based upon a merger of the three, 
Euratom will be able to retain a portion of its structural 
identity. Reference to this has already been made by the 
newly installed Community Commission President, Jean Rey, 
who suggests that Euratom might well be brought into a new 
Science and Technology Directorate.
31 Whatever the case, it 
appears fairly certain that for the immediate future the con-
?ept of nuclear cooperation among member states, fostered by a 
reasonably independent commission or authority, is dead. This 
is not_ to say, h™ever, that_ the dream of European unity has 
expired with it; Making this point clear, and reflecting the 
"Euro.pean' s 11 boundless confidence and dis position to forget 
- past reversals, the former President of Eura tom, Etienne 
H.irsch, on the occasion of the Community's tenth anniversary 
31 . . ,. Nucleonics Week. Vol. 8, No. 29, July 20, 1967, P· o. 
The 'European Parliament has also consid~red the question "as 
to how far the implementation of Community research pro-
grammes should be left to Eurat?m 6r entr~st~d t~ a special 
body deriving from th.e future s.1ngle Comm1ss1on. Tenth 
General Report, p. 92. 
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remarked. that "al though the obstacles on the way towards . 
political_ unity still appear formidable," nevertheless the 
European Community remains as "the firm foundation on which 
to erect the United States of Europe. • 1132 Thus, with· 
or without Euratom, the quest for European unity will con-
tinue--although surely the revitalization of the European 
Atomic Energy Community would quicken the pace·. 
~~~~~~~---' 
32 ·. E an Comimunity Bulletin, No. 101, Quoted in urope ' 
March 1967, P· 7. 
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VOT~ DISTRIBUTION AND FINANCIAL QUOTAS 
Commis- Parlia- Financial Nation sion Council ment Ouotas/2f 
Belgium 
b/ cf d/ el r7 
1 1 2 9 14 7.9 9.9 
France 1 1 4 30 36 28.0 30.0 
Italy 1 1 4 23 36 28.0 23.0 
Luxembourg a/ 1 1 1 6 0.2 0.2 
Netnerlands 1 1 .2 7 14 7.9 6.9 
West Germany 1 1 4 lQ l~ 28.0 30.0 Total .-, 0 17 100 100.0/100.0 
Majority 3. 4 12 §_z 2.£ 
-
Notes: 
a/ Luxembourg assigns an accredited representative. 
b/ Simple .majority vote. 
c/ Weighted vote when conclusions of the Council re-
quire a qualified majority. 
d/ Weighted vote for adoption of the Research and 
Investment Budget. 
e/ Annual Operational Budget quota. 
f / Annual and Five-Year Research and Inve~tment Budget 
quota. 
Source: Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratoo) a~d 
co~nected documents. 
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